FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JANUARY, 1926

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

WILHELM MARX, former Chancellor of the German Republic * * * *EDUARD BENES*, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, one of the principal authors of the Geneva Protocol * * * *WALTER LIPPMANN*, Editor of the New York *World* * * * *SIR FREDERICK WHYTE*, President of the Legislative Assembly of India, 1920–25; formerly Associate Editor of *The New Europe* * * * *GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM*, former Attorney General of the United States, member of the Commission on the Progressive Codification of International Law * * * *H*, Anonymous * * * *R. R. KUCZYNSKI*, an eminent German economist, author of a number of financial works * * * *GEORGES THEUNIS*, former Premier of Belgium, head of the Belgian Debt Mission to the United States in August, 1925 * * * *EDWARD P. WARNER*, Professor of Aeronautics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, former Technical Assistant in Europe for the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics * * * *GAETANO SALVEMINI*, author of many works, former Professor of History in the University of Florence * * * *F. SCHNEIDER, JR.*, Financial Editor of the New York *Sun*, formerly Financial Editor of the New York *Evening Post* * * * *ERNEST BOYD*, author of several volumes of literary criticism.

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The Editors.

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THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR

By Wilhelm Marx

WHEN, on the eve of the Conference of Locarno, the German Government notified the Governments of Great Britain, France and Belgium to the effect that we were entering upon negotiations with the clear conscience that Germany was not that "felon who had wronged humanity" which the Treaty of Versailles had branded her, it was generally assumed that this declaration was the work of our Nationalist Die-hards. As a matter of fact, ever since Germany was forced to subscribe to the dictates of Versailles, the entire German people have not ceased to protest against the imputation that Germany and her allies bore the exclusive responsibility for the world catastrophe of 1914. Ministers of every party have joined in the protest — Bauer, the Social Democrat; Rathenau, the Democrat; Dr. Wirth, of the Centre Party; Stresemann, the leader of the German People's Party; and men like Baron von Rosenberg, Cuno and Luther — all have unanimously stressed Germany's disclaimer of the terrible reproach of having disturbed the peace of the world. And in response to the wishes of the whole people, I myself, when German Chancellor, felt impelled at the time of the adoption of the Dawes Plan by the German Reichstag to give expression to our deep convictions in the following words:

> "The admission in the Treaty of Versailles that Germany, by her aggression, caused the World War was wrung from us under compulsion by superior force. Such a statement is contrary to historical fact and is consequently repudiated by the German Government. The German people have a perfect right to claim release from this false charge. So long as this has not been done, so long as a member of the community of nations is stigmatized as the "Felon of Humanity," no real reconciliation and understanding between the nations can be achieved. The German Government will take an opportunity of bringing this to the knowledge of the foreign governments."

It now devolves upon me to bring forward the proofs.

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What are the actual "facts of history" to which I have appealed? On the basis of documents published since 1919 I will endeavor to give here a brief description of the incidents which, in accordance with the present status of strictly scientific research, were the real causes of the catastrophe of 1914.

First, a word or two concerning the documents themselves, which must naturally be unimpeachable if they are to have any weight. Those at our disposal are the German and the Russian, since there are as yet no collections of records drawn from the archives of the other belligerent Powers which would enable the historian to complete his knowledge concerning the origins of the catastrophe. The British Government has, it is true, promised to make such a publication, but this promise still remains to be fulfilled. The French Government has issued only a selection from the records of the Balkan Wars,[1] but as this deals solely with a small section of the great course of events it permits of no conclusions as to the general policy of France prior to 1914. Moreover, the publication fails to give the original numbers of the diplomatic records reproduced, so that the historian is not in a position to tell whether even for that one period, namely the Balkan Wars, all the documents have really been made public. Hence, being deprived of all means of checking the correctness and completeness of the records published, he will always be under the necessity of treating this source of information with critical caution.

In preparing for publication the German documents concerning the World War, the aim above all was to enable the reader to obtain a complete idea of German policy. As early as 1919 there appeared, in four volumes, the "Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch," containing all records of the German Foreign Office from the murder at Sarajevo down to the Austrian declaration of war against Russia. At the instance of the Revolutionary Government, this collection of records was compiled by the socialist Karl Kautsky, working in coöperation with Count Max Montgelas and Professor Walter Schücking. In addition, the secret archives in Wilhelmstrasse were thrown open to three well-known historians, namely Dr. Friedrich Thimme, Dr. Lepsius and Professor Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, who at the close of 1919 proceeded to publish the records for the years 1871 to 1914. In

[1] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères: "Documents Diplomatiques. Les Affaires Balkaniques, 1912–1914."

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compiling the records they were left an entirely free hand; no attempt whatever was made to influence them; they acted according to their own best knowledge and belief. Their work already comprises 35 parts printed in 25 volumes; it will be completed in the spring of 1926 and will then consist of 50 parts in 37 volumes containing all documents referring to the last forty-three years of German policy which furnish information as to what the statesmen of Berlin desired and did. It is clear that Germany is presenting to the world an unvarnished and ungarnished view of her past and is making it possible for anyone who chooses to examine matters for himself.

The Russian contributions to the history of the pre-war period concern in the main two extensive and important subjects. There is first the book by von Siebert, formerly Secretary of the Imperial Russian Embassy in London,[2] which reproduces chiefly documents concerning Anglo-Russian relations. The other publication is that containing the Isvolsky documents which Friedrich Stieve has compiled for the German Foreign Office.[3] For a large part, these documents had previously appeared in Russian, published by the Soviet Government, and in French, in the so-called "*Livre Noir*" by Marchand. That the genuineness of these records cannot for one moment be called into question is attested by no less an authority than the former Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov, who was responsible for the policy of St. Petersburg from the year 1910 till the outbreak of the war; in a recent preface to the English edition of the diary kept in his Ministry during the critical days of July, 1914, he writes: "Now that all the holes and corners of our archives have been ransacked and all their hidden documents have been published, it is hardly possible to say anything new about the events which preceded the European war." This gives the lie, once and for all, to any attempt to minimize the value of the Russian documents by slighting them as "Bolshevist propaganda." The Tsar's Foreign Minister himself announces that these records have emanated from his erstwhile archives and are consequently unexceptionable historical evidence.[4]

[2] "Entente Diplomacy and the World." Edited, arranged and annotated by George Abe Schneider. New York and London: The Knickerbocker Press, 1921.

[3] "Der Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis," Band I–VI, Berlin, 1924.

[4] Mention must also be made of the documents found in Belgium by the German troops and published by the German Foreign Office as "Belgische Aktenstücke, 1905–1914"; also the Serbian documents published by Bogitchevitch in "The Causes of the War" (Larghuysen: Amsterdam, 1919).

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Hence, in culling from these various publications a short survey of the events which caused the World War, I feel on absolutely solid ground. The objection might be raised that I was not directly concerned with the decisive happenings, *i.e.*, that I took no active part in them. But this is rather an advantage than the reverse in enabling a person to form an unprejudiced judgment; for in ascertaining historical truth the personal actors in the terrible drama are more likely to be hindered by their recollections than helped by them; they saw only one side of the affair, namely, the one in which they themselves acted, the one which they were forced to present as just and unalloyed to their own people. In doing so they have tied themselves down to a certain attitude and are no longer in a position to form an unbiased judgment. They are bound to be partial and to remain so as long as they have to defend their former actions. For my part, I rely solely upon the clear evidence of the records and simply reproduce what they have to tell me and everyone who refers to them.

About the year 1910 Europe was divided into two groups of Powers. The one consisted of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy and was known as the Triple Alliance; the other group, that called the Entente, was composed of France, Russia and Great Britain. In themselves such coalitions do not necessarily constitute a danger to peace. On the contrary, by their means a certain equilibrium may be realized which has a tranquilizing effect. It is, however, essential that the two groups really should be fairly well matched as regards power and influence and that they should both have an unquestionable interest in the maintenance of the existing situation. If the one coalition outweighs the other in power it is easily tempted to draw the sword in any disputes with its weaker rival; while if it pursues secret aims with regard to a change of the so-called *status quo* its bellicose tendencies will become a conscious intention. To what extent did all this fit the case of the Triple Alliance and the Entente?

Firstly, which party was the stronger? At the present day it is no longer a secret that, for a long time prior to the war, Italy had stood in very loose relationship with her allies, Germany and Austria. As early as 1902, she had come to an agreement with France outlining the aspirations of each in the Mediterranean. Paris secured Morocco; Rome claimed Tripoli.[5] In the Treaty of Racconigi, concluded in 1909, this arrangement received the

[5] See, in the French "Yellow Book," "Les accords Franco-Italiens, 1900–1902."

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assent of Russia, her object being to obtain greater influence in the Dardanelles. After this first rapprochement between Italy and the Entente, more and more intimate relations were established behind the scenes, so that by the summer of 1912 Paris and St. Petersburg regarded Italy as nothing but a "dead weight" in the Triple Alliance.[6] In this way the position of the Central Powers was considerably weakened. As regards the relative size of the two coalitions, it is to be noted that the Entente countries and their colonies had a combined population of 800 millions, whereas the inhabitants of Germany and Austria together totalled only 120 millions. It is commonly argued, on the other side, that Germany, led by Prussia, had enormously increased her army and was, from a military point of view, almost more than a match for the whole of Europe. Let figures once more tell their tale. In 1914, the two Central Powers commanded armies totalling together 3,547,000 men, whereas Russia and France alone could place 5,360,000 troops in the field. In addition, there was the enormous British Navy with its well-known preponderance over the German. If it be remembered that the geographical position of Germany, with her two long and exposed frontiers in the East and in the West, in itself constituted a great weakness, it will be readily understood why Lloyd George could write in the *Daily Chronicle* in January, 1914: "The German Army is vital, not merely in the existence of the German Empire, but to the very life and independence of the nation itself, surrounded as Germany is by other nations, each of which possesses armies about as powerful as her own. We forget that, while we insist upon a 60 percent superiority (so far as our naval strength is concerned) over Germany being essential to guarantee the integrity of our own shores, Germany herself has nothing like that superiority over France alone, and she has, of course, in addition, to reckon with Russia on her eastern frontier. Germany has nothing which approximates to a two-power standard. She has, therefore, become alarmed by recent events and is spending huge sums of money on the expansion of her military resources."

Thus the Entente was so much stronger than the Central Powers that an aggressive scheme on the part of Germany and Austria would have been almost suicidal. In any case, one thing is certain: if anywhere the idea of recourse to arms had any sense, it was not in Berlin or Vienna.

[6] See "Der Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis," Vol. II, p. 221.

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Let us now turn to the second point which we indicated above as jeopardizing the equilibrium of Europe. A stronger Power and a weaker one may well live side by side in harmony if each is content with its lot. A menace to peace arises only if the stronger party contemplates definite aims which are unachievable without action being undertaken against the weaker. Hence, our investigation reduces itself to this: "*Did the Entente as a whole, or did its individual members, cherish any such aims?*" It is just on this point that the records give us very clear evidence.

The inception of the Entente, *i.e.*, the adherence of Great Britain to the Franco-Russian Alliance, took place in a period of decisive historic significance for the fate of Europe. Russia, after suffering defeat at the hands of Japan, had ceased to seek expansion in the Far East, and had turned her eyes westward. The desire for an open and ice-free seaport, which for decades had inspired the policy of the greatest Slav Power, no longer sought realization on the Pacific coast, but nearer home. The Empire of the Tsar gazed covetously towards Constantinople and the Dardanelles — those straits which had been closed to its navies ever since the Crimean War. The man who effected this fatal change in Russian politics was no other than Alexander Petrovitch Isvolsky, who was made Foreign Minister at St. Petersburg in the year 1906. He, himself, tells us in his memoirs[7] how he put over the helm of the gigantic vessel and turned her course from East to West, how he aimed at a rapprochement with Great Britain and Japan in order to remove all antagonism to these Powers in Asia and so obtain a free hand for his new enterprise. As early as 1907 matters were settled. In 1908 the Russian Tsar and the King of England met at Reval to set the seal upon the entente between their countries. In the same year Isvolsky endeavored to take the first step towards realizing his wishes in regard to the Black Sea. To this end he travelled to Vienna and requested the assent of Austria-Hungary to the free passage of Russian warships through the Dardanelles, offering as an equivalent the annexation of Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Sanjak. The Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Aehrenthal, agreed to the proposal; but he proceeded to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina before Isvolsky had succeeded in obtaining the consent of Rome, of Paris and — more particularly — of London to his scheme. The Russian Foreign Minister was bitterly disappointed, and cast

[7] "Mémoires d'Alexandre Isvolski, Ancien Ambassadeur de Russie à Paris." Paris: Payot.

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about for other means of gaining his object. The means which he adopted passed over Austria, passed over Vienna and Berlin to Constantinople. In the autumn of 1908 the Serbian Minister at Berlin, Milanovitch, reported to his government regarding a conversation he had had with the Russian Foreign Minister in Berlin. The report was dated October 25 and ran thus: "Isvolsky repeatedly and severely condemned Austria-Hungary, in whom Russia and the western Powers could no longer place any confidence. He expressed his conviction and his hope of an early and sanguinary settlement with Austria-Hungary. Consequently, the Austrian question would soon become much more acute than the Turkish and his (Isvolsky's) policy was directed towards liquidating all Russian questions outside Europe in order to lead Russia back to her European aspirations."[8] The new program aimed, in the first place, at uniting the Balkan States against the Dual Monarchy under Russian leadership. Serbia was given definite promises of future assistance by her big Slav brother; and in December, 1909, a secret treaty was concluded with Bulgaria, the fifth article of which read: "In consideration of the fact that the realization of the high ideals of the union of the Slav peoples in the Balkan Peninsula, which are so dear to the heart of Russia, is only feasible by means of a successful issue to the conflict of Russia with Germany and Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria undertakes the solemn obligation," then accurately defined.[9] This language it is impossible for anyone to misunderstand. Isvolsky's scheme was war with the Central Powers, whereby his country was to obtain the hegemony over the south-east of Europe and the possession of Constantinople.

This dangerous man became Russian Ambassador to Paris at the close of the year 1909. As to the objects which he pursued there, important witness has been borne by the Frenchman, Ernest Judet. Writing in the Paris newspaper, *L'Humanité*, he stated that the Russian statesman, Count Muraviev, had confided to him the aims of Isvolsky's mission in the following terms: "In order to produce the saving crisis and to bring European politics to the breaking-point, it was more effective to work in Paris than in St. Petersburg." This is a clear statement that the Tsar's new Ambassador on the Seine contemplated inveigling the allied French Republic into his scheme of a war against the Central

[8] Bogitchevitch: "The Causes of the War," p. 171.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 180.

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Powers. It is extremely interesting, in a perusal of Isvolsky's diplomatic documents, to see to what extent he succeeded in his object.

In the year 1911, that is in the first year of Isvolsky's new activities, the political atmosphere of Europe was first disturbed by the so-called second Morocco crisis. France assumed the protectorate over the greater part of Morocco; and, scarcely had she succeeded in doing so, when St. Petersburg broached the question of the Dardanelles. Neratov, the assistant of Sazanov, who was at that time Russian Foreign Minister, wrote to Isvolsky on May 5 the following lines: "Far from desiring France to bind herself for a definite future time in regard to the Dardanelles by any concrete promise, we consider it opportune to secure the assent of our ally to refrain from opposing our views or any measures taken by us when we shall esteem it necessary to proceed to definite discussions and perhaps even actions in questions which concern us."[10] In this cautious and delicate way, Russia endeavored to find out whether she would receive French assent to her proceeding against the Dardanelles. After lengthy negotiations between Isvolsky and the French Foreign Office, the latter finally gave a reply which, evasive as it was, nevertheless promised a discussion of the question, "whenever fresh circumstances should render an examination of the Dardanelles question necessary." That was the first faint feeler put forth in this all-important matter.

France having obtained Morocco, Italy, in pursuance of the agreement made in 1901, meanwhile picked a quarrel with Turkey and started a war in order to capture Tripoli. Thus the torch of war was coming nearer and nearer to Europe, one violent measure being followed by another. While Italy and Turkey were at strife, a third event of most decisive importance occurred: in the spring of 1912 the Balkan states, Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Greece, concluded a secret aggressive alliance against Turkey. The sordid part played in this affair by Russia has never been better characterized than it was by the then French Premier and Foreign Minister, Poincaré. Writing to Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador to the Court of St. James, under date of October 15, 1912, Poincaré stated that the treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria, shown to him during his visit to St. Petersburg in August, 1912, had greatly perturbed him. "M. Sazonov and

[10] For this and subsequent quotations from Isvolsky's correspondence see "Der Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis."

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M. Isvolsky," we read in his despatch, "have, for some weeks, taken pains to pacify the agitation caused in my mind by the perusal of this treaty. They have assured me that Russia is not bound by it, that she is at liberty to decline the arbitership offered her, etc. But, nevertheless, it is certain that she knew everything and that, instead of protesting against this diplomatic document, she espied in it a means of securing her hegemony in the Balkans."[11]

This verdict is indisputably correct, and the incident proves how consistently Russian statesmen continued to labor at the scheme evolved by Isvolsky, for the secret treaties of the Balkan states were not aimed solely at Turkey but also at Austria-Hungary.

At the outset France shrank from entering upon the perilous path taken by her eastern ally. Poincaré declared in St. Petersburg "that public opinion in France would not permit the French Government to take military action in connection with purely Balkan affairs unless Germany were concerned and had created a *casus foederis* by her own initiative." But we shall shortly see that, disastrously for Europe, he did not stick to his point, but very soon adopted a totally different attitude. Moreover, France just previously had attached herself more closely than ever to Russia. The military convention concluded between the two countries in the year 1892 had been supplemented by a naval convention on July 16, 1912; and, in pursuance of this latter, the French fleet had been stationed in the Mediterranean. This had led to a further fatal step, namely, the conclusion in August, 1912, of a secret naval convention between France and Great Britain, whereby in the event of a war Great Britain undertook the protection of the north coast of France from which the French vessels had been withdrawn. On the outbreak of the war, Lord Grey in a speech to Parliament called attention to this obligation entered into by Great Britain and gave it as one of the reasons for the armed interference of his country. A third extremely questionable proceeding was Poincaré's urging Russia, during his visit, to accelerate the construction of her strategic railways leading to the German frontier.

Thus, on the Entente side prior to the outbreak of the Balkan Campaign the public mind dwelt continually on preparations for war. But Russia's friends had not, in any way, tied themselves to her scheme. On the contrary, when the Balkan states took up

[11] Documents Diplomatiques. Les Affaires Balkaniques," Vol. I, pp. 111, *et seq.*

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arms to assail Turkey, Poincaré did all he could to prevent the collision. But the military successes of the allied Balkan states soon caused him to veer round. In October, 1912, the troops of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro rushed upon Turkey and, in rapid succession, won battle after battle. Hence the Russian enterprise promised the very best results, so that the mood in Paris is vividly depicted in Isvolsky's letters as taking quite a new turn. The scruples of the French Premier were completely allayed and he directed his whole attention to preventing Austria-Hungary from reaping any benefits from the Balkan embroilment. On November 4, 1912, he despatched a letter to Isvolsky containing the following passage: "In agreement with the Ministry, I consider it wise to fix in advance a general policy to be followed in the event of Austria wishing to attempt territorial expansion. . . . The French Government (like the Russian) is of opinion that such a proceeding would pave the way for all sorts of contentions. I should be glad to know whether the Imperial (Russian) Government, like ourselves, is opposed to any annexation of Turkish territory by a Great Power and whether you would be inclined to discuss with France and also with Great Britain the means to be adopted for averting this danger." The same man who, a few weeks before, had admitted that the Balkan War was an enterprise of Russia's "intended to establish her hegemony in the Balkans" — which, of course, meant a distinct threat to the Dual Monarchy — that man, now that the enterprise had proved a success, proceeded to deprive Austria-Hungary of the possibility of taking any counter-measures. But there was more to follow. In November, 1912, news reached Paris that Austria was planning an attack upon Serbia. This report, which came from Belgrade, was not in accordance with fact. But as it was given credence in French official circles, it led to a decisive incident. On November 17, 1912, Isvolsky cabled to his government, quoting Poincaré: "It is for Russia," said he (Poincaré), "to take the initiative in an affair in which it is the most interested party. It is the task of France to give her effective support." "Broadly speaking," added Poincaré, "it all comes to this: if Russia goes to war, France will do the same. . . ."

Isvolsky was right in exulting, for France had now unreservedly declared for the schemes which her Slav ally had planned against the Central Powers. On December 18, 1912, he reported: "During the last few days, I have no longer had to combat the idea that

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France might see herself involved in a war for other people's account, but rather the fear that we (the Russians) remained too passive in an affair which affected the position and the prestige of the entire Entente." At the same time, the French Minister of War, M. Millerand, in a conversation with the Russian Military Attaché in Paris, reproached the Russian Government with hesitating to strike the first blow. "We," he said, "are ready, and that must be recorded."[12] The wave of excitement in Paris at that time ran so high that it greatly influenced the attitude of France during the conference of the Great Powers held in London at the close of 1912 for the purpose of putting an end to the Balkan War. It may not be out of place to quote here the verdict passed upon this conference by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, in his concluding report, in which he wrote: "In briefly reviewing the conversations I have had with the French Ambassador, the remarks which passed between us and the attitude adopted by Poincaré, there arises in my mind a thought, tantamount to a conviction, that, of all the Powers, France is the only one which, I will not say wants war, but at any rate would not regret the outbreak of war. In any case, nothing indicated that France is actively contributing to bring about a compromise. Now compromise means peace; no compromise means war."[13]

We have reached here a critical turning-point in the history antecedent to the catastrophe of 1914. The greatest Slav Power had received from her western ally *plein pouvoir* in regard to her Balkan schemes even if they meant a world war. Russia now knew that France would coöperate with her if she proceeded to extreme measures, *i.e.*, to war with Austria and Germany. If the Empire of the Tsar refrained on that occasion from resorting to arms, it was only because, in the first place, Austria-Hungary, with the exercise of the greatest self-restraint, avoided every imprudent measure which might jeopardize peace, and, secondly, because Russian armaments were not yet adequate to ensure success in such a gigantic enterprise as a European conflict. In 1913 everything was done that could be done to make good what was lacking in this respect.

Right at the beginning of that year the French Ambassador to St. Petersburg, Georges Louis, was recalled from his post. He

[12] E. Adamov: *Izvestia*, July 29, 1924, No. 171.

[13] "Deutsches Weissbuch über die Verantwortlichkeit der Urheber des Krieges," p. 156. Also see "*Livre Noir*," II, p. 306.

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was the victim of an intrigue whereby Isvolsky induced the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov, to request the French Government to replace this man, who had so ardently striven for peace, by another ambassador. In regard to the whole affair, which has recently been most clearly dealt with in a book by the French writer, Ernest Judet, the most important point is the choice of George Louis' successor. That successor was Delcassé, the pronounced enemy of Germany. This new French Ambassador, now so significantly chosen, was entrusted with a very special mission, as may be gathered from the telegram sent by Isvolsky to Sazonov on March 13, 1913, which reads: "As you are aware, M. Delcassé is peculiarly competent, not merely in questions relating to foreign politics, but also in all that concerns military and, more particularly, naval affairs. According to the information received by our Military Attaché, he has been specially instructed to persuade our Military Administration of the necessity of increasing the number of our strategic roads in order that the concentration of our army on the west frontier may be accelerated. M. Delcassé is so familiar with this question and with the views of the French General Staff that he can discuss matters with our military authorities quite personally. He is, withal, authorized to offer Russia, in the form of railway loans, all the funds which may possibly be required for the purpose." Thus the Empire of the Tsar was now to be urged on to most energetic efforts.

Somewhat later the Act introducing the three-years' service system for the French Army was passed. Concerning the effect of this Act the Belgian Minister in Paris wrote to his Ministry under date June 12, 1913: "This new law will weigh so heavily upon the population and the expenditure which it will involve will be so enormous that the country will soon protest, and France will see herself faced with the alternative of abandoning what it cannot bear or, in a short time, waging war."[14] Delcassé's negotiations concerning the strengthening of the strategic railways of Russia soon yielded results. The Russian Premier and Finance Minister, Kokovtzov, concluded on December 16, 1913, the following treaty with the French Government:

> 1. The Imperial (Russian) Government may, in the course of five successive years, take up annually on the Paris money market a maximum of 500 millions in the shape of State Loans or of State-guaranteed Loans for the purpose of carrying out a railway program.

[14] "Belgische Aktenstücke 1905–14," p. 124.

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2. The railway construction, the need of which has been recognized by the French and Russian chiefs of General Staff during the consultations of August, 1913, will be begun as soon as possible so that they may be completed within four years; the expenses will be met either out of the funds obtained by way of the loans or out of the surplus of the Russian budget, according as it suits the Imperial Government.[15]

The fatal development was progressing rapidly. Meantime the Balkan entanglements, which continued throughout almost the whole of 1913, contributed in their turn to increase the inclination of St. Petersburg for a world war. Russia twice attempted to gain her goal of Constantinople by her own unaided efforts. On the first occasion, namely during the Second Balkan War, when the Bulgarians were threatening to move upon the Turkish capital, a direct attack was contemplated but had to be given up on account of the military difficulties. The second occasion was during the Third Balkan War, when an advance through Asia Minor was meditated; but energetic opposition being met with, especially from Great Britain, this plan, too, had to be abandoned. On December 8, 1913, therefore, Sazonov presented a memorial to the Tsar dealing with the means by which Russia could obtain Constantinople. The memorial closes with the words: "Moreover I must repeat that the solution of the Dardanelles question can scarcely make any progress save by way of European complications. To judge by the present state of affairs, these complications would find us allied with France and possibly also with England; the latter country would at least maintain benevolent neutrality. In the event of European complications, we should be able to count upon Serbia and possibly also upon Rumania. Clearly it is the task of our diplomacy to create favorable conditions for establishing the most intimate relations with Rumania."[16] These significant words prove that St. Petersburg had been converted to Isvolsky's programmatic view that "The way to Constantinople runs via Vienna and Berlin."

Evidently the political atmosphere of Europe at the close of 1913 was dangerously charged with electricity. The secret collusion between Russia and France went so far that Delcassé discussed with Sazonov the aims to be pursued by the two countries in an approaching world war. This we learn from two very instructive telegrams despatched by Isvolsky on October 13, 1914,

[15] "Der Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Isvolskis," Doc. 1177.
[16] *Ibid.*, Doc. 1157.

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in which, two and a half months after the outbreak of the war, he reported concerning his conversations with the French Foreign Minister, Delcassé, touching the war aims of the Entente. These telegrams were of the following tenor.[17]

No. 497. *Bordeaux, September 30/October 13, 1914.*

Re your telegram No. 2935.

Personal.

I have had an opportunity of personally talking over with Delcassé the questions raised. Delcassé made the reservation that, at present, it was too early "to sell the bear's skin" and that he had hitherto avoided discussing this subject with his colleagues; but he admitted that it would not be unprofitable to define clearly and in good time the mutual views and wishes of the Allies. He is convinced that *no* differences of opinion on the question could arise between Russia, France and Great Britain. He himself (Delcassé) has very often talked quite openly with you (Sazonov) and has been able to convince himself of the identity of the objects pursued by France and Russia. For herself, France aims at no sort of territorial acquisition in Europe, with the exception of the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine. In Africa, too, it purposes no new conquests and will be satisfied with the elimination of the last remnants of the Algeciras Act and the regulation of certain colonial frontiers. Further, the main object of France — and in this all three allied Powers are absolutely at one — is the destruction of the German Empire and the weakening of the military and political power of Prussia as far as possible. It is essential to arrange matters in such a way that the various German States will themselves be interested in this question. It is, at present, too early to discuss the future configuration of Germany.

Great Britain would probably demand the restitution of Hanoverian independence, to which Russia and France would naturally raise no objection. Schleswig and Holstein would have to go to Denmark notwithstanding the ambiguous attitude of the Danish Government. Great Britain likewise desired no conquests in Europe, but would demand colonial extension at the expense of Germany, which France would not oppose. So far as Russia was concerned, her territorial claims would, in general, determine themselves, and France had of course agreed to them from the very first. In addition, Russia would naturally demand free passage through the Dardanelles with efficient guarantees therefor; in this, Russia would receive ample support from France, who, in regard to this question, would be able to exert influence upon Great Britain which would be useful to us.

(*Will be continued.*)

ISVOLSKI.

[17] Stieve: "Iswolski im Weltkrieg," Doc. 224 and 225.

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No. 497. (Continuation.) *Bordeaux, September 30/October 13, 1914.*

Personal. Highly confidential.

Referring to the negotiations which took place in St. Petersburg in 1913, Delcassé urgently requested me to direct your attention to the fact that the demands and wishes of France have remained the same save for the unshakable desire to destroy the political and economic power of Germany. The necessity for this is dictated by the present conjuncture, especially by Great Britain's participation in the war; and France insists upon the attainment of this aim, because she is of opinion that it is important, not only for France, but likewise for the other States and, indeed, for the whole world.

ISVOLSKI.

If, keeping these matters in mind, we glance at the general situation, we shall without difficulty come to the conclusion that the position of the Central Powers was endangered to a degree. Despite the quarrels which ultimately arose among the Balkan states, the Balkan Wars ended with a victory for Russia. Above all, Serbia, the special protégé of the great Slav brother, came out of the struggles with Turkey enormously strengthened and drew from them fresh energy and fresh hopes of a further extension of her territory, a thing which was only feasible at the expense of Austria. The "expansion" propaganda started with great vigor, its chief object being to prepare the way for linking Serbia up with the Croats, Slovenes, Dalmatians and Bosnians living in the Dual Monarchy. A secret society of national officers, known as the "Black Hand," perpetrated systematic attacks upon Austrian politicians. Official Serbian circles quietly allowed this to go on, because they knew that Serbia was supported by Russia. After an audience granted to the Serbian Minister, Pashitch, on February 2, the Tsar took leave of his visitor with the words: "Greet the King and tell him we will do anything for Serbia."[18]

In the year 1914 the ring of fire was closed around the Central Powers by the conclusion of a Naval Convention between Great Britain and Russia. This convention, which owed its origin to the Tsar's initiative and the intermediation of Isvolsky, was intended to draw closer the bonds of union between Great Britain and the two members of the Entente.

Europe now resembled a powder-cask in which the smallest spark would suffice to cause an explosion. And the spark soon fell in the shape of the murder at Sarajevo. On June 28, 1914,

[18] Bogitchevitch: "The Causes of the War," p. 217.

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the Austro-Hungarian Heir Apparent and his consort were assassinated by Serbians belonging to the Dual Monarchy. The Chief of the Intelligence Department of the Serbian General Staff, Colonel Dimitrijevitch, had prepared and provoked the deed. But more than this; according to the recently published evidence of the then Serbian Minister of Education, Ljuba Jovanovitch,[19] the Serbian Government had been previously informed of the scheme. Other disclosures suggest that the Russian Military Attaché in Belgrade was in the secret and had reported to the military authorities in Russia concerning what was to take place. The circle of accessories and accomplices grows larger and larger in the light of the latest research. It seems absolutely clear that Viennese diplomacy was indisputably justified in regarding the assassination as a direct attack upon the status of the Dual Monarchy. Nevertheless, Austria-Hungary did not proceed to immediate action, but instituted first an enquiry as to the murder. At the same time, the Emperor Francis Joseph wrote personally to William II; and, in consequence, a consultation between the German Kaiser and several of his ministers took place on July 5, 1914, which led to Germany expressing her assent to a possible campaign of the Dual Monarchy against Serbia, *i.e.*, to a purely local war between the two states concerned. It would be utterly false to assert that an Austrian punitive expedition against Serbia would *eo ipso* have involved Russia in war. Russia was not bound by any alliance to assist Serbia, and we have seen, in dealing with the events of the year 1912, that France at that time even complained of St. Petersburg's too passive attitude towards the alleged menacement of Serbia by Austria. Accordingly, the responsibility for the participation of other Powers in the quarrel between Vienna and Belgrade rests, not upon Berlin, but, as we shall presently see, upon St. Petersburg.

While Austria-Hungary, after a protracted consideration of the pros and cons, was drafting her ultimatum to Serbia, M. Poincaré, the President of the French Republic, went to St. Petersburg. That city was in a thoroughly bellicose mood. The French Ambassador, M. Paléologue, who was an eye-witness of the events, reports that the Grand-Duke Nikolai Nikolaievitch, the leader of the Russian military party, gave a banquet in honor of the French visitors, during which the Grand-Duke's consort, Anastasia, the daughter of the King of Montenegro, joined her

[19] " Krv Slovenstva," Belgrade, 1924.

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sister in calling out to M. Paléologue: "The war is coming. Not a trace will remain of Austria. Our armies will meet in Berlin." That was on July 22, *i.e.*, before the Austrian ultimatum had been handed over to Serbia. And Poincaré himself, who left St. Petersburg on July 23, namely on the same day that the Austrian ultimatum was presented, had also, prior to his departure, confirmed the *plein pouvoir* given to Russia for the event of a world war. A telegram despatched on July 24, by the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan, in dealing with the results of the conversations between the French President and the Russian statesmen, mentions as the third point: "Solemn confirmation of the obligations laid upon the two countries by the Alliance."[20] Hence, before Austria's first move against Serbia had been made, France and Russia had contemplated a general conflict. This changed absolutely the local character of the struggle; it became thereby a European question.

When Vienna, having declared the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum to be unsatisfactory — a view also held by the French savant Renouvin[21] — commenced hostilities against Serbia, Berlin continued to work hard for the localization of the conflict. Almost all the mediatory proposals received from London were sent on to Vienna by Germany — the proposals being often accompanied by supplementary recommendations. Nevertheless, all efforts to prevent the great conflagration failed, for, in the afternoon of July 30, the Tsar took the decisive step of issuing orders for the general mobilization of Russia. This was a menace, not only to the Dual Monarchy, but also to Germany; and from this time onwards it was impossible to call a halt. In Paris, where not one attempt was made to admonish France's eastern ally to moderation, matters developed with fatal rapidity. True, in order to inspire Great Britain with the belief that France desired peace, the feint was made of withdrawing the French troops 10 kilometres from the German frontier. But on July 31st, France decided in favor of war, for by 1 o'clock a. m. on August 1 the Russian Military Attaché was able to wire home: "The French Minister of War informed me, in a tone of exultation and cordiality, that the (French) Government was firmly resolved upon war."[22] That was 16 hours before Germany's declaration of

[20] Stieve: "Iswolski im Weltkreig," p. 213.
[21] Renouvin: "Les Origines immédiates de la Guerre." Paris: Costes, p. 64.
[22] Romberg: "The Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book." London: G. Allen & Unwin, p. 54.

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war upon Russia and two and one-half days before her declaration to France. Thus the dice determining the outbreak of the World War had already fallen in St. Petersburg and Paris when Germany, threatened on both flanks, openly took up arms to defend herself against the deadly embrace.

In all the foregoing I have cited only such facts as can be proved with absolute certainty. Whoever is familiar with these facts will easily comprehend the deep moral indignation felt throughout Germany at the reproaches still thrown at her that her aggression, with that of her allies, caused the World War. Surely truth must triumph in these days of progress and democracy. In the face of the documents antecedent to the war, is it possible to shelve a revision of the verdict, simply because that verdict was over-hastily pronounced by the victors in 1919? All that the German people demand is fair play. Reconciliation among the nations is only possible if spite and hatred yield to calmness and discernment. Are the events of the past to act as a barrier to a better future? Is a nation to remain eternally branded as the "Felon of Humanity," when impartial research has clearly proved the falseness of such a stigma? Quite lately the English historian, G. Gooch, who has been entrusted by the British Government with the editorship and publication of the British records antecedent to the war, has declared in his work entitled "Germany" that "no evidence, however, has appeared to indicate that the German Government or the German people desired and plotted a world war. Both before and after the murder of the Archduke, the intentions of the Wilhelmstrasse were as pacific as its policy was maladroit."

This is one of the several steps recently taken in the right direction. It is a step which will help forward moral disarmament. That military disarmament is essential to alleviating the distress of the over-burdened peoples of Europe has long been recognized. But this military disarmament will only become possible when moral disarmament has made sufficient headway, above all only when the moral condemnation of Versailles has been cancelled, when that mutual hatred has subsided which, though seven years have passed since the World War ended, still cankers the minds of men. To this end a knowledge of the truth must be spread among mankind; and the fight for truth concerning the past is therefore a fight for the future happiness of humanity.

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AFTER LOCARNO: THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY TODAY

By Eduard Beneš

EMPIRE builders striving for world power and the pacifists of all ages represent two spheres and two conceptions of thought. Yet both are concerned in subjugating the greatest possible part of the world and of humanity. In the one case it is a world empire founded on power which is to provide the largest possible section of mankind with the benefits of security and peace; in the other case it is an organization of the world on the basis of ideas which is to achieve those ends. On the one hand, mankind declares war on war and seeks to attain peace by means of material force, violence and arms; and on the other, by peaceful methods and by material and moral disarmament. There is no need to enumerate the attempts made in all ages to found world empires, and the reasons for their fall. Nor is there need to refer to history in order to see how in all ages great religious, philosophical and social ideas aiming at world peace by peaceful methods have been wrongfully applied and fruitless. In spite of all this, the best minds of every generation, the apostles of genuine humanity, those who have faith in the mission of mankind, have continued to struggle to give the world peace through peace and not through war.

The greatest thinkers of ancient, medieval and modern times have wrestled with the problem of how to convince states and governments that it is possible to solve this primary question, and they have invented systems of eternal peace and universal human solidarity. Aristotle and Plato in their classics of the ancient world, Dante in his work on monarchy, Grotius in his study on arbitration, Rousseau in his treatise on European federation, and Kant in his call for eternal peace — all these thinkers strove for the ideas which today are expressed in the endeavors of the League of Nations. Many practical politicians, too, from George of Poděbrady and Henri IV to President Wilson, have attempted to arrive at a peaceful organization of the world. Since 1848 the parliaments of Europe have been occupied uninterruptedly with the problem of disarmament. If we refer to the minutes of practically every European parliament from the beginning of this century we see that the leading minds of Europe and America

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have struggled to a much greater extent than one imagines for everything that the League of Nations has been attempting to accomplish during the last few years.

Most of the political events in Europe during the last six years have been connected with the problem of security. On its solution will depend, in great measure, the tendency of international European politics for many years to come. The history of the problem shows three stages.

In the first stage, beginning at the Peace Conference and lasting up to the year 1923, it was a question of a guarantee pact between Clemenceau, Briand and Poincaré on the one side and Lloyd George and Lord Curzon on the other — a guarantee pact concerning only France, England and Belgium.

The second stage witnessed the abandonment of this first conception, and the substitution for it of an attempt on the part of the League of Nations to bring about a general pact such as the Treaty of Mutual Assistance or the Geneva Protocol.

The third stage has consisted of a compromise between the two preceding attempts, on the one hand, and the proposals made by the German Government on the other — a partial guarantee pact, combined with the admission of the late enemy state to the League of Nations and that state's assumption of obligations therein, the whole to be regarded as a first step towards a universal pact of security in general.

I. NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FRANCO-BRITISH SECURITY PACT IN 1919–1923

All the contemporary negotiations on the question of security arise out of the demand which France made at the Peace Conference and which was recognized by all her allies, namely that she should be safeguarded for the future against the invasion of foreign armies, a thing which had happened three times during the last century. France abandoned her demand that political and military provisions for her security should be included in the Peace Treaties when she was offered the alternative of the so-called Three-Power Guarantee Pact between France, England and the United States. The proposal, which was signed on June 28, 1919, by Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau, fell through when the United States refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. From the beginning of these negotiations, however, Lloyd George

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and all his successors recognized that England was morally bound to provide France with guarantees of security in view of the circumstances under which the negotiations on the Three-Power Pact had been conducted.

Thus it happened that the question of a guarantee pact turned up regularly in the course of all Anglo-French negotiations. At the Cannes Conference Lloyd George proposed to Briand (January 11, 1922) a new pact, according to which England should for a certain period guarantee aid to France and Belgium in the case of those countries being attacked by Germany. In the Cannes resolution the idea was to bind *all* states mutually to refrain from making any kind of attack upon their neighbors. (The members of the League of Nations have this obligation under Article X; in the Cannes resolution the reference was also to non-members of the League of Nations.) This attempt failed because the French Opposition, led by Poincaré, did not consider the proposal adequate. As a result Briand resigned and the Poincaré Government came to power.

Poincaré drew up the claims of France in detail and augmented them. He desired, in particular, that the pact proposed at Cannes by Lloyd George should be concluded for a longer term and should be supplemented by a military convention. The negotiations came to nothing, and this apparently constrained Lloyd George to attempt to extend the question of security to all Europe and to come to the Genoa Conference with a new proposal for an all-European guarantee pact, known as the Pact of Non-Aggression. This somewhat vague pact, composed of two articles, simply bound each state to refrain from attacking the frontiers of any other state — an obligation expressed in much stronger form in the Covenant of the League of Nations. It was rejected by the great majority of the delegates to the Genoa Conference after fruitless efforts had been made to supplement and perfect it.

The disaffection which followed upon the Genoa Conference, and the opposition of Poincaré to Lloyd George's proposal, caused a temporary break, in July, 1922, in the whole Franco-British negotiations touching security. In the summer of the following year London made a new effort to discuss this question in connection with reparations, but Poincaré declined to combine the two questions. The tension arising from the occupation of the Ruhr likewise rendered difficult a direct Franco-British agreement,

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and the negotiations were constantly put off throughout 1923.

When the MacDonald Cabinet was formed in January, 1924, following the English general election, and the Herriot Government came into power in France in May, 1924, the question of reparations first claimed the attention of both. This question, as is well known, was solved at the London Conference last year, though the questions of inter-allied debts and of security remained open. On leaving the London Conference, Herriot received the assurance from MacDonald that England regarded herself as bound in the matter of the guarantee pact and that she would enter into negotiations as soon as possible on this point with France. Such was the state of negotiations between the two countries in July, 1924.

II. LEAGUE NEGOTIATIONS FOR SECURITY: THE TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND THE GENEVA PROTOCOL

In the meantime, parallel with the negotiations between France and England, the question of security began to be discussed in the League of Nations in combination with the question of disarmament.

Although the League of Nations Covenant signifies great progress towards the establishment of a more lasting peace, it does not mean everything. It contains provisions whereby states are obliged to endeavor by peaceful methods to maintain peace, but it does not enforce an obligatory peaceful settlement of a conflict. It prohibits certain wars, but it cannot prohibit all wars by rendering wars in general impossible. All the endeavors of the supporters of the League of Nations have been directed towards the problem of how to fill in these two great gaps.

Article 8 of the Covenant, according to which the members of the League bound themselves to disarm to the greatest extent compatible with the maintenance of their national security, was taken as the starting-point. On the basis of this obligation, and after difficult negotiations in the Assembly of the League, there was passed in September, 1922, the so-called Resolution XIV which lays down in solemn form the principle that the states should disarm, but that they must mutually undertake also to render military aid to a disarmed state should it be attacked by any other. Thus the problem of disarmament was for the first time clearly and in binding form combined with the problem of

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security, and in all subsequent negotiations these two principles were not again separated.

After a long discussion on the so-called Pact of Guarantee at Geneva during the year 1922, projects for a system of this kind were finally submitted to the League of Nations by the representatives of England and France. These projects were discussed in the committees of the League of Nations during 1923 and were submitted in definitive form to the Assembly of the League in September, 1923, under the title of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. This treaty represented an attempt to ensure general European security on the basis of the following principles:

1. Armaments are to be restricted and are to be permanently subject to control.
2. States are to undertake to assist an attacked country. At the same time recognition is given the necessity of regional treaties and alliances which should form the principal means of rendering assistance.
3. A certain measure of differentiation is to be permitted between the individual parts of the world (more freedom being allowed in regard to subscribing to this treaty than was later allowed in the Geneva Protocol).
4. The entire functioning of the treaty is to be placed under the control of the League of Nations.

After having been submitted to the various Governments for consideration, the Pact of Guarantee was agreed to in principle by eighteen states but aroused considerable fears and objections in the case of other states. The answer of the MacDonald Government was unfavorable. It rejected the principle of special regional treaties and demanded in substitution of them a universal pact; it emphasized the necessity for demilitarizing the individual frontier zones where no danger threatened; and it took a decided stand for the principle of arbitration. In view of these objections the Treaty of Mutual Assistance fell through.

Out of the discussion and criticism of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance arose a further demand based on the demand for disarmament. The states providing assistance, it was said, must demand from the states which they happen to assist a moral and juridical guarantee of a reasonable and peace-loving policy, this to be demonstrated by the fact that the states signing the pact of guarantee should unconditionally submit each of their international conflicts *to an international tribunal for peaceful settlement.*

The acceptance of this principle of arbitration led to the need for a system of security guarantees which should support the ful-

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filment of the arbitration obligations prescribed and of the verdicts of the international court. Thus as a result of the discussion and the political struggle in the League three great problems of present-day international politics were inseparably linked together: *the limiting of armaments, the creation of security guarantees, and the organization of international arbitration.*

I was entrusted by the sub-committee of the League to formulate for discussion a new general proposal which should take into consideration all the English objections as well as the suggestions of other states (those members of the League as well as non-members) which had been made during the deliberations on the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. The draft proposal came before the League committee, some recommendations of the law committee were added to it, and, after discussion and a series of amendments, the proposal was unanimously passed by the League and became the well-known Geneva Protocol for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes.

The Geneva Protocol was a new, more perfected and more complete guarantee pact. The form of a treaty of guarantee was replaced by the form of the Protocol, which simply supplements the provisions of the Covenant. A number of delegates at Geneva rightly believed that the League of Nations Covenant in reality contains in germ everything: the principle of the peaceful settlement of international conflicts, guarantees of security, and, finally, the principles of the limitation of armaments. They believed it sufficient simply to supplement it where gaps remained.

The main principle of the Protocol was the prohibition of an aggressive war and of war in general, whereas by the League of Nations Covenant the sovereign right of states to wage war against one another is limited but not entirely removed: in addition to prohibited wars there are legal wars and also wars which are suffered.

A second main principle of the Protocol, logically supplementing the first principle, was that every international dispute which might give rise to armed hostilities must unconditionally be submitted for peaceful settlement.

I cannot here examine in detail the whole of the complicated juridical machinery suggested. I will mention only its principles as interpreted in the official proclamation of the French Government. In concluding his speech at the session of the Council of the League of Nations in March, 1925, M. Briand said:

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"This document means only the realization of the system contained in the League of Nations Covenant. . . . It allows for the first time a practical emergence of the principle of international solidarity and of the principle of arbitration. It introduces for the first time into international law the doctrines of private law, and declares aggressive war to be a crime. In the interests of all nations it organizes the activity of permanent international justice and realizes in this way a second great step forward. But it does not content itself with the acceptance of the principle. It organizes arbitration, which is henceforward laid down for the settlement of conflicts; it fixes the procedure of arbitration and takes steps to prevent it from becoming a trap for unsuspecting nations. It defines the agressor and organizes preventive measures against war. If, despite the measures taken, it is necessary to have recourse to sanctions, whether they be economic, financial or military, the Protocol implies only obligations which are imposed on the members of the League of Nations by Article 16 of the Covenant which was solemnly approved by all the Powers which signed the Treaty of Versailles."

The Geneva Protocol, which solemnly expressed the principle of the solidarity of the big states with the small ones, whose equal right to security had been recognized, was accepted in September, 1924, by all the factors then interested, with sincerity and enthusiasm, as a new general effort to settle the problem of security and as a document not only expressing what was then felt to be the practical need of all, but also expressing the lofty ideals for the future as incorporated in the League of Nations.

The fall of the MacDonald Government and the reserved attitude of the succeeding British Government during the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations at Rome in December, 1924, indicated that England would not accept the Protocol of Geneva in its existing form.

In distinction to the point of view of the British Empire, all the members of the Council of League of Nations (even while admitting some shortcomings in the Protocol, as could hardly be otherwise, for every such general document will always display some discrepancies owing to the geographical, cultural and moral differences between individual nations in different parts of the world) spoke decidedly for all the principles of the Protocol, and declared that they would keep to these principles and that they would work for their realization. They said, on the other hand, that they did not adhere slavishly to the accepted text of the Protocol, and that they did not reject on principle the British suggestion, namely, that of solving the problem of security temporarily by a partial guarantee pact entered into directly between

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the interested powers and subordinated to the control of the League of Nations.

France, after six years' negotiation for security, possessing the Geneva Protocol as the only (at least morally) binding act, emphasized naturally and rightly its importance and her decision to adhere to it. She was willing, however, as were other members of the League, to substitute for it, temporarily, something which would be able to solve the present problem of security in Europe. But France did not, and does not, give up hope of the Protocol being brought into effect by degrees.

The British Government, for its part, declared that it did not desire to solve the problem of security by a diplomatic act of general character such as the Geneva Protocol, but that it would rather give precedence to the principles applied in the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, negotiated by the League of Nations in 1923, and that the solution of the problem of security was possible only through the direct conclusion of guarantee pacts between individual interested powers.

Thus the British Government added to its program these two points:

> 1. As such a pact should be concluded with the participation of all directly interested, in this case it should have the participation of Germany, in order that the action should not appear to take the form of a *bloc* against one state.
>
> 2. The pact should be placed under the control of the League of Nations and submitted to the principles which direct the whole activity and policy of the League.

At the last session of the Council of the League of Nations, in March, 1925, the British Government declared itself against the Protocol as a means of solving the problem of security. An analysis of the speeches of the English Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Chamberlain, shows that: (a) the British Government did not regard a general application of the principle of arbitration as acceptable, and wished to reserve to itself the possibility of settling certain disputes in another manner; and (b) that the obligations imposed by the Protocol were, in view of the extent of the British Empire, too great. In particular it seemed to the British Government impossible to take upon itself the duty of guaranteeing the preservation of peace in some regions of Eastern Europe.

In other words, the British Government rejected once more what it has always rejected from the very first negotiations (outside

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the League of Nations) touching security — that is, to give a guarantee for anything more than the Franco-Belgian frontier with Germany.

Thus the Geneva Protocol was thrust back, and we come to the last act in the negotiations touching the problem of security.

III. THE GERMAN PROPOSALS FOR A GUARANTEE PACT

Under the influence of the occupation of the Ruhr by the Poincaré Government, which in official circles in Germany was considered also as a part of the struggle for France's security and not only as a sanction for not fulfilling the reparation clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, the first attempt was made from the German side to aid in the solution of this question. On December 18, 1922, the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Hughes, transmitted to the French Ambassador, M. Jusserand, the proposal of the German Chancellor, Dr. Cuno, in which the latter proposed that the Great Powers which had an interest in the Rhine frontier should bind themselves (America serving as a guarantee) that for a period of about thirty years, i. e. one generation, they would not declare war against each other without the declaration being preceded by popular vote.

Premier Poincaré rejected this proposal as inadequate and pointed out that the same thing was guaranteed, without limitation as to time, by the Covenant of the League of Nations; besides, neither America nor England showed any intention to adhere to these agreements or to guarantee them.

The second German proposal was made on May 2, 1923, when the German Government submitted to England, France, Italy, Belgium, Japan and the United States of America its proposals regarding the reparation question and added an offer to negotiate with France a pact by which she would bind herself to settle all conflicts in a peaceable way and not by war. As a condition to the conclusion of this pact Germany demanded the evacuation of the Ruhr. In September, 1923, Minister Stresemann in a public speech at Stuttgart repeated the same idea in an absolutely general form. These proposals did not lead to any further negotiations; they were generally considered as tactical steps aimed at bringing about the evacuation of the Ruhr.

The end of the year 1923 and the year 1924 were occupied, as already said, by the proceedings of the League of Nations in con-

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nection with the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Protocol; even on the part of Germany the attempts at a solution of the problem of security stopped, just as had the direct negotiations between France and England.

Just at the time when the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Chamberlain, had prepared his reply to the Geneva Protocol, came the new proposal for a guarantee pact from the German Government. This proposal, as well as the first proposal made by the Chancellor, Dr. Cuno, was evoked not only by the general development of the problem of security, but also by current political events closely affecting Germany. On January 10, 1925, was made the Allied decision to maintain temporarily the occupation of the Ruhr. To the German protest Premier Herriot replied in Parliament, on January 28, 1925, with a famous speech which aroused great attention.

Herriot recalled the negotiations during the Peace Conference regarding the security of France and the concessions which France had made without receiving in return the fulfilment of the promise of security which had been given her. Further, he called attention to the fact that the Military Control Commission possessed material which showed that military preparations were being carried on in Germany and pointed out in what respects the peace obligations from this point of view had not yet been fulfilled. He emphasized, therefore, the necessity of accepting the Geneva Protocol and the definitive adjustment of military control, so that the whole question of French security could be settled.

Two days afterwards Chancellor Luther delivered his reply. He made two main points. In the first place, he said, M. Herriot regards Franco-German relations from the point of view of the problem of security; Germany agrees in this, but as the question of security exists for Germany too she is interested in the solution of the guarantee pact and wishes to collaborate in its preparation. Secondly, Germany agrees with the ultimate aim of France to attain a general peace convention such as the Geneva Protocol. Such a general convention, if it cannot be secured immediately, can be prepared gradually by partial pacts of guarantee in regions where the problem is most acute. Germany would be willing to coöperate immediately in such negotiations.

On February 9, the German Government transmitted to the Governments of the Great Powers a confidential memorandum, in which the ideas of Chancellor Luther were stated with some

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important additions and with more precision. The proposal was for a pact of guarantee among the Great Powers, by which the *status quo* on the Rhine would be guaranteed to all states reciprocally, the stipulations of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles regarding the demilitarization of the left bank of the Rhine would be carried out, and arbitration conventions would be signed between Germany and all other interested Powers, not only the Great Powers but also Germany's neighbors on her eastern frontiers. The memorandum repeated Dr. Luther's idea that this partial guarantee pact might prove a first step to a world-wide protocol, ensuring security in general.

The preparatory period of the Western Pact negotiations, which were opened by the German memorandum of February 9, ended with the German Note of August 27, whereby the German Government accepted the French suggestion that the further negotiations should be conducted orally and that they should be commenced by a meeting of legal experts at London. At this conference of legal experts, which was convened in the beginning of September, 1925, the text of the Rhine pact was agreed upon in principle, together with the fundamentals of the arbitration treaties.

There followed upon these negotiations the concluding conference at Locarno, from October 5 to 16. There, after strenuous debates, an agreement was arrived at and expressed in a complex of treaties forming the Peace of Locarno. These treaties set forth the contemporary condition of the process of European pacification.

The first important diplomatic document produced by the Locarno Conference, the so-called Rhine Pact, contains roughly the following points:

1. Germany, France and Belgium bind themselves to respect, and England and Italy guarantee, the inviolability of the Franco-Belgian-German frontiers.

2. Germany, France and Belgium bind themselves mutually not to undertake any invasion and not to have recourse to any warlike step.

3. The obligation not to wage war does not apply to cases of necessary defence, the violation of a demilitarized frontier, the fulfilling of the duty of a member of the League of Nations, and the carrying into effect of articles 15 and 16 of the League of Nations Covenant (which includes, for France, the case of assistance to Czechoslovakia and Poland). In this case military intervention is not bound down to any previous decision of the Council of the League, if it is a question of necessary defence, a flagrant violation of a demilitarized frontier, a flagrant attack, or violence.

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4. Germany, France and Belgium, having made a decision not to wage war against one another, bind themselves at the same time by special arbitration treaties to settle all their disputes by peaceful means, or by accepting the verdict of a court of arbitration.

5. England and Italy guarantee the observance of these obligations on the part of the participating states.

6. All the rights and duties of the participating states arising from the League of Nations Covenant remain unaffected, i.e., all these negotiations are conducted within the compass of the Covenant and are really the carrying out of certain of its principles and articles. These obligations will enter into effect with the entry of Germany into the League of Nations.

Another equally important part of the Peace of Locarno consists of the arbitration treaties between Germany and France, Belgium, Poland and Czechoslovakia. It is a question here of integral arbitration treaties, not excluding the settlement by arbitration of any kind of dispute. The Locarno Conference therefore did not take as a model the arbitration treaties which Germany after the war negotiated, for example, with Switzerland, Sweden and Finland, and which exclude from settlement by arbitration disputes referring to independence, territorial inviolability and other supreme interests, i.e., precisely those all-important disputes which most frequently lead to war. On the contrary, the Locarno Conference was guided by the principles which have been supported hitherto in the League of Nations.

In their essence all the arbitration treaties that have been negotiated are based on the difference (indicated in Article 13 of the Covenant) between disputes where the parties are in conflict concerning a right positively laid down and formulated by treaties, texts of obligations and the principles of international law, etc., and conflicts involving a clash of interests which are not thus positively laid down juridically. At Locarno, disagreements of the latter type were termed, not entirely correctly, disagreements in interests or purely politically disagreements. We are dealing here with a dispute where one state makes full use, to its own advantage, of the given *status quo* on the basis of existing international treaties and of the principles of international law, and another state, feeling itself to be affected disadvantageously thereby, though not asserting in any way that the first state has violated a right, endeavors to obtain an alteration in that state's course of action.

The view that all disputes between states should be settled on a solely legal basis was not supported at Locarno by any state.

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It was therefore necessary to distinguish between two categories of disputes. It appeared very dangerous, however, to render possible the settlement of disputes of the first category only, the so-called juridical disputes, and to regard conflicts of interests and political conflicts as insoluble, — as has always happened hitherto.

Means, too, were sought for solving the problem of security for Central Europe, so far as the problem is capable of solution in existing circumstances. It was here that the idea arose of mutual guarantee pacts between France on the one hand and Czechoslovakia and Poland, respectively, on the other. These pacts were so formulated as to represent a complement to the Rhine Pact and the arbitration treaties. The two pacts — the Franco-Czechoslovak and the Franco-Polish — constitute a special entity, but they are referred to specifically in Article 2 of the Rhine Pact, and are also expressly mentioned in the final Protocol, so that from a political point of view they form, plainly and indisputably, a constituent part of the Locarno agreement.

All the Locarno documents have the same ideas for their basis and pursue the same end. Indeed, the final Protocol of the Conference states that the treaties and agreements are mutually inter-related. This indivisibility of the Locarno agreements finds legal expression in the provision that they all enter into and lose their force simultaneously and under the same conditions. They become effective as soon as all the ratifications are deposited with the League of Nations and Germany becomes a member of the League. No restrictions are placed on their length of duration. They remain in force until one year after the date when the Council of the League of Nations shall have ascertained, by at least a two-thirds majority, that the League is so established that it can itself give certain and adequate guarantees to the parties to treaties. In my opinion the Locarno agreements could only be replaced by the acceptance of the Geneva Protocol or some similar system.

What is the import of the Locarno agreements from a general international standpoint?

Historically, politically, and from the point of view of power, the Locarno treaties are the outcome of struggles in the League of Nations that have lasted for three years. I will not deal with this in detail or try to show what the Locarno agreements have adopted from the discussions carried on in the League and the

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documents passed through the committees of the League, nor will I deal with their relation to the Geneva Protocol. Even if they are not what the Protocol was intended to be, they are fully permeated with it and represent a great step towards it. I merely emphasize the fact itself.

The Locarno agreements introduce, for the first time in the history of European politics, the obligation — after the model of the Geneva Protocol — on the part of sovereign states in no case to resort to war but to settle all disputes by peaceful methods. I do not contend that this means a definitive end to wars. But at any rate it means that war in Western and Central Europe is rendered difficult and, in particular, that the danger of it is probably postponed for many decades.

The Locarno treaties, themselves the result of work by the League of Nations (a resolution passed at Geneva in September emphasizes this fact), signify further an undoubted strengthening of the League of Nations. They are conceived in the League spirit, and in all the peace organisation which they have brought into being they give the League of Nations a far-reaching task. They have also won Germany for the League of Nations, without whom the League could neither be complete nor quite normal. In this way they constrain all other countries which are not members of the League to begin to look upon the policy of the League with rather different eyes than in the past.

IV. THE NEXT STEP

I should like to emphasize one final political fact. It was clear to everyone that the tension existing in Europe after the war could not last very long. An agreement between the two sides that had fought the war had to be reached. The agreement which has now been arrived at means a fundamental change in the political situation of Europe: Germany is returning to European political life on a basis of full equal rights as a new Great Power. This is a significant thing for Europe and we must make ourselves well aware of it. It signifies the creation of a new psychological atmosphere in Europe, a new European equilibrium, and new international conditions in general. Locarno represents also an attempt to arrive at moral disarmament, a new moral consolidation and therefore also political and economic consolidation. It means that for a long time to come the present *status quo* will be accepted in Western and Central Europe, a fact which is

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of immense political importance. Finally, it means that present-day Russia will be obliged, willy nilly, to take this into account, to include it definitively in its calculations, and, accordingly, to come to an agreement with the rest of Europe. I should like to point out that we must prepare ourselves for an agreement of this kind also with Russia. *The time is not far distant when there will be a second Locarno, when the whole of Europe will arrive at an agreement with Russia.* This will be of advantage alike to Russia and to Europe. The United States of America, also, gradually and in the course of time, will probably change its attitude towards Europe in consequence of the Locarno agreements.

Looking back at the development of the problem of European security as we have sketched it through its three stages, we see that it was a question of a universal solution only in the second stage. In the first and third stages the question of security was narrowed down to perfecting first of all the organization of security in those parts of Europe — the Rhine district and Central Europe — where political and economic opposites have clashed so often and with such force that the effect was felt not only over the whole continent but also beyond the seas. It was seen that to safeguard peace in these critical parts of Europe meant safeguarding it to a very considerable extent in the whole of Europe and also outside Europe. This is the last phase of the contemporary process of pacification; it is the phase which will serve as the basis of further endeavors to arrive at security and to cause the benefits of peace to be spread over as large an area as possible.

The World War was the grave of a long series of pacificist endeavors and experiments. The League of Nations is a post-war expression of the undying faith that it is possible, by gradually increasing the solidarity of mankind, to render difficult, impossible even, the conscious and deliberate slaughtering of man by man. The League of Nations Covenant means a great step forward along the path to a more lasting peace, but, as we have said, it does not mean everything. It was therefore supplemented by the Protocol and by its system of arbitration. The authors of the Protocol were well aware that they would not abolish all extreme cases, that is, wars, but they knew that they could improve the Covenant and that with the aid of the Protocol they could settle a greater number of disputes. They knew that the ideal could not be realized all at once, but they were certain that they could at

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least come nearer to their distant goal. They made their attempt because they did not wish to pursue a policy of all or nothing and because they were unwilling to appear to assume the inevitability of the existence of wars. They well knew that there is no perfection in this world and that it is impossible in the short period of a few weeks to bring into being what could not be accomplished in thousands of years. But they wished to take a step forward, and they were of the opinion that one day it would be said that it had been worth the trouble.

The negotiations over the security problem showed that we had not yet arrived at the point where it could be solved by means of a universal document. Locarno represents an attempt to arrive at the same end by stages, — by treaties and local regional pacts which are permeated with the spirit of the Geneva Protocol, — these to be constantly supplemented, until at last, within the framework of the League of Nations, they are absorbed by one great world convention guaranteeing world security and peace by the enforcing of the rule of law in inter-state life.

In the session of the Council of the League of Nations in March, 1925, when the idea of regional treaties was opposed to the idea of the Protocol, I expressed my doubts or rather my secret hopes as follows: "When the idea of a regional treaty under the aegis of the League of Nations and the Covenant begins to receive thorough study, I am practically certain that if there is a real desire for something lasting and firm, something providing genuine security, we shall necessarily return to the idea of some kind of Protocol, a limited, partial Protocol perhaps, one which is more elastic than is our own and more immediately practicable: but it will be return to a system that is analogous with the present Protocol." Today the necessity to confirm and supplement the Covenant is recognized by everyone. I think that this aim can be attained only by a system based on the great principles that we incorporated in the Protocol. Meanwhile we have commenced along other lines which may prove to be very good and may lead at last to the same result.

Though there may be different methods of approach, as far as concerns the period of realization I am not a pessimist. But time is needful for enterprises of this kind. It is necessary to be patient, and to go on working unwearyingly, without losing courage, and with sincerity and devotion.

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CONCERNING SENATOR BORAH

By Walter Lippmann

I

IN due course Senator Borah has been made Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. He has come into this high estate not by election of the people or by choice of his own party but under the rule of seniority. He has outlasted his predecessors. I mention this fact because it establishes his independence at the outset. A man who has attained an office because he is alive and because he continues to be elected by the people of Idaho is under no great compulsion to regard himself as the mere mouthpiece of a President or of a Secretary of State. *Deo volente*, he will survive them both. If only he continues to eat moderately, to exercise regularly, to sleep well, and to keep about half the voters in the State of Idaho on his side, he can look with cool detachment on any suggestion that issues from the White House.

The ordinary inducements to conformity count for little in Mr. Borah's case. There are many more voters on the island of Manhattan alone than in the whole State of Idaho; with such a small constituency to nurse Senator Borah does not have to worry about the favors and threats of the national administration. His constituency is manageable. He can really talk to it and make a direct personal contact with the local leaders who dispose of votes. No wonder his faith in an appeal to the people is unshaken, for there are so few people to whom he has to make his appeal. A loyal following of less than seventy-five thousand voters in Idaho is enough to make his reëlection certain. Mr. Borah does not need to worry. A national administration cannot help or hurt him much.

But he can help or hurt the Administration. He is the greatest figure in the Northwest, and the Northwest is about as warmly attached to the Republican Party as the Irish Free State is to the United Kingdom. The Northwest votes Republican in Presidential years, and then forms a coalition with the Democrats against almost all major Republican policies. President Coolidge and the Republicans of the East know that there are good reasons for being very kind to Senator Borah. For although he has never actually run away as Roosevelt did in 1912, there is

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something about him which suggests that he might. He is allowed to go his own way, therefore, in the reasonable hope that if he is given enough space to roam about within the party, he will find it convenient to stay inside the party.

Thus it has come to pass that wholly domestic considerations have given Mr. Borah a peculiar independence in international affairs.

II

He exercises the power of protest and of veto. It is a power exactly suited to his temperament. For Senator Borah has little interest in what is usually called constructive statesmanship. He is not possessed by a desire to make two institutions grow where one grew before. He does not like and he does not trust officials and committees and administrative hierarchies and executive orders and large payrolls and pensions. When some one comes to him with a proposal for elaborating the machinery of society, be it to maintain peace, to protect children, or to pension and instruct mothers, it is no lack of interest in the object but a congenital dislike of the machinery which brings him finally into opposition. Borah was born and bred on the frontier far from the complexity of modern civilization; it is in his bones to distrust formality and collective red tape, and to rely upon direct speech, common knowledge, individual salvation and his own conception of the sovereign power of the moral law. The strain of Jefferson, and of Rousseau, of the Reformers before them, runs strongly in Borah. He believes in the natural goodness of man, and, when that goodness is deficient, in the natural right of man to be damned in his own way. Thus recently he wrote to me, quoting Buckle, that "the most valuable additions made to legislation have been enactments destructive of preceding legislation." The real business of the statesman, in his philosophy, is not to construct institutions for the regimentation of men but to tear down those vested follies of the ages which thwart the natural goodness of mankind. Therefore, when Borah considers a new proposal he does not ask himself: What does this add to the machinery of living? Borah asks himself: Does it subtract from a machinery which is already top-heavy? Thus, the word constructive casts no spell upon him; he has read history with a deeply protestant mind and has concluded that what statesmen have usually constructed is a prison house for the soul.

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It follows inevitably that the career of Borah is built upon opposition. He has been against the League, and against the Court, and against the Pacific Pact, and against the British funding arrangements, and against the Wilson-Hughes Russian policy, and against the Caribbean policy, and against the Isle of Pines Treaty, and against the exclusion of Count Karolyi and Mr. Saklatvala, and against the alien property administration, and against the bonus, and against the Child Labor Amendment, and against Coolidge Republicanism, and against LaFollette insurgency. He is an instinctive conscientious objector, and his mind seizes swiftly upon the reasons why anything that is about to be done should not be done. His passion is to expose, to ventilate, to protest, to prevent and to destroy. Since he does not have a hankering to create institutions, pass laws, or facilitate agreements he has no use for the reticences and frustrations that are required in public affairs. Thus, for example, he was once arguing with Senator Brandegee that treaties should be discussed publicly in the Senate, and Mr. Brandegee had made the point that too much plain speech might give offense to foreign countries. "What are these delicate questions," retorted Senator Borah, "which may offend foreign powers? These delicate questions are too often questions of dubious righteousness." Only a man who has risen by appealing to audiences rather than by making executive decisions would, I think, have said that.

III

Now ordinarily such a man would find himself extremely unpopular in a country where the passion for doing something, or even anything, is so highly regarded. He would be labelled a chronic kicker and dismissed from the society of the righteous and the efficient.

That has not been Senator Borah's fate. It may be that he has lost a little in prestige since he became the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Many people say he has, but I am not so sure they are right. For they are the same people who think that the whole term of Mr. Coolidge will be like the present honeymoon when nobody is seriously dissatisfied with anything. It is in the nature of things that a great protestant like Borah should lose lustre in a time of fabulous complacency and contentment. But as surely as there will be new causes for discontent, so there will be a revival of Borah's influence. For in the

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existing confusion and paralysis of the Democratic Party he is the natural rallying point of the opposition.

In America today anyone who is out of sorts with anything thinks first of Mr. Borah. That is why he has grown great on opposition rather than weak by his chronic objecting. Within the last few years most of the large blocs of voters have been more deeply opposed to something than they have been eager for anything. The internationally minded wanted the League and the Court but Borah touched their hearts by his outspoken opposition to the Ruhr, by his Russian attitude, his Haitian attitude, and his Chinese. The strong nationalists deplored Borah's affection for the underdog nations, but where could they find a champion comparable to him in their fight against coöperation with Europe? He delighted the upper classes in the East with his attack on the bonus, and he delighted the people of the West by his attack on the international bankers who desire an easy settlement of the debts. He opposed the Child Labor Amendment and pleased the conservatives, and he opposed the suppression of free speech and pleased the liberals. Mr. Borah has not become an outcast like most objectors because he has made common cause at one time or another with every influential group.

On whichever side he fights he is a host in himself, and those who have had him as their champion in one cause readily forgive him for all the pet projects of theirs which he has brought to nothing. Borah is a very inspiring man to have on one's own side of the argument. He knows what is theatrically effective, he has an air of common sense, a resourcefulness, and an eloquence, which have made him the most successful debater in the Senate. He has a still greater quality than these. Borah's opposition has no poison in it. For some subtle reason, Borah does not make enemies of his opponents. One would expect that a man who had fought everybody's dearest project at one time or another would be hated throughout the land. Borah is not hated anywhere. On the contrary there is not a gathering from a bankers' convention to a communist meeting where Borah is not respected. He was the one irreconcilable enemy of the League with whom the friends of the League were on friendly terms. He has opposed almost everybody and has embittered almost nobody.

This is due in part to the liking which everyone feels for a man who is known to be brave, in part also to his vitality and his

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poise, and to the sense that he is not bitten and driven by jealousies and animosities. There is a natural well-ventilated health in Borah which distinguishes him from the run of overfed, tobacco-laden, anecdotal indoor politicians. But there is also a deeper ground of confidence. Borah's opposition has nothing exotic about it. He is not against this or that because he believes in strange doctrines. When a man denies he also affirms, and Borah always affirms the oldest American traditions and the simplest popular prejudices. He believes in helping the underdog, in distrusting powerful foreigners, in distrusting politicians, in preserving the Constitution, and in holding on to the taxpayer's money. When Borah is in opposition to the Child Labor Amendment nobody thinks he wishes to exploit children; when he opposes the League nobody thinks he is a militarist and a jingo; when he opposes the Haitian occupation nobody supposes he has fallen in love with the Haitians; and when he pleads for Russia, *mirabile dictu*, nobody, not even the most furious patrioteer, thinks he is in the pay of Moscow. He has fought the battle of the jingo and the pacifist, the reactionary and the radical, and yet he has not merged his identity with any of them.

IV

It would not occur to Senator Borah, I think, that he must sacrifice any of his liberty of action because he had become Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. He has always spoken his mind on all subjects, and he continues to speak it. If he does not like French policy in Morocco, or British policy in China, he says so just as plainly as if he were still a mere Senator. If he does not like what he hears about the intentions of the President in respect to the French debt, he says so loudly and publicly. He feels perfectly free to indulge in running comment on the acts of foreign powers, on the domestic affairs of other nations, on their statesmen and their national habits, on their ambitions and supposed purposes, and on any and all negotiations however delicate at any time while they are in progress. He is not concerned apparently about the difficulty which foreigners experience because they do not know whether they are being lectured by William E. Borah of Idaho or by the Senate of the United States as a coördinate part of the treaty-making power.

He feels himself privileged to use the prestige of his office to

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promote the influence of his opinions. The ensuing troubles of the Executive do not break his heart, and the demands of all institutions that men suppress themselves and conform mean very little to him. Mr. Borah is a confirmed bachelor who somehow finds himself married to the Executive. I do not say he will be unfaithful, but heaven pity the Executive if it expects Borah to worry about the whole darn family.

As a matter of fact he regards it as his high duty to watch the Executive with the utmost suspicion. The history of secret diplomacy in Europe has made a deep impression on him and he believes that the wars and miseries of mankind are due chiefly to the irresponsible intrigues of diplomats. He has also a sublime faith that legislatures and popular majorities are in the nature of things pacific and just. It is the very essence of his philosophy that bad deeds are done in the dark, and that light brings righteousness. I have never detected the quiver of a doubt on his part that this is one of the eternal verities, but also I do not recall any attempt on his part to consider the weight of popular prejudice which beats upon a statesman who might wish to appease the Japanese, or to deal rationally with debts and reparations. It is a fundamental fact about Borah that he accepts the dogma of open diplomacy at face value.

V

It will be a decisive fact in the immediate future of our foreign relations that Senator Borah looks upon the ancient prerogatives of the Senate as suited to the practice of open diplomacy. Other chairmen of the Committee, Senator Lodge for example, have been jealous to maintain the rights of the Senate against the President, but they have been moved, if I read them correctly, by the inveterate desire of all men to hold and extend a vested right. But Mr. Borah is moved by a passion to thwart evil by publicity, and the powers of the Senate are for him a means to that end. He is more determined than Mr. Lodge ever was to make the Senate a major partner in diplomatic affairs, for Mr. Borah plays no favorites and cares nothing, where Mr. Lodge cared much, for the unity and glory of the Republican Party. Mr. Borah's insistence on the rôle of the Senate is inspired, therefore, by a faith that meant little to Mr. Lodge. It is a faith in the ultimate righteousness of an appeal to the people. If the Senators were consulted and if the Senators advised, Mr. Lodge

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was satisfied. He insisted that the President recognize the Senators. Mr. Borah, on the other hand, conceives it to be the duty of the Senate to force the President to consult the whole electorate.

Thus Senator Borah is engaged in trying to turn the treaty-making powers of the Senate into the means to a very open popular diplomacy. The experiment will be well worth watching because surely there can be no doubt that with the increase of contact across frontiers various interests within each nation are bound to play a larger part in the conduct of foreign policy. It has ceased to be possible for diplomacy to be in the sole keeping of the head of the state. The Executive must obtain the advice and consent of many people if his engagements with a foreign nation are to be binding. The question is whether the Constitutional powers of the Senate under Article 2, Section 2, can be stretched to cover this new need.

They were not designed to make possible an open diplomacy. The authors of the Constitution certainly did not suppose that they were compelling the President to open up the whole conduct of foreign policy to popular discussion. *The Federalist* commends Article 2, Section 2, because it "provides that our negotiations for treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived from talents, information, integrity and deliberate investigation on the one hand, and from secrecy and dispatch on the other." In another place the writers of *The Federalist* argue that the House of Representatives is not fit to participate because "decision, secrecy and dispatch are incompatible with the genius of a body so variable and so numerous." It is plain that the authors of the Constitution thought that the President would consult in secret with a small body of men; there were only twenty-six Senators at that time, and the President needed only to convince about eighteen of them. The House which the fathers rejected as too variable and too numerous was then smaller than the present Senate. It consisted of only sixty-five members. President Washington himself tried once to consult the small Senate of that day about the treaty with the Creek Indians, and had such an unpleasant time that he never tried it again. Later when the House asked him for information about the Jay Treaty he refused, saying that "the nature of foreign relations requires caution and their success must often depend on secrecy."

While it is clear enough what the authors of the Constitution

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meant, they did not state what they meant very clearly. The phrase "advice and consent" is so vague that it left room for a large development of our constitutional practice. Thus by the beginning of the twentieth century the powers of the Senate had, at least in the opinion of Senator Lodge, grown to the point where the Senate virtually had the right to negotiate independently with a foreign power. The doctrine of Lodge is worth looking at here, for our hero, Mr. Borah, has adopted it and is making the fullest possible use of it.

The doctrine was enunciated by Mr. Lodge in an article written for *Scribner's Magazine* in 1902 and reprinted by the Senate in 1921. Mr. Lodge felt that a little lecture on American constitutional law was in order, for Lord Lansdowne, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had evinced a regrettable inability to understand the Senate. The noble Lord said he was puzzled by the behavior of the Senate in amending the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty; he complained that contrary to well-established international usage His Majesty's Government, "without any previous attempt to ascertain their views," had suddenly been confronted with a new proposal. Lord Lansdowne was used to dealing with foreign offices but he had never yet been asked to conduct a diplomatic negotiation with a branch of the legislature.

Mr. Lodge proceeded, icily and firmly, to set him right:

> "Mr. Hay and Lord Pauncefote open a negotiation for the modification of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. . . . After due discussion they agree upon and sign a treaty. That agreement, so far as Great Britain is concerned, requires only the approval of the King for its completion, but with the United States it is very different, because no treaty can be ratified by the President of the United States without the consent of the Senate. . . . *But he (Lord Lansdowne) does not seem to have realized that the Senate could properly continue the negotiations begun by Mr. Hay and Lord Pauncefote by offering new or modified propositions to His Majesty's Government.*" (Italics mine.)

A treaty drawn by the President in agreement with a foreign power is still "inchoate," said Mr. Lodge; it is "a mere project for a treaty." And so a foreign power which sets out to make a treaty with the United States must deal first with the State Department at one end of Pennsylvania Avenue and then with another State Department at the other end. Lord Lansdowne must have found that very strange. He had not yet learned that a diplomatic affair with the United States is like a two vol-

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ume novel in which the hero marries the heroine at the end of the first volume and divorces her triumphantly at the end of the second.

In asserting these powers of the Senate Mr. Lodge planted himself on the meaning of the Constitution. In the interpretation of this clause it is a case of each man his own oracle, for if one thing is clear it is that the Fathers had no very prophetic idea of how they meant Article 2, Section 2, to work. Hamilton wrote a paper on the subject for *The Federalist*, and the paper is one of the least illuminating he ever wrote. But in one clause of a sentence devoted to a very different subject he speaks of obtaining "sanction in the progressive stages of a treaty." Although this does not bear out Senator Lodge's notion that the Senate could "continue the negotiations" by itself, it does seem to say that the Senate was to advise and consent not merely on the completed treaty, but step by step in the negotiations.

VI

The moral of it all is that the Constitution itself is so ambiguous that it could be stretched to cover any workable arrangement. The real difficulty for Mr. Borah or for anyone else who wishes to see the legislature play a serious part in diplomacy is that large bodies of men cannot conduct a negotiation or initiate a policy. As a general rule they can only approve or disapprove propositions presented to them. The Senate can accept or reject a treaty; it can even occasionally adopt amendments proposed by Senators; it can make reservations. The Congress can declare war; it can appropriate money or refuse to appropriate money to carry out an international obligation. Yet these powers, great as they are, control only a very small area of diplomatic action. At the most they may be sufficient to compel the President to consider whether he can enlist the support of the legislature for the policies he is pursuing. The President is like a general with a somewhat mutinous army on his hands; he cannot be sure his troops will follow him. Occasionally his troops will run away from him. But whether his troops obey or disobey they do not determine the strategy of the campaign. He determines the strategy in the light of the support he can muster.

The attempt of a legislature to control foreign policy is in the nature of things an attempt to make the tail wag the dog. Congress alone, for example, has the power to declare war. But

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the President has the power to make war and to put Congress in the position where it must either back him up or haul down the flag. The Executive who believes a war is necessary can create a situation where Congress really has no choice. He can occupy ports, shoot off the cannon, and get himself embroiled so that no patriotic legislature will refuse to help him out. It is something of a fiction to say that Congress alone can declare war. It is nearer the truth to say that Congress has a theoretical right to decide whether a war which has already begun shall be continued. But Congress has no power to say how long the war shall be continued. For the President can make an armistice when he chooses.

The power of the Senate over treaties is no less elusive. In theory no covenant binding the action of the United States can be made without its consent; in fact every President makes decisions which are binding without the consent of the Senate. He may do this by exchanges of notes, by gentlemen's agreements, by the mere fact that when the President does one thing something else follows by the logic of necessity. The intervention of the Senate when formal treaties are presented to it occurs in the presence of a mountain of accomplished facts. The Senate can tinker a little with the text, but as a general practice it must take it or leave it. And even if the Senate takes the treaty, the real meaning of the treaty eludes the Senate because the power of interpretation and administration remains with the Executive. "Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws," said Bishop Hoadley, "it is he who is truly the law-giver to all intents and purposes."

How very elusive is the legislative control of foreign affairs may be seen by a remarkable memorandum in the Roosevelt papers.[1] On July 29, 1905, the Japanese Premier, Count Katsura, had a "conversation" with a personal representative of President Roosevelt. This spokesman, who remains anonymous to this day, was not a member of the State Department. The conversation was secret, and the agreed memorandum of it was confirmed by a telegram from the President. It is a statement of Roosevelt's Far Eastern policy, and contains the following passage:

> "The Count well understands the traditional policy of the United States . . . and perceives fully the impossibility of their entering into a formal alliance . . . with foreign nations, but in view of our common

[1] For text cf., Tyler Dennett, "Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War," p. 112.

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> interests he could (not) see why some good understanding or an alliance in practice if not in name, should not be made between these three (Britain, Japan and the United States) nations, insofar as respects affairs in the Far East. With such understanding firmly formed, general peace in these regions would be easily maintained to the great benefit of all concerned.
>
> "(The American spokesman) said that it was difficult, indeed impossible, for the President of the United States to enter even to an understanding amounting in effect to a confidential informal agreement, without the consent of the Senate, but that he felt sure that without any agreement at all the people of the United States was so fully in accord with the people of Japan and Great Britain in the maintenance of peace in the Far East that whatever occasion arose appropriate action of the Government of the United States, in conjunction with Japan and Great Britain, for such a purpose could be counted on by them quite as confidently as if the United States were under treaty obligations to take (it)."

All this was quite correct no doubt for it explicitly disclaims a formal alliance. But it was none the less a secret understanding about a great international question, and the Senate was not consulted. This is not an isolated case. One could duplicate it, I believe, many times in the administrations of other Presidents because the necessity of reaching agreements with foreign powers overrides all theory. President Roosevelt at the time wrote to George Kennan, who had proposed an open alliance with Japan and Britain, that he was "talking academically. . . . I might just as well strive for the moon as for such a policy as you indicate. Mind you, I personally entirely agree with you." And yet he gave Count Katsura fairly definite assurances, much in the spirit of a man who obeys the Volstead Act but has a refined bootlegger.

The effort of the Senate to control the conduct of foreign affairs is bound to be spasmodic, to be feeble as a general rule, but now and then powerfully obstructive. A continuous control in the present state of the world is out of the question. As long as the relations between great states remain essentially combative, until, if ever, their relations are reduced to established law and a formal, orderly, and leisurely procedure, the open, popular control of diplomacy which Mr. Borah desires will remain largely an aspiration. It is incompatible with the prevailing anarchy of heavily armed sovereign states. It is suited only to a pacific world in which there are no dangerous decisions to be made, in which any question can be debated and bungled without fatal damage in the rough and tumble of legislatures and elections. The

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internal peace of the United States is so profound that the methods of Congress are at the worst an inconvenience. But the peace of the world is so fragile that those same methods would convulse it in an unending agitation.

It is the fundamental paradox of Mr. Borah's career that he combines a passion for open diplomacy with a passionate objection to every step toward that world organization under which open diplomacy might ultimately become feasible. Unless he changes more than most men of his eminence change at his age, it is too much to expect that he will resolve that paradox. Mr. Borah is not the kind of man to subject himself to the labor of following through in a patient way the implications of his own ideal. He is a self-sufficient man with great confidence in the promptings of his own conscience. He shrinks instinctively from a train of thought which might compel him to revise certain of his passionate negations, and from a course of action which it would be difficult to explain to large audiences. The definite pursuit of the ideal of open diplomacy would carry him into regions where he is not at home, into fields of coöperation which are unsuited to his temperament.

For he is a virtuoso who plays by ear. He is a powerful obstructor of good and of evil, always gallant and sometimes perverse. Amidst trimmers and place warmers he is a gadfly to the bureaucratic and the toplofty. He is an immense advertisement for the idea of open diplomacy. Like the universe and like the weather the only thing to do about Borah is to accept him. You will find him very useful tomorrow, and you should not complain, then, if he leaves the confused relationship of the President and the Senate no less confused, and the anarchic relations of sovereign states no less anarchic. A man, even when by accident he becomes Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, does not change his character.

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POLITICAL EVOLUTION IN INDIA

By Sir Frederick Whyte

THE Indian Legislature is composed of the Governor-General and the two Chambers — the Council of State and the Legislative Assembly — on the analogy of the King, Lords and Commons of the United Kingdom. It was set up by the Government of India Act, 1919, which, in its turn, was the legislative expression of the well-known pledge given by the Secretary of State for India in the House of Commons on August 20, 1917, in the following words:

> "The policy of His Majesty's Government with which the Government of India are in complete accord is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the Administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire."

Thus a pledge, given at the very height of the European War, was redeemed without delay; and before the ink was dry on the Armistice agreement, the Secretary of State had drafted the measure which was to offer the peoples of India a larger instalment of responsible government than ever before.

There are two aspects of this departure which are important. The first is that the British Parliament chose the moment of victory for the inauguration of the new Indian Constitution; and the second is that the Constitution is really new. There is no need to labor the first of these points. No candid critic can pretend that the British nation failed to redeem — and more than redeem — the political pledges it gave to India during the war. The fact which marks the novelty of the departure was that before the Government of India Act, 1919, was passed, India possessed no legislature in the true sense. The Legislative Councils set up by Lord Morley's Act were in essence an extension, though a large extension, of the then existing system; and their author himself emphatically declared that they were not Parliaments. He was right. And we need not now enquire whether he foresaw the inevitable demand which the rapidly maturing political consciousness of India would provoke. The germ of his policy lay far back in the

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days of the East India Company; and he made no departure from established principle.

The Government of India Act, 1919, made a new departure: and Lord Chelmsford, then Viceroy, was justified in saying that the new Constitution represented the abdication of autocracy and the inauguration of genuine political coöperation between the governments and the peoples of India. The autocratic power of the Government of India and of the local governments was veiled, not impaired, by the Legislative Councils of the Morley-Minto period (1909); but the change wrought by the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms was so substantial as to amount to a political revolution. No longer are the Provincial Legislative Councils or the Indian Legislature mere consultative committees with certain powers which merely whet inquisitiveness; they are legislatures enjoying large political opportunities. The practice of the Constitution for the past three years proves the truth of this statement, for though the Governor-General still possesses constitutional powers, which may be called the residue of the old autocracy, he has used them so sparingly that no one can accuse him of lightly disregarding the wishes of his Legislature. Moreover, though the Government is not in strict constitutional usage responsible to the Indian Legislature, the history of the Delhi Parliament since 1920 shows that it is responsive to it.

It may be appropriate here, before we review the events of 1921-1925, to glance at the composition of the Legislative Assembly. The Government of India is well represented by the presence of three members of the Governor-General's Executive Council, four or five secretaries to Government, and about a dozen other officials representing various public departments. Considering the fact that most of these men have been trained in the school of administrative efficiency, which regards talk as the enemy of work, they have displayed a remarkable aptitude for parliamentary life. With few exceptions they have upheld the policy of the Government in debate after debate by a combination of skill, candor, and good humor which has done much to promote the growth of good parliamentary traditions. They stand in a position unique in the governments of the world, being the only administration which is in a permanent minority in the House of which it forms a part.

Facing it on the other side of the chamber is the non-official majority, of whom only nine are Europeans, and ninety are Indians. For the most part the members of the majority were new

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to parliamentary life when they came to Delhi in 1921; but they quickly settled down to their work and throughout the last five years have unfailingly displayed a desire to follow the best traditions of the House of Commons. The nine provinces of India are represented in the Chamber in varying strength according to their population and importance; and, if they vary in strength, they vary even more in quality. At the outset in the first Assembly, 1921–1923, Madras took the lead but lost it to Bombay in 1923. Three or four of the leading members of the Madras group were, and are, men who would make their mark in any Chamber. They are for the most part lawyers, and display a suppleness of mind and an aptitude for debate to which they owed their original hegemony in the Chamber. They lack practical experience, not only of administrative problems, but also of commerce and industry, but their general forensic ability has enabled them largely to conceal this defect. The defect itself would, of course, come sharply into prominence if they were called upon to assume large executive responsibilities.

The only province which approached Madras in parliamentary ability in the first Assembly, and far outstripped it in the second, is Bombay; and it may be said that even at first the Bombay representatives never allowed Madras to have it all their own way. On all occasions when the House was transacting business of a practical kind in legislation or in finance, the more varied experience of the Bombay members, particularly in commerce, gave their speeches a far greater weight in debate. These two provinces stand far ahead of all the rest. One of the surprises of the Legislative Assembly was the comparative mediocrity of the representation of Bengal. It is not so very long ago that Bengal was one of the leaders of political India, but the lack of staying power in her sons and their incurable emotionalism militate against political success, and today the reputation of Bengal in the Legislative Assembly rests mainly on the active part which one or two individuals from Calcutta take in its proceedings. The other six provinces are only remarkable for an individual here and there whom they have sent to represent them. None of them catches the eye on account of the outstanding quality of its general representation; and some time must obviously elapse before, say, the Punjab or the United Provinces, both in themselves vitally important factors in the Indian polity, can reveal their capabilities under the new dispensation.

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One other feature may be noted before we pass to the account of work done. A certain number of provincial officials are nominated by the Governor-General, on the recommendation of the respective local governments, to represent often widely differing interests of the nine Provinces at Delhi. In 1921 the local governments seemed to have decided that the Delhi Parliament was a convenient place on which to dump the square pegs that would not fit the round holes of their administration. In consequence they played little or no part in the life of the Assembly. This practice was reversed on the urgent recommendation of the Government of India; and today the provinces are represented in the Assembly by men — both British and Indian — who, on notable occasions, have taken an effective part in influencing its decisions.

Generally speaking, the parliamentary standard which the Delhi Parliament has set up for itself is not unworthy of the task which it has to perform. If we remember the comparative inexperience of the great bulk of its Members — the Council of State (the second chamber) on the whole is the more experienced body — we may endorse, with some reservation, the good opinion which the Assembly has of itself. It has shown a sense of responsibility in many of its decisions on public policy. It accepted, in the lean years of 1921, 1922, and 1923 (in part), its own share of the odium which attaches to increased taxation: it refused *nemine contradicente* to ask for the release of Muhammad and Shaukat Ali in 1922 when these two brothers were the fire-brands of the Muslim wing of the Non-Coöperation movement: in the same session it rejected by a considerable majority a resolution demanding the abandonment of what are called "Repressive Measures:" it conducted itself with remarkable decorum, though not without some display of hot feeling, in the debate on the forced resignation of Mr. Montagu over the Turkish Question in 1923: and it has never, for long, practised the art of parliamentary obstruction for its own sake. The Swaraj Party is publicly committed to the policy of extorting constitutional concessions by obstruction — or what America calls "filibustering"— but it has achieved little by it and is not sorry to find excuses for moderating its former intransigence. Now, remembering that within certain limits the majority can practically do what it likes, this last statement is all the more remarkable for it proves that, by and large, the Legislative Assembly has been animated by a desire to transact business in an orderly fashion.

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Cognate to this is the attitude of the Assembly towards the Executive. Relations between the Government and the majority have, on the whole, been friendly, and though some of the debates have given opportunities for the display of sharp racial feeling, this nastiest of all poisons has not affected the personal relation between individual and individual in the Chamber. To this result everyone has contributed in his own degree, and the harmony between the two sides of the House is a credit to both. The patience of the Government has been tried severely on some occasions when the majority, through inexperience, failed to appreciate the difficulties which any executive government has to surmount. These difficulties are in themselves great enough, and they are greatest where, as in India, the Government has not full control over the majority in the Chamber. Adequately to discuss the problem here mooted is beyond the scope of this article, but we may repeat here what has been said often before of the present Indian Constitution, that the situation in which an irremovable executive and an iresponsible majority stand face to face in the same Chamber is unstable and cannot last long.

The formation of parties in Delhi greatly agitated the lobbies at first. The parties themselves remained embryonic for the first three years and will probably represent a somewhat unreal division of opinion until the Constitution itself reaches a more stable condition. As long as the constitutional question overshadows all other Indian political problems, just so long will the formation of parties along lines of genuine political and economic cleavage fail to progress. We need go no further than the proceedings of the political conventions held in Delhi February, 1923 and 1924 for proof of the fact that, when Indians assemble to make a political program, their proceedings are devoted entirely to such questions as the relation between the Government of India and the Secretary of State, or whether the Legislative Assembly shall be entitled to control army expenditure.

When we speak of Indian parties, however, we must remember that party politics as practised in Britain and America is unknown in India. There are a number of loosely strung organisations that call themselves parties, but the lines of cleavage are indistinct, and in most cases unreal. This is partly due to the character of the present Constitution, and partly to the prevailing incapacity of the Indian for large scale organisation. The General Election of 1923 awakened the interest of the average educated

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Indian in the names and programs of parties; but his choice of a political home is nearly always dictated rather by accidental personal influences than by any definite choice of principle, with the probable exception that the Swaraj party — ex-Non-Co-operators from Mr. Gandhi's movement — possesses the attraction of the big unit for the small, by its mass and momentum.

In other lands where the science of politics is more widely studied and the art of politics more effectively practised, the people tend naturally to fall into substantial groups representing definite conflicts of social or economic interests. India is full of such conflicts, but the present character of the Government of India and the prevailing irresponsible nature of the Indian Legislatures, both Provincial and Central, tend to throw all the native Indian political troups into a somewhat heterogeneous alliance of opposition against the Government. The main line of cleavage is, therefore, racial; and though the feuds that rage between Hindu and Mussulman, between Brahmin and non-Brahmin, sometimes reach a climax of the fiercest intensity, neither of them has made its mark as clearly upon the proceedings of the Legislatures during the last three years as the inevitable cleavage between the Indian and the European in India. And this must be so as long as it appears to the Indian that, in all matters vital to his country, the last word of decision rests, not with himself or with his fellow-countrymen, but with the Imperial Parliament in London and its servant, the Government of India in Simla, neither of which, he claims, can really understand the needs of his motherland. Western education has awakened him to his own needs, both political, economic, and social, and has armed him with arguments and precedents to prove that peoples should govern themselves.

The presence, therefore, of those who are not Indians at the seat of power in India explains the apparently artificial alignment of Indian parties. It would be waste of time to describe in alphabetical series the many groups and sects that have moved across the Indian political stage; but a brief record of the parties and personalities engaged in the election of 1923 may be given as an introduction to the situation which has arisen since.

Setting aside the innumerable political sects which so variegated a country as India must always produce, we may say that the mind of India today, like Caesar's Gaul, falls into three parts.

The extreme left or revolutionary wing is held by the Non-

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Coöperation Party, in which Gandhi is now the only outstanding personality. This party, almost all-powerful three years ago, itself largely the creation of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi's strange and striking personality, has undergone a serious decline, amounting almost to paralysis. When Gandhi went to prison in 1923 no one appeared to carry his mantle. The chief organ of Non-Coöperation, the Indian National Congress — ironically enough under the leadership of those who were professedly Gandhi's most devoted lieutenants a few months before — publicly threw Gandhi overboard, and has since been engaged in maintaining an elaborate pretence of unity where everyone knows that the organisation is rent with personal jealousy and political dissension from top to bottom. If Non-Coöperation is to be restored as a revolutionary force in India, it must purge itself of its elements of conflict and find an effective program. There is no sign of its being able to do either.

The second Indian party represented a new element, and may be called the party of the White Sheet. It bears the name of Swaraj, which is, perhaps, the most comprehensive shibboleth ever devised to enable people who disagree to pretend that they do not. Literally interpreted the word means "self-rule" or "home-rule." Five years ago Gandhi announced it as the war-cry of Non-Coöperation, and wisely refused to define it, though occasionally he gave half a dozen definitions from which you could choose which you liked best. Today it is the name borne by the party led till the day of his death, in 1925, by C. R. Das, of Bengal, a politician who had enough intelligence to realise that Gandhi's old program was politically impossible, and that no leader could embark on the course of Non-Coöperation which Gandhi marked out for himself without deliberately realising that it must lead to bloodshed and revolution. C. R. Das did not want revolution but played with it. Knowing that, in the circumstances, Indian home rule is to be won neither by Gandhi's passive resistance nor by Irish methods, he screwed up his courage to declare publicly that the road to self-government lay through the political institutions set up by the Government of India Act of 1919. This declaration represented a shrewd estimate of present-day political values in India, and at the same time it was perhaps the most abject capitulation that a public man ever made. In a word, C. R. Das confessed in 1923 that he was a blind and blundering fool in 1920.

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The Swaraj Party, first under C. R. Das and now under Pandit Motilal Nehru (of Allahabad), therefore represents the dawn of sanity in the ranks of Indian revolutionaries. It must not be supposed that this statement means that anarchical conspiracy and the like do not still rumble underground and may not still break into the open, but it is justified because the greater part of those who were the brains of revolutionary conspiracy in Bengal and elsewhere earlier in the present century have now definitely forsworn the bomb and the dagger and have chosen the path of constitutional reform.

The third party is to be found in the National Liberal Federation of India, a substantial but not too well organised body of educated political opinion which during the three years 1921 to 1923 was well represented in the Legislative Councils of the Provinces, and in the Legislative Assembly and Council of State at Delhi. To the courage of those who called themselves "Liberals" is due the fact that the new Constitution launched in 1921 has had any chance of life at all. These men coöperated with the Government to inaugurate and establish the new Legislatures; and if these bodies weathered the storms of the first three years, the National Liberal Federation and the Government of India may share the credit between them. It would be too much to say that this Federation represents the right wing of Indian politics; and yet, in contrast to the revolutionaries of Non-Coöperation, the Federationists ought rather to be called the "Conservatives" than the "Liberals" of India. Yet this, too, would be misleading, for they are progressive in many senses of the word; and probably for some time to come India will have to look to the personalities of the Federation for her ministers and for administrators.

The broad lines of political division in India are set out above, undisturbed by all the confusing little by-paths and cross-roads that lead nowhere in particular. Anyone who obtains a clear view of the three forces briefly described above and bears in mind the fact that the anonymous entity called "Government" is still the greatest power in India and therefore to be reckoned among her effective political forces, will understand something of the present situation — a situation in transition — and in order to simplify the presentation, eliminate from the picture irrelevant and confusing detail.

Let me retrace the steps of this argument for the moment to examine a little more closely the origin and present plight of the

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Non-Coöperation movement. Though it may be said to be but one more manifestation of Indian unrest, like the Swadeshi and Bengal Partition agitations of ten years ago, it presented a somewhat different character from them. It was born in the general ferment of "self-determination" during the war, but it might never have assumed the menacing aspect of 1920 had it not been for a series of internal events in India which provoked popular feeling. The story of the enactment of certain measures necessary for the defence of India during the war, and of their reënactment in part after the war, is too long to be told here. Broadly speaking, however, what happened was that the Government of India, foreseeing that it would be deprived of those special powers which the Defence of the Realm Act gave it for the purposes of war, decided to reënact, for a time at all events, some of the more essential powers. The Indian counterpart of the British Defence of the Realm Act was due to come to an end six months after the end of the war. Now, in 1919 no one could have foreseen that the official date for the end of the war, that is, for legal and constitutional purposes, would be the autumn of 1921. Hence the apparent need for the enactment of special legislation to deal with the disturbed state not only of India but of the rest of the world in 1919–20. Indeed, the Government of India was justified by the report of a Committee specially appointed to examine the need for legislation of this kind. This Committee, presided over by Mr. Justice Rowlatt and almost entirely judicial in composition, reported that the continuance of certain emergency powers was necessary. Hence the famous Rowlatt Act. Its passage through the Legislature was made the signal for a prolonged outburst of feeling, and once it became an act, it was magnified and distorted by the less responsible leaders of popular opinion into an engine of torture. The irony of the situation, as we look back on it now, is that the act was never put into operation, though its presence on the statute books very nearly wrecked the new Indian Constitution at the very moment of its launching.

At this time Mr. Gandhi held the key to the position. He was at first disposed to give a guarded welcome to the Government of India Act, 1919, which embodied the new Constitution, and gave to India certain real powers of parliamentary government for the first time. Mr. Gandhi had so far believed in the cause of the Allies that he had actually recruited for the Indian Army in Gujarat, his native part of India; but the publication of the

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secret treaties — which, as readers of FOREIGN AFFAIRS will remember, created such a stir during the latter part of the war, — and the subsequent enactment of the Rowlatt Act by the Imperial Legislative Council (India) shook his faith, and on his own confession it was about this time, between the publication of the secret treaties and 1919, that he began to doubt whether any good could come out of Nazareth. None the less, it was not till after the actual provisions of the new Constitution were known that he decided to turn his face against the Government. Even though he had publicly acknowledged that the new bill offered Indians ampler opportunities than they had ever enjoyed, he was so stung by what he called the attitude of official distrust shown in the Rowlatt Act, that he turned finally against the Government and launched Non-Coöperation on its disastrous career.

Two years later, on August 1st 1921, I stood on the brow of Malabar Hill which looks down upon the city of Bombay. The Chaupatti sands were white with great multitudes of Mr. Gandhi's followers assembled to salute the passing of the British Raj and the establishment of Swaraj. Overhead the lowering monsoon sky spread its heavy grey clouds streaked with orange and gold from the sunset in the west. Beneath our feet lay the city spread out along the Island of Bombay. From half a dozen points, columns of black smoke rose from the piles of burning cloth and mingled their darker shades with the monsoon sky. Non-Coöperation had reached its high water mark. All India hung on Mr. Gandhi's lips; and millions of ignorant men and women all over the Indian countryside, turning to him as to a prophet, saluted the Bombay smoke of August First as the sign that Swaraj had come. For had he not promised the day of delivery on the First of August, and was not the smell of the burning of foreign cloth an omen to show that the day of the alien ruler was over?

It has often been asked: What did Mr. Gandhi mean by Swaraj? Not even he himself knew; or if he did, he professed so many interpretations of it that in the end the world was bewildered and forsook him. Swaraj actually means self-rule; and sometimes he interpreted it in the political sense of responsible government, sometimes he interpreted it in the purely personal sense of self-knowledge, self-discipline, self-control. In truth, Mahatma Gandhi cared nothing for politics and knew nothing of it. Statecraft to him was an unnecessary encumbrance in human life, for

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at the bottom of his heart he believed or professed to believe that the only permanent bonds which can hold human society together are those of good-will and love. The ideal was too high even for him to reach, let alone the common humanity of India; and the policy which he founded on this conception of society naturally broke under the strain of circumstances. He attempted to impose upon his own movement an ideal too high for it; and he confessed himself that he had committed a "Himalayan blunder" in believing that a movement of passive resistence could long remain passive.

Here lay his fundamental error. He and India have paid for it since. But it none the less remains true that his influence, both for good and for evil, stretched more widely throughout India than the influence of any other man in our generation, or perhaps in any other. Non-Coöperation in some of its aspects will soon be forgotten, or will only be remembered as a movement composed of mixed good and evil which was marred by some hideous bloodshed. But whether Non-Coöperation is remembered or not, there is no shadow of doubt that the influence of Mahatma Gandhi will remain, not in virtue of his spinning wheel or his homespun, but in virtue of personal example. It is idle to inquire what personality is, whence it comes or how it can move mountains; but the fact remains that the most novel feature in the whole landscape of India during the past five years has been the awakening of the masses to their political and economic conditions. That awakening is Mahatma Gandhi's work. Thousands, if not millions, of Indians have understood for the first time during these years, vaguely and ignorantly, the meaning of the word "political;" and wherever Gandhi passed, he left behind him an imprint on all minds which will not rapidly be effaced. Therefore, despite all the extravagance, chicanery, corruption and cruelty of the Non-Coöperation movement, the net sum of it is not evil and goes to the credit of its creator.

Why, then, did the ablest men amongst his lieutenants break away from his leadership three years ago, and thereby reduce his political influence to a nullity? In the end it was because they conceived of India in political terms and he did not. They could hardly listen without a smile of ridicule to his pæans of the spinning wheel and his glorification of homespun. Moreover, they realised that the evil flowering of his doctrines at Chauri-Chaura, Bombay, and perhaps also in the Moplah Rebellion, could only

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bear fruit in severe acts of repression by the Government of India. Knowing full well — and the knowledge was shared with them by Gandhi himself — that in a struggle of physical force the Indian popular movement must inevitably be defeated, owing to lack of discipline, lack of cohesion, lack of trust in one another, the political leaders realised in 1922 that the time had come to call a halt on the negative side of Non-Coöperation and to consider seriously a radical change not only in the tactics but in the strategy of the whole Nationalist movement.

A change could only mean one thing. With physical force ruled out of the question, with Gandhi falling into discredit, there remained but one course, the path of Constitutional agitation. Thus it was that within two years of the inauguration of the Constitution by His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught in Delhi, the worst enemies of the Constitution had begun to repent, and, though they veiled their repentance in their professed intention to destroy the Constitution by obstruction from within, having failed to destroy it by violence from without, everyone knew that failure awaited them within the walls of the Legislative Assembly, as it overwhelmed them without. It is true that greater success might have attended their intention to obstruct had they been able to persuade the electorate to return them to the Legislative Councils and to the Legislative Assembly in the autumn of 1923 in larger numbers. As it was, the strength of the Swaraj Party, as the ex-Non-Coöperators called themselves in the Legislative Assembly, just fell short of the numbers necessary to conduct an effective campaign of obstruction; while in the Bengal Legislative Council, though the followers of Mr. C. R. Das were more numerous, and though the Bengal Government played into his hands more than once, the deadlock was only effected by a majority of one or two votes. It is surely significant that, after two years' experience of the working of the Constitution from within, the Swaraj Party should only have succeeded in producing a deadlock in one Legislative Council out of nine.

In the Legislative Assembly the first effect of the entry of the Swaraj Party was greatly to enliven the debates and to produce the first elements of deadlock; but within a year, though the debates themselves remained as lively as ever, the deadlock was resolved and practically all the government legislation, including the Budget and the Finance Bill of 1925, passed through the Legislative Assembly intact. There were several reasons con-

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tributing to this result. I place first the discovery which the Swarajists made early in their new career that the Legislative Assembly, as one of the principal instruments of the new Constitution, was by no means a sham and that their influence over the actions and intentions of the Government of India was vastly greater than they had dreamed. Secondly comes the recovery of the Independent Party (ex-Liberals) from the futile position into which they had been manoeuvred, partly by their own lack of judgment and partly by circumstances in 1924. These Independents, though a comparatively small party, were strong enough to hold the balance in the Legislative Assembly, whenever they chose, between the Swaraj Party and the Government of India. At the very beginning of the session of 1924, that is immediately after the General Election, they precipitately committed themselves to join Pandit Motilal Nehru and his Swarajists in a campaign of obstruction, and when three months later the Assembly came to the Budget, the Independents, though they disliked the idea of throwing out the finances of the year, found themselves held as in a vice by their three months' old pledge to the Swaraj Party. Thus, in 1924 it seemed possible that the deadlock predicted by the Swarajists had actually been achieved. Within a few weeks, however, of the end of that session, the Independents showed signs of repenting of their action and when 1925 came round they had resumed their former liberty and played a most effective part in the deliberations of the Chamber.

The daily detail of the proceedings of the Assembly does not concern us here. It will suffice to conclude that the present Constitution, as seen in operation in the Legislative Assembly and in the Legislative Councils, transitional and therefore unsatisfactory as it is, possesses great powers for good. I have often challenged my Indian friends to deny that the Constitution presents them with opportunities of doing things themselves, as well as of influencing the way in which the Government of India does them, which are so much greater than anything they ever enjoyed before that it deserves at least the benefit of the doubt in their minds. This at all events is certain: that—without the changes wrought by the Constitution of 1919—neither in the Indianization of the Civil Service, nor in the measures taken to prepare young Indians for military and even for naval service, nor in the protection of Indian industry, nor in many other directions welcomed by Indian

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public opinion, would the Government of India have even contemplated the policies which are now in active operation. Take, for instance, the Steel Protection Act of last year. The Government of India, under the régime which prevailed till 1921, would not have proposed the measure, public opinion at home would never have accepted it, and even if the Indian Government had contemplated any departure in this direction the Secretary of State would have forbidden it. Observe now the change which has come over the scene owing to the creation of the new Legislatures. Indian public opinion is not only vocal, but influential, and in many respects effective, for the first time in history. Without possessing the same authority over the Government which the House of Commons enjoys, it has over and over again in the last five years bent the Government of India to its will and thereby shown that the present Indian Constitution is an instrument of large effect.

Whether India is aware of the problems which still lie ahead before the present Constitution can reach a permanent and stable form is at least doubtful. The Legislative Councils of the provinces, for instance, will have to show a much longer and more impressive tale of achievements before they can claim that they have proved that the democratic institutions of the West are a plant which can flourish in an Eastern soil. Moreover, the relation between these Councils and the Central Government is a vital and complicated matter which the average Indian has never studied; and, though the present Indian Constitution appears superficially to wear a federal aspect, no one, either British or Indian, has yet attempted to envisage the whole problem of government in India as a study in Federalism. That the Government of India itself is now aware that the successive changes wrought in the Indian Constitution during the past two generations have brought India to the threshold of Constitutional problems of vast import is shown by the fact that the Viceroy only last autumn ordered the preparation of a monograph on the relations of central and local governments in the principal federal units of the world, as an introduction to the study of Indian Constitutional Reform which will be taken seriously in hand by the Royal Commission of 1929.

India thus presents to the politician, to the historian, and to the political scientist, a study in political evolution without a rival in the modern world.

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THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

By George W. Wickersham

THE very wise and practical statesmen who in 1787 assembled in Philadelphia to frame a charter of government for the thirteen states, which should "form a more perfect union" than the existing Confederation, in the enumeration of legislative powers which they proposed to confer upon the Congress of the United States, included the following: "To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations." The framers of the Constitution recognized that there was a law of nations and they empowered the new national government they were creating to define and punish offenses against that law. Yet today we are being told by certain American politicians that until international law is reduced to the confines of a written code the United States cannot safely give adhesion to the Permanent Court of International Justice, established for the enforcement of that law in international disputes, and which has been functioning at The Hague during the last four years.

What, then, is this law of nations, the existence of which Washington, Hamilton, Madison, Franklin, Wilson, Rutledge, Pinckney, Morris, and their associates, recognized in framing the Constitution? It was also recognized in the Articles of Confederation, which empowered the Congress to appoint courts "for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas." Under the authority of those Articles, the Congress of the Confederation had enacted a law defining piracy and providing the death penalty for the offense. By the law of nations, Judge Story wrote, piracy was robbery at sea, while by the common law it was an offense against the universal law of nations, and a pirate was considered an enemy of the human race. When the clause came before the Constitutional Convention in the form above quoted, Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to strike out the words "offenses against the law of nations," so as to let these be *definable* as well as punishable, by virtue of the preceding member of the sentence. To this Mr. Wilson objected, expressing the hope that the alteration would not be made. To pretend to *define* the law of nations, which depended on the

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authority of all the civilized nations of the world, would, he said, have a look of arrogance that would make us ridiculous. Mr. Morris's proposal failed and the clause remained in its present form. Mr. Madison advocated its adoption, because it was a great improvement on the Articles of Confederation. These articles, he said in the 42nd paper of *The Federalist*, contained no provision for the case of offenses against the law of nations, and consequently left it in the power of any indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations. A similar view was expressed by Mr. Randolph. When, in the exercise of this power, the Congress proceeded to define and punish the offense of *piracy*, it turned to the law of nations for the definition of the offense, — "robbery on the high seas," — and in substance embodied it in the first Crimes Act enacted April 30, 1790. Later legislation, now embodied in the Federal Penal Code, declares that "whoever on the high seas commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life."

The Supreme Court of the nation, from a very early date in its existence, recognized the law of nations as a part of our own law, binding upon our government and our people and enforceable by the Courts of the United States. Like the common law, the law of nations grew out of custom, the custom of civilized nations, long continued, acquiesced in, reasonable, certain, compulsory and consistent — which, as Sir William Blackstone wrote, are necessary to make a particular custom binding. As early as 1796, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking by Mr. Justice Chase,[1] said: "The law of nations may be considered of three kinds, to wit: general, conventional or customary. The first is universal, or established by the general consent of mankind, and binds *all* nations. The second is founded on *express consent*, and is not universal, and only binds those nations that have assented to it. The third is founded on tacit consent; and is only obligatory on those nations who have adopted it."

There seems no doubt that throughout all recorded history there has been a more or less imperfect recognition of certain rules of intercourse among states claiming to be civilized, a disregard of which by any one would afford an excuse for acts of reprisal by another. These rules have varied with the conditions of the times, and whatever force they had arose out of the

[1] Ware *v.* Hylton, 3 Dallas 199, 227.

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recognition by different Powers of the reciprocal advantage resulting from their observance. Such, for example, is the rule exempting fishing vessels, their crews and cargo, from capture as prize of war, which, in 1898, the Supreme Court traced back to its origin in the fifteenth century and recognized as having become, by long continued custom, a principle of international law, which the Courts of the United States would enforce.

A world of lawless nations presents a no less horrid spectacle than a nation of lawless individuals. Common recognition of the necessity of restraint upon individuals, as essential to true liberty and the welfare of all, has been followed, slowly, to be sure, but inevitably, by a recognition of the need of restraint upon the action of states in the interest of all. Never was the necessity of a law of nations more clearly demonstrated than during the awful miseries inflicted upon mankind by the Thirty Years' War, and when that welter of human cruelty, misery and degradation was at its height, in the year 1625, Hugo Grotius gave to the world his treatise on the Laws of War and Peace, which marks the beginning of international law as it is conceived of today. Grotius sought a basis for the law of nations in what he called *natural* law, accepted as such by all civilized nations, and he endeavored to demonstrate the advantage to be realized by the observance of this natural law. Later writers have abandoned this theory and have sought to find a philosophical basis for the existence of the law of nations in different theories. Indeed, some respectable writers go so far as to maintain that there can be no such thing as international *law*, because *law* must have the sanction of the police power of a state to support it. More practical modern thought, however, recognizes the existence of a system of law binding upon civilized states, based upon usage, and looks no further for its source than to common recognition of the mutual advantage to each from its observance by all, or the resulting damage to all from its disregard by any. The sanction for such law it finds in the increasingly mobilized public opinion of the civilized world.

Since the time of Grotius, nations more and more have recognized the advantage of the peaceful settlement of international disputes through conference, conciliation, arbitration or judicial process. Principles of international law have been ascertained and declared by Courts of the United States, Great Britain and the British Dominions, as well as by those of other civilized

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nations, and international treaties and agreements have defined, extended and applied rules which arose out of usage and custom. Decisions of Arbitral Tribunals have aided in reducing these rules to more certain form, and text writers of recognized learning and ability gradually have brought the body of international law into logical arrangement and somewhat authoritative structure. The publication in 1896 by the Honorable John Bassett Moore of his "Digest of International Law," in seven large octavo volumes, averaging 1000 pages each, was the most valuable contribution made since the foundation of our government towards the formulation of a systematic authoritative statement of the principles of the law of nations, recognized in the diplomatic intercourse of the United States and the decisions of American Courts. This was supplemented in 1898 by Judge Moore's "History and Digest of International Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party," in six large octavo volumes. These two works together constitute a monumental contribution to the history and application of international law in regard to questions, negotiations and controversies affecting the United States. If similar digests of the experiences of the Governments of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the Scandinavian countries, as well as of Holland, Belgium and Spain, could be prepared, the materials would be complete for the preparation of a *Corpus Juris Internationalis*. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, gave an impetus to the movement towards the written formulation of rules of international law, and the Peace Treaties of 1919, and the Agreements reached at the Washington Naval Limitation Conference in 1922, as well as the Treaties and agreements made between various nations, registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations since 1920, have established a large body of conventional rules, of more or less general application, all of which tend towards the written formulation of a body of international law.

In general, boards or commissions of international arbitration have been left free to apply such principles as they should choose in the determination of questions submitted to them. Composed, as such bodies generally are, of representatives of the disputant states, with one or more impartial members, their decisions often have been political rather than judicial, the product of expediency rather than of law. A recognition of this fact led the Government of the United States, in 1907, to urge upon the second

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Hague Conference the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice, composed of judges appointed for fixed terms, made independent of political interference, and charged with the determination of controversies between nations by the application of the principles and rules of international law.

The difficulty of finding a method of selecting judges for such a Court, which would satisfy both small and great nations alike, prevented the Conference from carrying out this recommendation, and it was not until the organization of the League of Nations provided adequate machinery for this purpose that the American recommendation of 1907 became possible of attainment. The Permanent Court of International Justice, resting for its existence upon a protocol or treaty, open not only to the members of the League of Nations, but as well to the United States and all other nations named in the Annex to the Covenant, is empowered to decide all controversies between nations voluntarily submitted to it for decision, and also is given compulsory jurisdiction over those states which, availing themselves of a provision in the Statute, shall expressly elect to accept such jurisdiction.

The Statute provides that the Court in its decisions shall apply: 1. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 2. International custom, *as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;* 3. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 4. Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, *as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.* In other words, the Court is to look for the law which it is to apply to a given controversy, first, in any international agreement expressly recognized by the contestants, and, secondly, in general principles or practices recognized as law by civilized nations, which may be found in (1) international custom, or (2) judicial decisions of courts of different nations, or (3) the writings of qualified publicists.

These are the same sources which always have been resorted to by the Supreme Court of the United States in ascertaining the rules of international law which it has applied when controversies involving the application of such law have come before it.

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Chief Justice Marshall spoke for the Supreme Court in 1815:

> "The law of nations is the great source from which we derive those rules, respecting belligerent and neutral rights, which are recognized by all civilized and commercial states throughout Europe and America. This law is in part unwritten, and in part conventional. To ascertain that which is unwritten, we resort to the great principles of reason and justice: but, as these principles will be differently understood by different nations under different circumstances, we consider them as being, in some degree, fixed and rendered stable by a series of judicial decisions. The decisions of the courts of every country, so far as they are founded on a law common to every country, will be received, not as authority, but with respect. The decisions of the courts of every country show how the law of nations, in the given case, is understood in that country, and will be considered in adopting the rule which is to prevail in this."[2]

In later cases[3] the Court has added that in ascertaining and declaring what international law is, in any given case, the Court must obtain such aid as it can from judicial decisions, from the works of jurists and commentators, and from the acts and usages of civilized nations.

A similar method is pursued by the courts of all English-speaking countries, in finding the rules of the common law, by which a large proportion of all cases arising in those countries are governed. The contention that our government cannot give adherence to this International Court, the realization of American thought and advocacy during the last quarter of a century, until international law is reduced to the form of a written code, ignores all experience in the judicial history of England and America, and disregards the almost uniform practice of the United States Government in its arbitral procedure, as well as the declarations of its highest judicial authority.

Nevertheless, efforts to formulate principles of international law and to secure general agreement upon them by civilized states have been made and are being continued at the present time. A century ago, the great English law reformer, Jeremy Bentham, began to agitate for the codification of international law. Sixty or seventy years after Bentham wrote, David Dudley Field published a code of international law, the inadequacy of which for present uses furnishes suggestions of the difficulties of anticipating the future relations of nations, as well as of making a code from the standpoint of one country alone, to say nothing

[2] 30 Hhds. of Sugar *v.* Boyle, 9 Cr. 191, 198.
[3] Hilton *v.* Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 163; The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677, 700.

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of the task of reconciling differences of language, and of varying conceptions of legal principles in a code designed to govern all or at least a number of civilized nations. Two great learned societies were formed in Europe in 1873 for the express purpose of codifying international law. They have included in their membership some of the most eminent jurists of Europe and America. They have produced valuable contributions to the science of international law, — but no general code. The American Society of International Law for eleven years maintained a Committee, whose membership included some of the most highly qualified students of international law, which was charged with the duty of preparing a code of international law. They failed to produce it. The Assembly and Council of the League of Nations recently determined to take up the matter, tentatively and cautiously. They created a committee of lawyers, representing all the different systems of jurisprudence of the civilized world, which they charged with the duty of preparing a provisional list of the subjects of international law, the solution of which by means of international agreement would appear to be the most desirable and presently realizable. After communicating such list to the various governments and studying their replies, the Committee was instructed to report to the Council of the League upon the questions which were regarded as sufficiently ripe for agreement and the procedure which might be followed in preparation for eventual conferences for their solution.

It is apparent that the Assembly of the League contemplated only a tentative approach to the great problem of codification. The Committee is to select the topics of international law which in its opinion it is most desirable to clarify and make certain of international agreement, and upon which there is a present probability the nations may agree. The form of the resolution of the Assembly emphasizes the need of agreement among the nations to fix and clarify these rules of international law. A commission of lawyers appointed to codify the laws of a single American state or of a single nation, has a task, difficult enough to be sure, but easy in comparison with that of a similar body charged with the duty of codifying all, or even a part of the law of nations. When the commission of a state or of a single nation has finished its work, the legislature enacts it into law, sometimes with modifications, it is true, but in general substantially as reported. The courts thereafter wrestle with questions of con-

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struction, and, through judicial interpretation, in the course of years mould and clarify the work of the codifiers. The fiat of the legislature imposes the code upon the people as law. But the framers of a proposed agreement between nations establishing principles of international law, when they have finished their task of formulation, must submit it to the foreign offices of every civilized nation, where it will be studied in the light of the jurisprudence, the policies, the experience and the prejudices of each nation. Nor are even the preliminary processes of agreement upon topics, or the formulation of rules applicable to each topic, of easy accomplishment. Mr. Root has testified that but for the long years of work of the scholars who composed the membership of the Institut de Droit International, the Hague Conferences could not have produced the various treaties which they agreed upon and reported to the various governments represented. The conferences adopted almost literally the drafts which the Institut de Droit International had prepared with matured deliberation during a period of a quarter of a century. But those drafts, and the Hague conventions, covered but a small portion of the whole body of international law.

The popular notion that a Code of International Law may be easily prepared, covering every vital topic of the law of nations, arranged for ready reference, and by means of which controversies between nations may be almost automatically decided, is plausible, but utterly impracticable and fallacious. It is doubtful whether the codes of substantive law adopted by several of our American states have resulted in lessening litigation, or in giving the body of their citizens any more exact knowledge of their laws, than obtains in states whose laws have not been codified. As a matter of fact, the English language, by the very fact of its richness, drawn from so many and varied lingual sources, does not lend itself to such exact expression as do the Latin languages. Few statutes in the English tongue are not susceptible of more than one meaning. Hence, broadly speaking, no lawyer ventures to express an absolute opinion as to the meaning and application of a new statute until it has been construed by the courts. Moreover, the English law, including our own, has grown, modified and adapted itself, through judicial process rather than by legislative application, to the varying needs of a living, changing and expanding civilization; while the law of other lands is more static, more logical, perhaps more

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exact, but far less adaptable to changing conditions than ours.

An effort to reduce our American common law to written form, not for the purpose of enactment into statutes, but in order to present in accurate, systematic, orderly statement the *existing* law on various topics, as it is established by the decisions of the courts of last resort of the various States of the Union, recently was undertaken and is now being prosecuted by the American Law Institute, organized in Washington, D. C., in February, 1923, under the highest professional auspices, and handsomely endowed by the Carnegie Corporation. For nearly three years past it has engaged the continuous services of the most eminent legal scholars of America, aided by select bodies of able advisers, in the preparation of statements of portions of the law of Contracts, of Torts, Conflict of Laws, Agency, and Business Associations. With the utmost diligence these learned men have not yet produced a finished product for the final approval of the Institute. It is estimated that not less than ten years' time will be necessary to the completion of the task of restating any considerable portion of the unwritten or common law of America by this organization of learned and scholarly men. How much more difficult will be the task of the framers of a code of international law which shall meet the approval of the different civilized nations, may be guessed from this experience.

The initial steps of selecting the subjects which it is desirable and presently realizable to embody in international agreements involve a number of important considerations.

At the threshold of the discussion, lies the division of the subject into the international laws of peace and of war. It was the recognition of a crying necessity of rules for the government of nations in the conduct of war, for the preservation of humanity and private property from needless harm and destruction, that led Grotius to write his famous book. It was the disregard of the international laws of war, in the great contest of 1914–1918, that led the jurists who framed the Protocol and Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, in 1920, to recommend the creation of a commission to examine the state of international law as affected by the World War, to formulate and agree upon the amendments and additions, if any, to the rules of international law shown to be necessary or useful, as well as to consider what subjects are not now adequately regulated by international law, but as to which the interests of international

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justice require that rules of law shall be declared and accepted.

A first step towards the adoption of new rules of the international law of war was taken at the Washington Naval Limitations Conference, in 1921–1922, in the agreements formulated and submitted to the various governments for ratification, declaring submarine warfare as conducted by Germany during the World War to be piracy under the law of nations, and punishable as such, and regulating and restricting the use of poisonous gases in war. The law of neutrality cannot be rewritten until the fate of the Locarno treaties is settled. The law of contraband must be reconsidered and agreed upon when the state of the world has become more settled and the passions aroused by the great contest and the trying period of readjustment shall have passed. It would seem highly inexpedient to attempt at this moment to write the international laws of war with any reasonable expectation of acceptance by the Great Powers. This was the conclusion reached by the Committee upon the Progressive Codification of International Law, at Geneva, in April last.

Turning then to the next great subdivision of the subject, the public international law of peace, there must first be made a survey of the experience of nations, to ascertain what subjects have been or now are of frequent use or application in their relations with other nations, with respect to which there would seem to be some generally accepted rule or principle. If there appear to be disputes concerning principles frequently invoked, in international relations, the reasons for these differences must be sought, and consideration given to methods of reconciling the various views. The relative importance of the subjects also must be taken into account. When a subject has been selected, the question of different conceptions of its legal status by different countries and in various systems of law must next be approached. So simple a word as *domicil*, which enters into many international relations, expresses very different conceptions in the laws of different countries.

Again, continental European countries in general exercise jurisdiction over their own subjects for offenses against their own laws wherever committed. English and American jurisdiction extends only to the punishment of crimes committed within the national domain. Hence, continental European nations refuse to send back their own nationals for trial and punish-

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ment to a country where they may have committed a crime against its laws, but will themselves try the offender within their own jurisdiction and punish him for acts committed in a foreign land, which would have been criminal if done at home. To reconcile views differing such as these and to express rules of law in language which will have the same significance in English, French, German, Italian and Spanish — not to speak of other tongues — will be the task of the framers of a code of international law, and if American adhesion to the Permanent Court of International Justice were to wait upon the completion of such a task, the vision of a world governed by rules of law and orderly judicial procedure would soon fade from the sight of man.

Certainty in the law is desirable. The effort to clarify and state the law of nations in a form which may be agreed upon by all and which will facilitate the work of the Court of International Justice, must be carried on with the aid of the most highly qualified scholars in the world. But the public should not be suffered to think that the task of codification is a light one, easy of accomplishment, or possible of realization within a short time. Under the most favorable circumstances, it will be years before such a task can be completed. Differences in the legal conceptions of different races must be recognized and where possible reconciled. The obstacle of speech must be overcome. Provision must be made for the varying policies of different nations. Even matters of detail become stumbling blocks of serious moment, when language, tradition and national prejudice are involved. Meantime, the Permanent Court of International Justice, by its decisions, will be helping to make the law more certain and through judicial expression more appropriate for inclusion in convention. With the hearty coöperation of our government in the support of that Court, — a coöperation which all signs indicate will be authorized by the Senate at its next session, — an impetus will be given to the judicial determination of controversies between nations, and the task of making more definite the law of nations will be greatly advanced by the decisions of the Court, as well as by the continued labors of commissions of scholars working under the auspices of the nations of the old and the new world.

But the task is not easy and the road will be long. It must be travelled by stages. Systematic statements agreed upon by scholars will mark the first *étape*. Agreements by governments lie further along. *Qui va piano va sano, qui va sano va lontano.*

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THE CAMPAIGN IN MOROCCO

By H.

IN discussing the situation in Morocco, the question has repeatedly been debated during the past few months as to why the French, with the greatest modern army in existence in the world today, with a vast air superiority over any other nation, with the senior Marshal of France present in person in the theatre of operations, should have been unable to subdue a comparatively insignificant enemy in a campaign which, commencing the latter part of last April, has just terminated with the coming of the torrential rains of winter. This question is particularly enigmatical when it is known that a large Spanish army has been practically beseiged in three widely-separated, fortified areas on the eastern and western extremities of the Riff ever since their withdrawal from more advanced positions in the interior in 1924.

Recently General Boichut was asked this very question. The General commands the East Sector, or Nineteenth Corps, of the French Army with headquarters at Taza on the main road from Fez to Algiers. General Boichut answered that it was not a question of defeating Abd-el-Krim, but a question of defeating Nature, who has put all her advantages in favor of the Riffs. Mobile columns can push ahead with little difficulty but can only do so with safety if their rear and lines of communication are protected. The war, such as it is, is a war of transportation, for the greatest difficulty is the entire absence of roads. The mountainous country of the Riff is one of contrasts. In the dry season there is no water at all save in the few wells that are occasionally found. Advances must be from water hole to water hole. In the rainy season, the plains of the Ouergha and the Moulouya are a morass; water courses, dry the greater part of the year, are raging torrents. Woe betide the column cut off by rain in the Riff during the wet season. Starvation is certain for those fortunate enough to escape the incessant sniping of Krim's troops, who, accustomed to operate as individuals or in parties of two or three at most, have few wants and roam the country at will.

The almost insuperable difficulties of the terrain may perhaps be more clearly visualized by considering the numbers of troops engaged in and around a theatre of operations only 125 miles from east to west and only 37 miles from north to south.

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The Spanish permanent Army of Morocco consists of a European force of 69,290 officers and men and a native force of 15,000 of all ranks. In addition to the permanent Army of Morocco, Spain had an Expeditionary Force of 35,000 of all ranks in her zone at the beginning of October. This made a total of 104,000 Spanish troops in Morocco, in addition to the native "Regulares" and "Mehalla Jalifiana." The large force of Spain's European troops was distributed as follows toward the close of this summer's campaign: Melilla Zone, 45,142; Ceuta Zone, 40,516; El Araish Zone, 18,537. Fourteen thousand Spanish troops took



THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS IN MOROCCO

The part of the boundary between the Spanish and French Zones regarding which Spain and France do not agree is indicated by a broken line.

part in the landing operations on Alhucemas Bay and the capture of Ajdir which followed.

The French force in Morocco at the beginning of the year numbered some 72,500 officers and men. This number has been increased until, today, there are over 150,000 French troops available.

Against these large forces, Abd-el-Krim has only his "regular army" of the Riff, numbering from 6,000 to 10,000 well-armed men, and such tribes as he could induce or coerce to assist him against the ring of steel with which his mountainous haunts are surrounded. All reports are to the effect that the Riffs never have

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had more than 40,000 to 50,000 rifles, and it may be accepted as a fact that their forces at no time have exceeded that number.

Spain has attempted to pit European troops against these people and, leaving out for the moment her recent successes at Ajdir, has failed. European troops must have some semblance of European comforts; but their present opponents, accustomed to this kind of warfare, can endure unbelievable hardships.

France, on the other hand, is using African troops to fight Africans. Her Africans are better disciplined than the Riffs, better led and better equipped with every weapon that is effective in this type of warfare; further, they are just as habituated to life-long campaigning as are the Riffs. Of the 150,000 French troops in Morocco, only 12,000 are Frenchmen, which number supplies all the officers, non-commissioned officers and specialists of this large force. The rest (apart from the Foreign Legion) are Africans — Moroccans, Algerians, Tunisians and Senegalese. The French Foreign Legion, by the way, now has sixteen of its nineteen battalions in Morocco, numbering 12,800 men, forty percent of whom are Germans, forty percent Russians, and the remainder a *mélange* of all nations. The officers are enthusiastic about the fighting qualities of their men, who spend their entire term of service in the field under an iron discipline.

Thus, while Spain relies almost entirely on her own nationals for this trying military service, the proportion of her European troops to her native troops being almost five to one, France reverses this proportion, her ratio at present being roughly twelve natives to one European.

It is often forgotten that continuous warfare has been carried on by the French in Morocco since 1919 when, with the ending of the World War, they were enabled once more to resume the pacification of their Moroccan protectorate.

The operations of 1923 were conducted by some 22,000 out of the 63,000 troops which France then had in Morocco. In 1924 a large force under General de Chambrun badly defeated Abd-el-Krim's regulars and was able to establish firmly a new frontier on a line of crests dominating the country north of the Ouergha River. This brought within the French line a rich country which had been indispensable for the supply of the Riffs in their main operations against the Spaniards, and established a new line of outposts near the edge of the Spanish Zone. The same year, however, saw the termination of Spain's efforts to control

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her portion of Morocco. Spain proceeded to withdraw her troops, until at the close of the year only the Melilla area on the east and the extreme western end of her zone remained in her possession, and this not including the country of the Andjera and El Haouz tribes between Ceuta and Tangier.

The withdrawal of the Spaniards made it certain that the spring of 1925 would bring renewed attacks by the Riffs against the French. These attacks were launched between April 25 and 28 all along the French front from north of Ouezzane to Kifane, north of Taza. Though expected, the new offensive caught the French with insufficient troops, and by July the entire line of French posts, which had been established with so much difficulty the year before, was withdrawn south of the Ouergha River. Large French reinforcements arrived in July and an extensive campaign was initiated. By September the French had seven divisions in Morocco, consisting of 114 battalions of infantry, 25 squadrons of cavalry and a regiment of 22 squadrons of airplanes (6 planes per squadron), with tanks, artillery, armored cars and the necessary supply troops. The front was divided into three sectors, each occupied by a corps of two divisions. General Naulin was officially in command, with General de Chambrun in charge of the local political situation. The Moroccan Division from the Rhine was held in general reserve at Fez.

Late in July came the most significant achievement of the year's operations in North Africa. For years France and Spain had conducted entirely separate operations on opposite sides of the Riff, though almost within long range cannon shot of each other. The result was that the Moors were able to meet each of these attacks separately and either defeat or so hold it up that no real gains were made. In fact when the Spaniards withdrew to the coast after the campaign of 1924, the Riffs had been able for once to concentrate all their strength against the French. Now, mainly through the efforts of the French, an accord with the Spaniards was drawn up in Madrid. No official version of the terms of the agreement has ever been made public, but it is sufficient to know that the navies of the two nations were to operate together in blockading the Mediterranean coast of the Riff, that neither was to conclude a separate peace with Abd-el-Krim, and that troops of either might freely cross into the zone of the other. Following the Madrid agreement, Marshal Petain and General de Rivera held a conference on July 28 at Tetuan, in the Spanish Zone.

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In August the results of the agreement began to be manifest. There was a general advance by strong French columns in each of the three sectors. The objects of the French attacks were as follows. In the West Sector, the objective was to regain the posts north and east of Ouezzane and to establish connection with the Spanish on the Loukos River. The Center Sector was to clear the crossings of the Ouergha River by seizing and organizing commanding positions on the north side. The East Sector was charged with making a strong drive north of Kifane, which direction constitutes the shortest line to Ajdir; there, if the Spanish attack were a success, connection with the Spanish troops might be hoped for, thus cutting the Riff in two.

Spain, not ready to shift from her passive defensive attitude to a more active status when the French began their advance in August, centered attention on Alhucemas Bay by broadcasting rumors of a projected expedition in force to capture Ajdir, the so-called "capital" of the Riff chieftain. Late in September Spain launched the much-advertised Alhucemas Bay expedition to hold as many regular Riff troops as possible in that area, secure the excellent harbor at Ajdir for future operations, and gain the moral advantage of seizing the "capital" of the chieftain himself.

A general survey of the campaign may now be made, as all active operations practically came to a halt during the first week in October when the rains commenced.

In the West Sector, General Pruneau's 128th Division strengthened its contact with the Spanish line on the Loukos River, north of Ouezzane. The 35th Division now extends the regained old French line through the Center Sector (General Marty), which is held by the 2d Division. In the East Sector (General Boichut), three rifle divisions — the 1st, 11th and 3d — and a cavalry division, were stopped in a drive north of Kifane by the wet weather; the cavalry division did, however, close the gap between the French and Spanish troops, a Spanish column having pushed forward at the same time from Afso. The line of the Kert River will be held by the French and Spanish together. Ajdir fell to the Spanish attack and is now strongly held by some 8,000 troops.

The net results have been, first, to initiate coördinated operations between the forces of France and Spain; second, to deprive the Riffs of their capital, Ajdir, and of their chief source of supply, the Ouergha valley; and third, to squeeze Krim into a pocket. All these reverses will have the result of very seriously impairing

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the loyalty of the great bulk of Krim's adherents, most of whom are kept in line only by the fear that they will lose their cattle, which are held secure in the interior as hostages for their owners' faithfulness. Cavalry raids will doubtless continue during the winter, with the probability that the Spanish line will be advanced from Afrau to connect with the position at Ajdir.

Active hostilities having ceased, the outlook for next year's campaign may be considered. Neither Spain nor France can afford to maintain the present large armies in the field for a day longer than is necessary. Against either of his adversaries alone, Abd-el-Krim, assisted by the difficulties Nature has so lavishly provided, was able to carry on most successfully. But against the two engaged in coördinated operations, with his sea-coast blockaded and his main port of entry lost, he has little chance for a continuance of successful resistance next spring. It seems more than probable that the winter will bring forth peace terms which will be acceptable to all concerned.

When fighting ceases politics holds the center of the stage. Political activity over the Morocco question will now be keener than ever. The Spanish Directorate, which was trembling in the balance during the past summer, seems once more secure. The King, in recognition of popular clamor, recently decorated General Primo de Rivera with the Cross of San Fernando, with laurels, the Spanish "Medal of Honor." But in France financial questions have just caused the fall of one Cabinet, and the French Socialists never overlook an opportunity to attack the Government for its heavy expenditures for the army in Morocco. Abd-el-Krim certainly can obtain better terms this winter than he can ever again hope for. The diplomats were responsible for the Franco-Spanish agreement which paved the way for the military successes of this summer's campaign. Diplomacy may now be expected to make next year's campaign unnecessary.

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A YEAR OF THE DAWES PLAN

By R. R. Kuczynski

THE new reparation plan proposed by the Dawes Committee on April 9, 1924, and accepted by the Allied and German Governments on August 30, 1924, has now been in operation for over a year. This period is sufficiently long to warrant an examination of how the new plan has worked. In undertaking this task, one must distinguish between its political, technical, and economic aspects.

Politically, the new plan has been a complete success. For fully three years, from the fall of 1921 to the fall of 1924, France's main grievance against Germany had been that Germany did not fulfil her reparation obligations. This reproach has now completely ceased. While there are still many Frenchmen who complain that Germany pays less than she might, there is not to be found a Frenchman who asserts that Germany pays less than she has to pay. In Germany, on the other hand, the feeling of restlessness which since the armistice had harassed even those who wished that Germany should pay France as much as possible, has given way to a feeling of security so far as foreign financial claims are concerned. Moreover, the wide-spread fear that the new reparation plan would interfere with the internal financial sovereignty of the German Government has largely been dispelled.

Technically, the new plan has likewise worked admirably. All payments due from Germany have been put punctually, or even prematurely, into the account opened with the Reichsbank by the Agent General for Reparation Payments. And the Agent General without difficulty or friction has withdrawn from this account the sums necessary to pay the German mine owners, chemical factories, etc. for the deliveries in kind destined for France and Belgium, to pay the German Railway Company for the cost of carrying those goods to the frontier, to pay the occupation armies and the interallied commissions for their cash expenses in Germany, to pay German citizens for what they furnished the foreign troops, to pay the interest on the Dawes loan, and so on. The fact that under the new plan the Agent General has been the only creditor of the German Government in the matter of reparation payments has had a most beneficial effect: it has assured both to

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German citizens and to foreign Governments a prompt fulfilment of their claims.

Economically, the new plan has worked satisfactorily so far as Germany and certain of the Allies, especially Great Britain, are concerned. The fear — an unjustified fear, indeed, — that the reparation payments might financially or economically injure Germany in the very first year has not been realized. Germany had to pay into the account of the Agent General an annuity of altogether 238.1 million dollars (1 billion gold marks). Out of this total, 190.5 millions were secured from the proceeds of the Dawes loan and 47.6 millions from the profits of the German Railway Company. Four-fifths, then, were paid by the foreign subscribers to the German loan and only one-fifth by Germany herself. Of course, it might be that part of the money furnished through the loan was spent by the Agent General in buying German raw materials which, if they had stayed in Germany and been used for manufactures, would have been of more benefit to German industry than they were when exported in crude form; but it might just as well be that part of that money was spent in buying goods which otherwise would not have found a purchaser willing to pay the price granted by the Agent General. Further, the $47,600,000 provided by the German Railway Company was not a big enough amount to affect materially the German economy.

The damage incurred by the debtor was then by no means heavy. But how about the profit to the creditors? In order to answer this question it is necessary to examine a little more closely how the Agent General has disposed of the sums paid into his account with the Reichsbank.

Since the Reparation Commission on October 13, 1924, constituted the service of the Dawes loan a first charge on all payments provided for under the new reparation plan, and since the Transfer Committee on October 31, 1924, recognized the priority of this debt service and gave it an absolute right of remittance, irrespective of the effect upon the exchange, the Agent General had first of all to satisfy the claims of the owners of the Dawes loan bonds. The net proceeds realized by the sale of those bonds amounted to the equivalent of about 190 million dollars. The face-value of the American portion was $110,000,000, that of all other portions combined £21,720,000, 25,200,000 Swedish crowns, 100,000 Italian lire, and 15,000,000 Swiss franks. The total face-value of all together was $221,500,000 on October 10, 1924, when the

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agreement for the loan was concluded, a sum which — mainly on account of the rise of the pound — rose to $227,700,000 by March 31, 1925. The bonds mature within twenty-five years; they carry interest at the rate of 7 percent. The amortization of the American portion will amount each year to one twenty-fifth of the issue, redemption being by lot at 105 percent and accrued interest. For all the rest an equal annuity is provided for each year, including interest and amortization. The total service of interest and amortization of the American portion for the first year (October 16, 1924 to October 15, 1925) was $12,320,000, a sum which will decrease annually by $308,000 until it reaches $4,928,000 in the twenty-fifth year. The total service of all other portions combined is $10,100,000 (converted on the basis of the quotations of March 31, 1925). The total debt service requires, then, $22,420,000 in the first year and $15,028,000 in the last year. As the debt service started only one and a half months after the new reparation plan went into operation, the Agent General in the first Dawes year spent $18,469,000 on that service. This expense, which absorbed 7.8 percent of the total receipts of the Agent General was, of course, of no profit whatsoever to the Allies.

A second preferred claim which the Agent General has to fulfil before he may start on real reparation payments are, in accordance with the Allied Finance Ministers' Agreement of January 14, 1925, the expenses of administration of the Reparation Commission, the organisations created under the new plan, the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission, the Military Commission of Control, and the European Commission of the Danube. Those expenses, which before the establishment of the all-inclusive character of the annuities through the new plan had sometimes been excessive, were, according to the Finance Ministers' Agreement just mentioned, chargeable to the annuities only to a limited extent (in the first year altogether to $6,543,000 at the utmost, and the actual allocations of the Agent General for this purpose in the first year were indeed not more than $6,364,000).

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that these were the only "overhead expenses" to be disbursed by the Agent General. All the other payments of the Agent General for occupation purposes must also be considered:

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Payments (in 1000 dollars)	*France*	*Great Britain*	*Belgium*	*Total*
Reichsmarks to armies of occupation..	8,102	3,484	870	12,456
Requisitions, damages, furnishings under Arts. 6, 8–12 of Rhineland Agreement.....	18,134	3,700	3,099	24,933
Payments for services rendered by the Reichsbahn to armies of occupation in the Ruhr.....	6,302	....	955	7,257
Exploitation of mines and cokeries by the Régie.....	1,825	....	....	1,825
Total.....	34,363	7,184	4,924	46,471

Thus the Agent General spent for the service of the Dawes loan, for the administration of the various commissions, and for other "overhead expenses" $18,469,000 plus $6,364,000 plus $46,471,000, or a total of $71,304,000. These 71.3 millions constitute exactly 30 percent of his total receipts (238.1 millions). He then had at his disposal 166.8 millions for reparation purposes. Up to the close of the first Dawes year he did not actually disburse however, more than 141.5 millions:

Payments (in 1000 dollars)	*France*	*Great Britain*	*Belgium*	*Italy*	*Others*
Reparation recovery acts...	5,977	36,964	....	....	....
Deliveries of coal, coke, lignite.....	30,622	....	10,643	8,648	....
Transport of ditto.....	12,664	....	2,831	3,188	....
Deliveries, dyestuffs.....	1,230	1,081	893	2,133	907[a]
Deliveries, pharmaceutical .					9[b]
Deliveries, fertilisers.....	4,682	....	69	....	....
Deliveries, miscellaneous...	4,932	....	2,910[c]	413	10,683[d]
Total.....	60,107	38,045	17,346	14,382	11,599

[a] Japan. [b] Serb-Croat-Slovene State. [c] Including $261,000 for restoration of library of Louvain. [d] Serb-Croat-Slovene State $7,156,000; Rumania $1,761,000; Portugal $1,126,000; Greece $629,000; Poland $10,000.

On August 31, 1925, then, the Agent General had a cash balance of over 25 million dollars. On the other hand there were at this date certain outstanding liabilities on account of various powers (principally under contracts for deliveries in kind and the Reparation Recovery Acts) aggregating over 10 million dollars. In his report of September 10, 1925, the Agent General, Mr. S. Parker

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Gilbert, asserts that "to find the amount effectively received by any Power during the first year of the operation of the Experts' Plan, there must be added to the payments made on its account the amount of the liabilities indicated above outstanding on its behalf." It will be interesting to compare this "amount effectively received" by each Power with the share to which it was entitled according to the Finance Ministers' Agreement of January 14, 1925, "overhead expenses" being omitted in each case:

Country	*Received* (*in 1000 dollars*)	*Claim*
France	67,814	81,955
Great Britain	38,135	39,639
Belgium	18,899	21,269
Italy	15,244	15,854
Serb-Croat-Slovene State	7,424	7,933
United States	....	3,646
Rumania	1,761	1,772
Portugal	1,174	1,188
Japan	907	1,188
Greece	629	634
Poland	10	18
Total	151,997	175,096

The Allies thus have received 23.1 million dollars less for reparation purposes than they should have got. This is due mainly to three causes:

1. According to the Finance Ministers' Agreement, the occupation costs chargeable to the first annuity were limited for France to $26,204,000. She was, however, actually accounted for at $34,363,000 (including, it is true, $8,127,000 for furnishings in the Ruhr and exploitation of mines and cokeries by the Régie).

2. The United States has not yet received its share in the first annuity.

3. The Agent General at the end of the first year had a balance of cash which, even after the deduction of the liabilities indicated above, and of the American claim, amounted to $11,328,000.

The most striking results of our examination are:

1. Great Britain received practically all that was due her. (The small deficiency of $1,504,000 is almost entirely explained by the fact that instead of the $5,955,000 to which she was entitled for occupation costs she was accounted for in this connection to the amount of $7,184,000.)

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2. France received much less than she was entitled to receive. (The large deficiency of $14,141,000 is only partly explained by the $8,127,000, which the Agent General spent for her in payment of furnishings in the Ruhr and of the exploitation through the Régie.)

The disadvantage suffered by France in comparison with Great Britain is even much larger than appears from the total sums received, since Great Britain got practically all payments as proceeds of the Reparation Recovery Acts,—thus in cash,—while France got only about one tenth in cash and nine tenths in kind. As prices in France are below world market prices, and as the countries receiving deliveries in kind are in general forbidden to reëxport the goods thus received, the French Government in reselling those goods often does not realize the amount with which those deliveries figure in the accounts of the Agent General. The Finance Committee of the French Chamber of Deputies had assumed that in the year 1925 France would lose 10 percent in reselling the German fuel and 20 percent in reselling the German chemical fertilisers. According to recent information, she is really losing as much as 25 percent in selling the German fuel.

It may then be figured that the sum of 67.8 million dollars which in the first Dawes year France has altogether received for reparation purposes probably does not represent a total profit for France of more than 60 million dollars.

Thus, while the new plan has worked satisfactorily from an economic point of view for Germany and certain of the Allies, above all for Great Britain, it has not been a success so far as France is concerned. In this respect, one of its main objects, if not its most important object, has so far not been obtained.

Since Germany, in the first year, has not paid more than 47.6 million dollars out of her own means, it is impossible to draw from the experiences of this first year any conclusions as to whether she will be able to pay, year for year, from September 1928 onwards, 596 million dollars. But it is possible to form an idea of how the plan will work in the next two years. Here again it will be wise to distinguish between the political, the technical, and the economic side of the problem.

Politically. So far as France is concerned, much will depend on what she will have to pay in turn to her former allies. Her net profits from reparation payments will doubtless not exceed 100 million dollars in either of the next two years. If she should be

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obliged to devote the major part of this sum to the service of her British and American debts, she certainly will be dissatisfied. In Germany the reparation obligations are not likely to cause any political unrest, unless Franco-German relations in general should be strained, in which case the reparation question might again become a political issue.

Technically, the plan will continue to work satisfactorily. While it will prove impossible for the German Government in the second year to pay, as the Experts assumed, $119,100,000 out of the proceeds of the sale to the public of the preference shares of the German Railway Company, this gap will promptly be filled by means of tax revenues. Nor will the transfer problem cause serious difficulties in the next two years, since most of the payments will, as heretofore, be effected by deliveries in kind.

Economically, the effects of the reparation payments for the Allies will be about the same as in the first year. As long as French prices are below world market prices, France will have a favorable balance of trade, her industrial plants will work at full capacity and the state will be able to dispose of the German deliveries in kind — though at some loss. If French prices should rise — as they might after a stabilisation of the franc — there probably would be an industrial crisis and little demand for German goods; but if the French state were then willing to continue the sale of those German goods at reduced prices, it would probably not find it difficult to place them on the French market.

The effects of the reparation payments on German economy are, however, another story. Germany, as has been shown, had to pay in the first year not more than $47,600,000 out of her own means. If she should not be able to sell to the public the preference shares of the German Railway Company, she will have to pay of her own means $290,600,000 in the second year and $285,900,000 in the third year. Will she be able to do that?

In the first Dawes year there was no charge, under the Reparation Plan, on the German budget. In the second year this charge will amount to $119,100,000, and in the third year to $95,300,000. Since, according to the official statistics, the revenues of the Reich exceeded the expenses in the first year by $136,300,000, the Treasury may appear to be easily able to pay in the second and third years the sums due on reparation account. But the budget surplus was entirely obtained in the first six months; the last six months (March to August, 1925) showed a deficit of $4,000,000. While the

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situation of the Treasury may in reality be somewhat more favorable than appears from the official statistics, the tax reform of August, 1925, is likely even to reduce public revenues. It therefore seems doubtful whether it will be possible to pay in the near future the reparation charge on the budget out of current revenues. The statistics of the first month of the new year (September, 1925) are certainly not encouraging. Expenses (aside from reparation payments) exceeded revenues by $8,600,000 so that in paying $13,800,000 from budget revenues into the account of the Agent General the Treasury had to resort to former savings. The difficulty of paying this charge out of current revenues will be particularly great if German industry should further deteriorate.

Interest on the German industrial debentures will first be due in the second Dawes year: $14,900,000 on April 1, 1926, and the same amount on August 25, 1926. In the third year this service will require twice as much, or $59,600,000. This means in the second year about 0.4 percent, and in the third year about 0.8 percent, of the business capital of each of the industrial and trading concerns upon which the industrial charge is imposed. This charge will not be a too heavy burden for those enterprises which yield high returns; they simply will pay a somewhat smaller dividend than they might grant otherwise to their owners. But there are many establishments which have been operated for quite a time without profit; for all those the reparation charge will involve a certain hardship, as most of them will be compelled to borrow from the banks, at a high rate of interest, the sums which they need in order to comply with this obligation.

Interest on the German railway bonds was paid to the amount of $47,600,000 in the first Dawes year. The German Railway Company could pay this sum promptly without difficulty, as revenues exceeded expenses by more than that. But the Railway Company in the second year will have to pay $141,700,000 of interest, and in the third year $131,000,000. Will it be able to do that out of current revenues? There are people who will say: "Certainly; all it has to do is to raise the freight and passenger rates by 10 percent." And they may quote in this connection the Agent General, who in his report of May 30, 1925, in referring to the report of the Commissioner for the German Railways, stated: "The figures given in the Commissioner's Report show the substantial extent to which freight tariffs have been reduced since September 1, 1924, particularly on goods of numerous

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classes, and the relatively low increase over pre-war passenger rates in Germany as compared with the rates in other countries." Freight rates have indeed been substantially reduced since September 1, 1924. But does this prove that they can be easily raised? Coal freight rates are still higher in Germany than in France, Belgium, Holland, Poland, Austria or Italy; and the same is true for many other kinds of goods. The increase over pre-war passenger rates in Germany in the spring of 1925 was relatively low as compared with the rates in *some* other countries, but since then the German passenger rates have been substantially raised. The increase over pre-war rates now varies between 65 percent for the fourth class and 50 percent for the first class.

Moreover, a comparison of the old and new passenger rates by themselves does not show the whole difference. At present whoever wants to go the 410 miles from Berlin to Munich at an average speed of more than 36 miles an hour has a choice between only two trains, a morning train carrying merely first and second class coaches — the lowest fare being $13.34 — and a night train carrying only first and second class sleepers — the lowest fare being $15.72. Before the war there used to be nine such trains, seven of them carrying third class coaches with a fare of $5.03. In consequence, the number of passengers in the second class is now larger than before the war, while the number of passengers in the third class has decreased. That it is a dire economic necessity and not a taste for luxury which drives more passengers into the second class is easily proven by the fact that the number of first class passengers, which already before the war was infinitesimal (0.12 percent), is now only one-third of what it then was, while by far the greatest increase has taken place in the use of the fourth class. It therefore seems well-nigh impossible to raise either the freight or the passenger rates without seriously injuring German industry. And, so far as the passenger traffic is concerned, it even seems doubtful whether an increase of the rates would noticeably increase the returns. The experiences of the past are, to say the least, not encouraging: in spite of the large increase of rates, the revenues per passenger mile in the last fiscal year were only 8 percent higher than in 1913–14.

In view of all these economic difficulties it may seem surprising that serious technical difficulties are not to be foreseen for the Agent General in collecting the second and third annuities. But the new reparation plan has created an efficient safeguard:

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the controlled revenues (customs and taxes) which serve by way of security for the contributions to be made from the German budget, and by way of collateral security for the interest of the industrial and railway bonds, yield such high returns that all reparation payments can be easily covered from this source. It is then more of an internal German problem how the necessary surplus shall be raised. The methods which at first view present themselves — an increase of taxes and of railway tariffs — are not easily applicable. The consumers, who have little political power, already pay very high taxes; and the producers, who have much political power, are partly unable and altogether unwilling to pay more taxes than they do at present. As has been indicated, an increase of the railway rates might be harmful to the general German economy and perhaps even fruitless financially. A foreign loan would certainly offer a convenient provisory solution but would increase the difficulties of future years.

Germany was to recover economically in the first Dawes year. This object has not been obtained. German business has increased its foreign debts at an amazing rate, yet production is not larger than a year ago. The prospects of an economic recovery in the next two years are very poor: what Germany needs most of all is an up-to-date mass production, but such mass production is impossible without a strong domestic market, and since inflation has wiped out all former savings the purchasing power of the consumers will be slight as long as employers are unable or unwilling to pay fair wages and as long as business-men are less anxious to increase their turnover than to increase prices.

Thus we reach the following conclusions, drawn from recent experience and from the present status:

The execution of the new reparation plan did not present special difficulties in the first year.

The difficulties of the second and third year will be surmounted.

The real test is to come in the fourth or fifth year; in order successfully to meet this test Germany must get her business-men to adapt production, prices, and wages to the necessities of the community.

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BELGIUM TODAY

By Georges Theunis

IF the objective study that I shall try to make of present conditions in my country has any interest at all, it is because Belgium is beyond question one of the states whose existence has been most profoundly troubled by the war, and in which the adjustment of the new conditions created by the catastrophe that burst upon Europe in 1914 has raised manifold and serious problems and has led to deep-seated changes in both the public and the private life of the people.

I have no intention of setting forth in detail what the war has meant to Belgium; and yet, to understand our present position, the difficulties through which we have passed and those we have still to overcome, the problems awaiting solution, and our hopes, it is essential to recollect what has been happening in Belgium during the last twelve years. Before the war the country was often compared to a hive in the full bustle of its activity, or to a great factory with a huge store annexed. No country presented — or presents — such density of population, such commercial and industrial activity, such a network of railways, roads, and canals. With a population twenty times as dense as that of the United States, and three and a half times as dense as that of France, Belgium before the war was wholly occupied with finding foreign markets for the products of her toil, in order to procure the funds indispensable for the purchase abroad of the food supplies which her limited territory could not provide.

Belgium's geographical location assured her a privileged position so far as transport was concerned. Unhappily, that very geographical situation placed her at the point where the military routes of the great European countries crossed, and so helped on the disaster. Belgium, a neutral country, was attacked and invaded by one of the guarantors of her neutrality. At the end of a few weeks, 99 percent of her soil was occupied by the enemy; and the Belgian Army, under the leadership of our heroic King, was on the Yser with no more than a sliver of our territory left to defend. For want of raw materials and outlets, and also because our workmen steadfastly refused to coöperate with the enemy, industrial life gradually came to a standstill. Our great industries were systematically destroyed by the occupying forces, under the

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pretext of procuring raw materials but in reality in order to handicap what might be a dangerous industrial competitor later on.

Let me merely cite some facts about the iron industry. Of fifty-seven blast furnaces existing in Belgium in 1914, forty had been destroyed by the time of the armistice — not by artillery fire, but by special German demolition details. The great majority of the trains of rolls were destroyed by explosives, and converters, electric ovens, and coke ovens met the same fate. The machinery of our innumerable workshops was either sent to Germany or destroyed on the spot. Again, 3,000 locomotives and more than 100,000 cars and coaches were carried off or destroyed, while 1800 kilometres of roadbed were torn up or put out of service. Our stock-breeding, too, was ruined, most of the horses and the best of the cattle being seized by the army of occupation.

I mention these random examples simply in order to give some idea of the condition in which Belgian industry and agriculture found themselves at the time of the armistice, and I mention material damage only. It must not be forgotten that the working class, so numerous in Belgium, had been weakened by the wholesale deportations (120,000 workmen were deported to Germany for having refused to work for Germany), by unemployment, and by inadequate nourishment in spite of the admirable efforts of the Commission for Relief in Belgium. It is useless to speak of trade or transportation, since all our relations with other countries were wholly suppressed for more than four years. The indirect damage of the war and the occupation were indeed even more disastrous than the direct damage of the actual fighting.

Scarcely were the Belgians delivered from the enemy's yoke when they set themselves courageously to the task of building up their ruins, restoring their factories, reëstablishing their agriculture, and recovering the markets abroad that are indispensable to the country's existence.

Let us try in a hasty sort of way to find out what are the important changes that have been wrought, under various guises, during these twelve years.

So far as domestic politics are concerned, we must remember that the Belgian Parliament before the war consisted of two chambers, the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate. The members of the Chamber of Representatives were chosen by universal suffrage, but with a check in the provisions giving supplementary votes to freeholders, to persons qualifying in more

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or less advanced studies, and also to fathers of families. The Senators were chosen by the same electoral body, but — except for a number elected by the Provincial Councils — could be chosen only from among persons who had paid a certain minimum direct tax.

The revision of the Constitution, which was completed in 1921, has resulted in the establishment of universal suffrage, pure and simple, for both chambers. This is the principal modification. Women have the right to vote in municipal elections, but have not yet received it in provincial or legislative elections. The division of seats has been worked out by a rather complicated system of proportional representation. The old restrictions on eligibility to the Senate have practically disappeared.

The result of these modifications has been an increase in the influence of the Socialist Party. In the pre-war Chamber the division was: 41 Socialists, 44 Liberals, 99 Catholics, 2 Independents. Today there are 78 Socialists, 23 Liberals, 78 Catholics, and 7 of various parties.

There are only two Communist deputies in the Belgian Chamber. In spite of the propaganda which is carried on among us, as everywhere else, by Moscow's emissaries or with Moscow's gold, I have too much confidence in the rational and moderate spirit of my fellow-citizens to believe that Communist doctrines can ever find adherents among us in any numbers worth considering.

We shall see presently in what manner real property is divided in Belgium. Personal property is divided in about the same way. There are a million depositors in the Caisse d'Epargne, a kind of official bank for small savings accounts. And while we are on the subject, it is interesting to note that the official organ of the Socialist Party publishes the stock reports every day, precisely as the bourgeois journals do, which indicates how widely investments (all payable to the bearer, however) are distributed among all social classes. Another indication is provided by the great Socialist coöperative of Ghent, the *Vooruit* (under the direction of M. Anseele, one of the party leaders who is at present Minister of Railways), which a few years ago out of its own capital founded a bank and a whole series of industries — spinning mills, cotton mills, lace mills, foundries, workshops, steam fisheries, etc. The stocks of some of these are sold side by side with ordinary stocks on the Brussels Bourse.

This division of wealth, this economic organization of the work-

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ing class, constitutes an element of stability and sanity. In spite of the insuperable difficulties of adjusting wages in the midst of the economic upheaval of the post-war period, the number of strikes since the war has been far smaller in Belgium than in England or France.

For three years after the armistice, Belgium was governed by a ministry in which three parties were represented under the so-called *Union Sacrée*. Toward the end of the year 1921 the Socialists made up their minds to retire from the government and a Catholic-Liberal Coalition Ministry remained in power until the elections of last April. The Liberals, who had lost a considerable part of their following, then decided to participate in the government no longer; and after a long-drawn crisis a ministry including representatives of the Socialist party and of the Right — more especially the democratic section — came into power.

The greatest problem that Belgium had to face after the armistice was naturally reconstruction. This explains why the *Union Sacrée* Ministry was thought necessary and why it was able to maintain itself for a relatively long time. The problem, however, has outlasted that ministry; and though the reconstruction of the material ruins of the war has in fact been completed and the restoration of state finances has made enormous progress, financial and economic questions nevertheless still remain the questions of the day. The old religious quarrels are disappearing and, we may hope, will not spring up again — at least not with the old bitterness.

Belgium's financial situation after the armistice was truly tragic. Before the war her people paid relatively small taxes. The system of direct taxation was simple and was based on the external marks of wealth alone. The unequal division of taxation that resulted from this system was easily borne because of the extremely moderate assessment of fiscal charges. The government that came into power after the armistice found itself facing an apparently insoluble problem. On one side there were the enormous expenses necessary to wind up the war and the occupation, reconstruct the devastated regions, and support the hundreds of thousands of workers condemned to unemployment by the destruction of our industry and exports. On the other side, of our normal resources nothing, or nearly nothing, was left.

As a matter of fact, the old taxes were so inadequate to the needs created by the war that it was necessary to plan new ones

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at once. At the end of a few months a system of income taxes was put in operation, but had to be modified almost immediately because of certain blunders which its practical application revealed. It must be added that the income tax was destined to yield very little in the beginning, just at the moment when needs were most urgent. In fact, most Belgian incomes had been reduced to almost nothing. It was therefore necessary to borrow, and at this time the government was able to borrow considerable sums on the Belgian market, which was suffering from an inflation of which we shall presently speak. It could get money easily, too, because, industry and commerce having been reduced to almost nothing, floating capital had no conceivable employment. This was a time when there were many hopes, many illusions. The same confidence which had served to sustain our people's morale during the long years of occupation, served now to hasten the reconstruction of the devastated regions. During the war the Belgians had so often been promised the restoration of their country, that after the victory they had, indeed, some excuse for facing the future with a certain optimism.

A loan floated in America for the purchase of wheat and a reconstruction credit from the British Treasury assured the first vital requirements of the post-armistice period. But this was no more than a provisional solution of the difficulties, for the situation of the budget was really appalling.

The impossibility of balancing the budget during the first years led to a large increase in the public debt. The necessity of redeeming the marks that had been bought at an arbitrarily fixed figure during the occupation, the assumption by the state of the war contributions imposed by the Germans on provinces and communes, added to the expenses of reconstruction proper, led to formidable increases in the figures. The public debt, which was five billions before the war, increased by twenty billions during the first year following hostilities, and by from five to six millions during each of the two succeeding years. At the end of the year 1921 the total reached thirty-six billions. Then there was a gradual slowing down, and at the end of 1924 the debt amounted to 40,680,000,000 Belgian francs.

Rough comparisons with pre-war figures are obviously inaccurate, since our franc was at gold parity in 1914. The war, and more especially the inflation due to the arbitrary exchange rate imposed by the Germans during the occupation, gradually re-

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duced it to a quarter of its pre-war gold value. It will be observed that the lower value of the francs lent to the state before and after the armistice constituted in itself a heavy levy on Belgian capitalists.

On the other hand, this same depreciation added to the difficulties of the state, which every year found itself confronted with new demands by its employees, which necessitated adjustments corresponding to the cost of living. The unbalanced budget, the formidable growth of the public debt simultaneously with the gradual disappearance of illusions about the reparations to be obtained from Germany, led to a salutary reaction. Since 1921 there has been a continuous effort to clean up public finance. It has been necessary, even in carrying forward and completing the reconstruction of the devastated areas, to check the growth of public expenses, then to reduce them, and to diminish the number of state employees. Above all it has been necessary to increase taxation. The revenue from taxes anticipated in the budget of 1913 was 351,000,000 francs. That anticipated in the budget of 1925 was 3,540,000,000 francs. Even when the depreciation of the currency is considered, this is a tremendous effort, especially if we consider the distribution of wealth in Belgium, where the majority of the population have small or moderate incomes. The British Commercial Attaché, in his report of December, 1924, on economic and financial conditions in Belgium, says that "the growth of taxes has attained a degree previously undreamed of."

I have already said that Belgium is a country of small and moderate fortunes. I shall draw an example from the division of real estate. According to the figures of the Belgian register of the survey of lands for 1921, real estate incomes, on which no dissimulation is possible, were divided as follows (conversion into dollars being made at the average exchange rate of 1921): incomes from real estate below $30, 58 percent; incomes between $30 and $300, 38 percent; incomes above $300, 4 percent.

The division of personal wealth, though it cannot be verified in the same way, is probably about the same. Thus in determining the lowest exemptions in the income tax law, we have been led to set the figures very far down indeed. The tax-exempt income in large cities, for a household of four persons (father, mother, and two children), is 7,200 francs, or about $350. The advance of the super-tax rate is, for the same reason, much more rapid than in America or England. Incomes above $8,000 (165,000 francs) pay

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30 percent super-tax, whereas the 30 percent super-tax rate is not reached in England on incomes under $150,000.

The super-tax scale was fixed when the value of the franc was far above its present value. It is certain, therefore, that an adjustment is necessary if we are not to discourage completely the spirit of enterprise and thrift. After reading the figures given above, one has no difficulty in understanding why the harsh fiscal régime of the post-war years gave rise to an immense amount of complaint. In Belgium, as in a good many other countries, the Minister of Finance is not exactly a popular figure.

In fact, if we compare the per capita taxation provided for in the budget of 1925 with the same taxation in the 1913 budget we see a progression from units to tens. Again the comparison is obviously without significance because of the depreciation of the exchange. But if we make the same comparison, putting the taxes on a gold basis and estimating the dollar parity at the date when the budgets were drawn up, we see that the fiscal charge is 244 percent larger than it was before the war, a greater increase than the increase in France, Italy, or Switzerland.

The increase is heavier in Great Britain and America; but it is necessary to remember that while the national fortunes of the Allied states of Continental Europe were severely affected by the war, the United States and Great Britain have passed through a period of intense industrial activity during which the wealth of the tax-payers has greatly increased. In Belgium, as in France, the indispensable new taxes must be raised despite the fact that these countries are financially anæmic, not to say exhausted. In order to estimate properly the Belgian financial effort, let us add that it is not accurate to compare the number of paper francs collected by the state in 1925 with the number of gold francs collected in 1913. Nor is it fair to suppose that the incomes of the tax-payers — at least of all the tax-payers — have increased in proportion to the depreciation of their money. The workman, merchant, and business man have contrived to adjust their incomes, in greater or less degree, to the value of their money; but citizens living on their savings and salaried workers have had to meet the increased taxes out of incomes that have not increased — and this at a time when the currency is depreciating.

To wind up the tax question, it must also be observed that though Belgium before the war had attained a remarkable

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economic prosperity (despite the fact that she produced no raw material of prime importance except coal), this was simply because living was cheap and taxes were light. Too heavy taxation would threaten the source of Belgium's prosperity and would leave her industry incapable of competing with that of lands more favored in natural wealth.

In all countries — I know that this is notably the case in America — the tax-payers, feeling the burden that is imposed upon them, find fault with the government for trying to balance the budget by increasing its own receipts rather than by cutting down public expenditure. The reproach has often been well founded, especially since the war. During the war the question of price did not matter. It was necessary to win. Several years have been required to destroy this state of mind, which is so disastrous in time of peace. Everywhere necessity has led to the reduction of expenditures, and in Belgium the government has devoted itself energetically to the task. In the first place, it is to be noted that in countries like Belgium, where the public debt has been seriously increased by war and post-war expenses, the cost of this debt represents an important and irreducible part of the state's budget. In Belgium the service of the public debt represents 50 percent of the ordinary budget. This situation obviously cuts down very seriously the possibilities of economy. Moreover, it unhappily is a general law, — which applies to all countries without exception, so far as my knowledge goes, — that public expenditures have a natural tendency to increase. For a long time before the war states entered more and more fully into the life of their subjects. Belgium was no exception. For teaching, for child welfare, for the improvement of the national plant, the state is today meeting expenses that formerly either did not exist at all, or at least were not a burden on the public funds.

The covering statement made at the time of the presentation of the last Belgian budget compared the variations in budgetary expenditures of a number of countries. The expenditures of 1913 were represented by the figure 100. The budgetary expenditures compared do not include the charges of the public debt, which are of a special nature. It was shown that the expenditures of Belgium, reduced to gold, are 134 percent of those of 1913, whereas in England the coëfficient is 194 percent and in the United States 214 percent. Even the neutral countries of Europe have not escaped from the operation of this general law of

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increase, for the coëfficient for Switzerland is 171 percent and for Holland 293 percent. Though these comparisons, like all comparisons, may call for certain reservations, they at any rate seem to show that though something can certainly be done to reduce state expenditure, an appreciable effort has already been made since the armistice. The result of this policy, — fiscal sacrifices on one side and reduction in expenditure on the other — finds expression in the budget of 1925, where, given a supplementary fiscal charge of 125 millions, the equilibrium of the budget was assured; and this, let me repeat, without any reparations receipts from German sources.

According to the most recent statements of the Minister of Finance, the supplementary taxes planned a year ago are to be increased as a result of the necessary changes in the salaries of state employees and of pensions; and also to cover the cost of loans to stabilize the currency, of which we shall speak later. It may be hoped that these taxes will represent nothing more than a relatively slight increase and that this final effort will be fairly easy in comparison with those in previous years.

In any case, the balancing of the budget is the foundation of the present Belgian ministry's economic program, as it has been in the case of preceding ministries. All the parties have learned that this is a national question above the plane of their old accustomed quarrels.

The Dawes Plan, it is to be noted, will assure to the budget receipts which, while limited, nevertheless are guaranteed. Again, the debts to the United States have been adjusted. To be sure, this adjustment, especially for some years to come, will represent a new increase in the public charges. But if the economic improvement of Belgium continues, one may hope that these charges will be "endurable." At all events, this agreement has the genuine advantage of ending the uncertainty that has veiled this important question. It also permits us to form a plan for the solution of Belgian financial problems as a whole, from which the last unknown elements have now been banished.

In consequence, one can foresee the definite balancing of the Belgian budget; and the government has judged this an opportune moment to undertake the necessary task of stabilizing the Belgian franc. This is a delicate task requiring a combination of many favorable factors, some of which I have enumerated. The moral and psychological factors, especially the factor of

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confidence, are not the least important, but above them all is confidence within the country itself. This depends on the policy that is followed. Here, again, I hope that the national good sense will make people understand that a policy that can be approved by all Belgians who have their country's interests at heart is more necessary today than ever.

I have dwelt at some length upon the financial question, but the solution of financial questions depends primarily upon the state of economic life. In a country like Belgium, which must live by exportation, the question of tariff relations with the chief consuming countries is all-important.

In November, 1918, Belgium encountered new customs barriers on every side, due to the breaking of her commercial treaties. After long and laborious negotiation, she has succeeded in concluding temporary customs arrangements with many countries, especially with France and with Germany; but Belgian industrialists still find themselves compelled to struggle on every side against a protectionist tendency that is being more and more strengthened and generalized. To be sure, Belgium herself collects import duties, but these are moderate and may be traced rather to fiscal considerations than to a desire to protect industries. Thus, on a total importation of 17,581,108,000 Belgian francs in 1924, the total duties were only 450,552,000 francs, or a scant 2.6 percent. (I may pause to remark that the trade of Belgium and the United States is represented by the following figures: Belgian exports to the United States, in 1924, $54,500,000; United States exports to Belgium, in 1924, $105,000,000.)

Yet if we consider the economic condition of Belgium we shall find that in spite of all the difficulties strewing its path, a mighty effort has been made and has produced important results. The figures below will give some idea of its extent:

In 1924, the production of coal was 102 percent of what it had been in 1913; for the first eight months of 1925 the percentage sank to about 100 per cent, as a result of the intense coal crisis which at the present moment is gripping Western Europe.

In 1924 the production of coke reached 118 percent of the pre-war production; here too, in the last few months, there has been a reduction, but the production still remains above that of 1913.

The most remarkable effort has been that of the metallurgic industry, in view of the destruction to which the war subjected it.

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The production of cast-iron, steel, and finished steel in 1924 reached, respectively, 113 percent, 115 percent, and 128 percent of the pre-war production. (Strikes due to wage adjustments have unfortunately had a perceptible effect on this industry during the last three months.)

If, on the other hand, we examine Belgian exports as a whole, we find that in 1923 the relation borne by exports toward imports reached the same relationship which had existed before the war; and in 1924 exports were proportionately large.

Agriculture has progressively improved, and the area cultivated in 1923 was not far from pre-war figures. Since 1919 the number of horses has increased by 55 percent, and of cattle by 30 percent.

One of the most interesting results of the economic development indicated by these figures may be seen in the unemployment situation — that gaping wound of industrial countries. We shall leave out of account the unemployment during the war period, which was of course entirely abnormal. But the crisis of 1921 saw the number of unemployed pass 200,000. In August, 1925, the number of totally or partially unemployed had fallen below 20,000, a figure about the same as during a normal period before the war. (It must be added that for several months industry has been suffering from a serious slowing down of trade, but it is to be hoped that this will not reach the dimensions of a crisis.)

In contemplating the relatively comforting picture of Belgium's present financial and economic situation, one is tempted to ask why the course of the Belgian franc does not reflect it more clearly. To explain this fact it is necessary to go back to the underlying cause of our currency's depreciation. This initial cause is clearly the war. Belgium's currency structure suffered in a peculiar way during the occupation, when the German military authorities set up a compulsory exchange rate, fixing the value of the mark at 1.25 francs. The rise of prices due to the introduction of German marks was consolidated by the substitution, at par, of the notes of the Banque Nationale de Belgique for the depreciated currency then in circulation. The result was to depreciate Belgian money suddenly. The consequences of this immediate inflation, which was increased by the unsettlement of exchanges, are still making themselves felt today in trade transactions, in the budget, and in the public debt.

Recovery from Germany of the amount represented by the marks withdrawn from circulation and taken in charge by the

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Treasury was not guaranteed by anybody, the Treaty of Versailles having left it to Belgium to enter into direct negotiations with the German Government. At Spa, in 1920 and later in 1921 and 1922, conversations were opened, but without result. For it is to be noted that the German Government has never denied its responsibility for the losses caused to Belgium by the introduction of the marks. It always has simply pleaded its incapacity to make offers of adjustment. The Dawes Plan having now settled the question of reparations, we may hope that the Belgian treasury will recover a part of its loss by a long-term arrangement with the Reich. We know that at least semi-official conversations between Brussels and Berlin on this subject are in progress.

To withdraw the marks from circulation, the Banque Nationale in 1919 made the government an advance of 5,800,000,000 francs. The post-armistice financial difficulties through which Belgium passed prevented the government from regulating this credit. But aside from this single operation, the Belgian Government has *never* had recourse to the Banque Nationale for the needs of the treasury. Since the armistice it has even succeeded in reimbursing the issuing institution by the sum of 600 millions, or more than 10 percent of its debt toward the latter.

I think I have shown that Belgium deserves to inspire confidence in foreigners as well as in its own subjects. External confidence will follow domestic confidence. Our old European allies have always testified to a warm sympathy for us; and I had personal cause two or three months ago, during my mission in America, to feel that our great allies beyond the sea still retain a peculiar friendship for our little people, who amid the difficulties of their national revival have displayed the same courage that they showed during the unjust war of which they were the victims.

I come finally to Belgium's foreign policy. It cannot be understood except in relation to the considerations which I have discussed above. It is, like the foreign policies of all the Allied countries of Western Europe, dominated by two questions: reparations and security, which have profound and direct repercussions on finances and on the prosperity of the nations concerned.

I have already shown how Belgium's necessity of bringing about her own restoration by her own exertions contributed to swell the total of her debt. Up to the present time, in fact, apart from all reparations payments received from Germany, more than 13

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million francs have been expended in Belgian budgets on the work of material restoration — happily almost finished — as well as on the payment of military and civil pensions resulting from the war.

That is the financial side of the reparations problem; but this problem has likewise a close relationship to our foreign policy. Though the object aimed at was identical for all the Allies interested, they did not always envisage in the same way the means to be taken to obtain from Germany the execution of the engagements which she had signed. Throughout the international discussions on this subject, Belgium, being convinced that Germany would never keep her promises unless confronted by absolute union among her creditors, constantly strove to play a conciliatory and moderate rôle. To bring about this unity of views, she on many occasions proposed practical solutions which were designed to obviate conflicts and difficulties. She always sought to commercialize the German debt, being persuaded that if it were deprived of its exclusively political aspects it could unquestionably be stabilized.

Belgium was likewise among the first to approve the conference of bankers proposed in 1922. After the check at the Conference of London in August, 1922, Belgium did all that she could to gain time and permit her larger allies to seek a solution which would avoid rupture and the application of the grave sanctions with which Germany was threatened. For this reason she consented, in spite of attendant risks and perils, to receive six-month notes, accepted by the Reichsbank, instead of payments in kind which would have lasted until the beginning of 1923. These notes, moreover, were paid, thus giving a first proof of the advantages of commercializing the reparations debt.

Faced by renewed delinquencies on the part of Germany, Belgium decided, in agreement with France, to occupy the Ruhr. In applying this sanction she had no object except to compel Germany to keep her engagements. This purpose was attained, since Germany was induced to compose the difficulties and cease the passive resistance which she had organized. Moreover, the promise to evacuate the Ruhr was undeniably the determining element in Germany's acceptance of the Dawes Plan in 1924.

Belgium was the first to accept the Dawes Plan without any reservation. Aside from the practical virtues of this solution of the reparations problem, Belgium saw in the intervention of

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distinguished American citizens — even though it were merely friendly and private — one more guarantee that the Plan could be carried out. We may now be permitted to hope that the era of justified anxiety, which has made such an agony of the reparations question, has come to an end.

Last of all, the question of security unquestionably dominates the external policy of Belgium. A little country, without natural defences, placed at the crossroads of war, she has learnt through the bitter experience of history to be constantly on the alert regarding her security. The war of 1914–1918 having upset the guarantee of compulsory neutrality, sanctioned by the Powers, that once protected us, it has become necessary to assure the security of our territory in some other way. The Treaty of Versailles looked to a guarantee of our security by England and America. Unhappily, its non-ratification by the United States ended the project. The idea was taken up again in the course of the Cannes Conference of 1922, where a Franco-Belgo-English security pact was on the point of conclusion when it was made impossible by the French ministerial crisis which arose at that very moment. The seed was sown, nevertheless, and the peoples came more and more to understand that a new effort was required. As I write these lines the Locarno Conference has just ended with a general agreement on arbitration treaties and the guarantee of a territorial status quo.

The signatures of England and Italy affixed to the Rhenish pact at Locarno, along with those of the countries directly and immediately interested, at length assure the inviolability of the frontiers that have so often been disputed, as well as of the demilitarized zones as established by the Treaty of Versailles. Moreover, the mutual assent of all the great European nations to the conventions of reciprocal arbitration drawn up at this Conference give a special character to the other treaties issuing therefrom. Thus has been elaborated the juridical status which one may believe to be definitive for Western Europe. The mutual engagements solemnly and unanimously assumed by the Great Powers give ground for the hope of a peaceful and secure future.

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INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT

By Edward P. Warner

IN Western Europe air transport is inherently international in its nature. The airplane and airship are essentially long distance vehicles. The terminals between which they operate are usually well outside of the cities that they serve, and the loss of time at the beginning and end of a voyage when travel is by air is much more serious than when the railroad is used. Except on such unusual routes as those across the Channel and those connecting Copenhagen with other points, the airplane does its passengers but little good over distances of less than two hundred and fifty miles. For a real demonstration of its possibilities the distance should be considerably greater than that. As for mail and express transport, which may be quite as important as the carriage of passengers — and in this country up to the present time has been much more so — the distance should be a full thousand miles to permit the airplane to compete successfully with a highly organized railroad system. For the airship the economical and practically expedient length of journey is still longer. As a result, no single country in Europe, except Russia, is large enough to build up solely within its own borders a really extensive or important system of air lines. The vast majority of the lines now operated in Europe touch at least two countries, and in some cases an intimately connected group of services makes it possible for passengers to cross half a dozen international boundaries in a single day's flight.

The manifest importance of aerial navigation in the sphere of international relations attracted the attention of students at a time when the airplane was still incapable of flying more than a few miles, and when the only aircraft in common use was the free balloon drifting at the will of the wind. At that early day, and indeed for a number of years afterwards, there were two directly clashing opinions on the legal position of air space. One view, that of most of the British writers on the subject, upheld the claim of complete sovereignty over the air, at all heights, within national boundaries. The other, commanding the adherence of a number of Continental students of international law, declared the air, like the sea, to be free to all nations, — freedom beginning either above the bounds of actual

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use from the ground or above some arbitrary altitude specified by analogy with the three-mile limit at sea. The experience of the war removed the question from the realm of theory. Once the potentialities of aircraft had become apparent, the assertion of sovereignty over the air, dictated by vital considerations of national self-preservation, was accepted by common consent.

Although there was no questioning of the rights of sovereignty, it was clear that an intolerable situation would result if every nation were left free to prohibit foreign air traffic or to control it as it willed, subject to no restraint by international agreement. Out of this general recognition grew the International Air Navigation Convention, drawn up at Paris on October 13th, 1919, and signed by the representatives of thirty-two nations, including the United States. A number of these, however, did not subsequently ratify the Convention, and in our own case it was never even submitted to the Senate.

In that basic charter of non-military flying the position taken as regards sovereignty is explicit. In the first sentence of the first article it is declared that "Every Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory." The need of concessions to facilitate commercial flying, however, is dealt with in wording equally plain. "Each contracting state undertakes in time of peace to accord freedom of innocent passage above its territory to the aircraft of the other contracting states, provided that the conditions laid down in the present Convention are observed" (Art. II). And, again, "Every aircraft of a contracting state has the right to cross the air space of another state without landing" (Art. XV). As between the signatories, there has been general coöperation in carrying out those provisions, the occasional international incidents which have resulted from misunderstandings or from forced landings or other misadventures in flight having been too trivial for discussion. The only moves towards the control or restriction of air traffic for national ends have been through the passage of laws, similar to the coastwise shipping law of the United States, reserving to native enterprise the right to the carriage of passengers and goods between internal points.

The International Convention, in addition to defining the legal status of the air, makes detailed provision for the supervision of aircraft and their operations. The one thing is a necessary consequence of the other. No state can undertake to give

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freedom of passage above its territories and above the heads of its citizens to foreign aircraft unless there is assurance that they will be of safe design and properly maintained and under competent pilotage. It is therefore required (Art. XI) that "Every aircraft engaged in international navigation shall . . . be provided with a certificate of airworthiness, issued or rendered valid by the state whose nationality it possesses." There is a similar requirement with reference to the licensing of pilots and other members of the navigating personnel, and the rules under which certificates of airworthiness and licenses are to be granted are made by each state in accord with general specifications laid down and subject to periodic modification by the International Commission for Air Navigation. That body, placed under the nominal direction of the League of Nations, and including representatives of every nation that has ratified the Convention, meets at regular intervals and maintains a permanent office and staff in Paris. Additional safeguards, in the form of rules for the lights and signals to be carried on board of aircraft and for the operation of machines when there is danger of collision, are incorporated in the annexes of the Convention.

The International Convention was written as an instrument of peace, but it was drawn up in conjunction with the Treaty of Versailles and its companion documents, and the intent to keep German flying closely under control is manifest. "No contracting state shall, except by a special and temporary authorization, permit the flight over its territory of an aircraft which does not possess the nationality of a contracting state" (Art. V). That provision might be defended as guarding against a state remaining outside the Convention and making separate agreements with those of its neighbors from whom it had something to gain through air commerce, while barring passage above its territory to the aircraft of other states. In practice, however, the exclusion of Germany from among the contracting states, the German Government never having been invited to accede to the Convention, has made Art. V unworkable. To take only a single instance, air traffic with Germany was of vital interest to the Netherlands, and while Art. V remained in force that traffic could be maintained only at the expense of Dutch adhesion to the Convention. Dutch inability to comply with the terms of the document and consequent unwillingness to ratify

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would, under a strict interpretation, have made Dutch airplanes in turn outlaws within the Allied countries with which, as well as with Germany, they desired to keep up services. That is but one typical case. A circle of non-ratifying states tended to spread outward from Germany as a center.

It is the highly special position of Germany in relation to commercial air transport that has lain at the root of most of the international difficulties of the last five years, and that gives the clue to several otherwise mysterious elements in the present situation.

Like so many other European troubles, the erection of barriers against European aeronautical commerce finds its origin in the Treaty of Versailles. It is with the clauses of that instrument relating especially to military aeronautics that the German aircraft industry has come into conflict, with secondary repercussions disastrous for certain commercial air lines. The military, naval, and air clauses include provision that "The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces" (Art. 198), and that "During the six months following the coming into force of the present treaty the manufacture and importation of aircraft, parts of aircraft, engines for aircraft, and parts of engines for aircraft shall be forbidden in all German territory" (Art. 201). The six months' period so defined was subsequently extended on grounds of German non-compliance with treaty provisions and failure to surrender aeronautical equipment as required, but full freedom of rights to manufacture was regained in 1922, so far as admittedly commercial aircraft were concerned. The construction of machines for military uses is prohibited under Art. 198.

Unfortunately, the definition of a commercial aircraft is a very difficult matter. The vagueness of the distinction between certain classes of military airplanes and those intended for peaceful purposes was considered at the time of the Washington Conference for the Limitations of Armaments to be prohibitive of any attempt at limitation of the equipment for aerial warfare, and it has been quite impossible to arrive at a line of demarcation which would permit the companies operating German commercial air lines to use the equipment that they wanted to and which would at the same time satisfy Allied, especially French, demands for security against the preparation in Germany of a reserve of equipment for possible future bombing

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raids. The Treaty has left the Allies in a position to write their own definition of a commercial airplane and enforce it, and they not unnaturally leant towards conservatism in deciding what was needful to admit a German airplane to the commercial class. Their final decision took shape in the famous Nine Rules, which became effective on May 5, 1922, and which, with some changes introduced during the summer of 1925, still remain in force. The rules stipulate, first of all, that there shall be no construction of airplanes designed for flight without a pilot under radio control, no special provision for the mounting of guns or bombs, and no building of single passenger machines having engines with more than 60 horsepower. Those specifications relate to purely military factors, and against them no one can well complain, if the abolition of the German air force is accepted as a *fait accompli*.

On the other rules there is more argument. German airplanes must not be designed to rise to a height of over 13,000 feet above sea level. That limitation is of comparatively little importance, as ability to climb to great heights is secured only at the expense of economy. Speed was originally limited to 106 miles an hour at a height of 6,500 feet, a figure subsequently increased to 112 miles an hour at the same altitude, which, for the typical airplane, is equivalent to about 116 miles at sea level. For many commercial routes that is ample, but where the airplane has to come into direct competition with a good rail service a somewhat higher speed is desirable. German protest against the limitation of speed has been vigorous and frequent.

The original set of rules limited the amount of fuel that could be provided for to about enough for four hours' flight at full power, while the total weight of pilot and crew and passengers and freight carried could not exceed 1,320 pounds. The last restriction, introduced of course to prevent the building of machines large enough to be converted for heavy bombing, laid the most serious burden on German operators of aircraft. In response to their protest a considerable concession was made in 1925, the load limit being raised to 1,980 pounds, permitting the carriage of a pilot and eight passengers and three or four hundred pounds of baggage and express. Even that concession keeps the Germans from competing on equal terms with the French and British companies, which operate some machines on which the weight of the "pay load" and crew totals over

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2,500 pounds, with types very much larger in early prospect.

The first result of all this was a hegira of German airplane companies onto unregulated soil. Although they keep up factories in Germany, nearly all of the important constructors have branches across the borders in Italy, Denmark, Sweden, or Lithuania, where they can build airplanes of any size or speed without hindrance or inquiry into their activities.

Aside from such a removal, a further possible German answer was clear, and it was promptly made. The aerial navigation clauses of the Treaty of Versailles (Arts. 313 to 320) had given to the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers "full liberty of passage and landing over and in the territory and territorial waters of Germany," as well as most-favored-nation treatment in respect of internal commercial air traffic, but all obligations laid on Germany by those clauses expired on January 1st, 1923, when full liberty of action in respect of foreign aircraft was regained. The German Government was prompt to provide that foreign machines flying over German territory should comply with the same restrictions laid upon native aircraft. Since none of the French and British commercial airplanes at that time fell within the bounds marked out by the Nine Rules, all being either too large or too fast (in fact it would hardly have been possible to build an airplane which would fit those rules and still qualify for the French subsidy), the effect was to prohibit Allied air traffic across Germany.

That this was a very serious matter becomes clear from a glance at a relief or contour map of Europe. The Alps, running in a crescent from within ten miles of the shore of the Mediterranean to near the shore of the Adriatic, cut off the Italian penisula from the rest of Europe as far as aerial navigation is concerned, except for airplanes able to operate safely across a rough and jagged terrain six thousand feet or more high — an accomplishment of which truly commercial airplanes, operating with reasonable economy, are hardly capable. Express may be carried over mountains by air, and the United States Air Mail is flown across ranges much more than six thousand feet high, but the hazard for passenger transport is too great. For aerial transport, then, as for the march of armies, the Alps isolate Italy; and Italy has no landplane commerce as a result. If to the Alpine barrier the whole German Republic be added as a forbidden land, the combined topographic and political obstacle

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extends clear from the Mediterranean and the Adriatic to the North Sea and the Baltic, and cuts Europe definitely into two parts. If French airplanes are unable to fly across German territory, no practical route to the east is open to them, unless they are so safeguarded against forced landings that they can strike out directly over the open sea from the Dutch Coast to the Danish, and again from Southern Sweden to the Polish Corridor, the latter flight covering a distance of 160 miles over open water. Given a free passage over Germany, on the other hand, there lies open a route across level fields and plains for virtually the whole width of Europe, and the trip from Bordeaux by way of Paris, Amsterdam, Berlin, and Moscow to Kazan or other cities in Central Russia can be made without ever crossing land more than fifteen hundred feet above sea level. Germany holds the key.

One French company has been in a good position to realize the importance of that key. The *Compagnie Internationale de Navigation Aérienne*, formerly the *Compagnie Franco-Roumaine*, has engaged since 1920 in the maintenance of air transport between France and the countries of the Little Entente and other eastern states. Starting with a line from Paris to Warsaw via Strasbourg and Prague, there was added in 1922 an extension from Prague to Vienna and Budapest, a branch extended in the next year to Belgrade, Bucharest, and (only intermittently, because of political difficulties) to Constantinople. Negotiations were entered into with the Angora Government for a continuation to the Turkish capital, and a few flights into Anatolia have been made. The stretch from Strasbourg to Prague, however, ran for two hundred miles across German territory. Airplane engines are not wholly immune from trouble, and there were occasional forced landings on the aerodrome at Nuremberg and elsewhere in Germany. Through 1922, with the German Government bound by the Air Navigation clauses of the Treaty, no serious inconvenience resulted. But in 1923 full liberty of action was regained by Germany, and during the latter part of that year and during 1924 each forced landing resulted in confiscation of the airplane and technical arrest of the pilots, who, however, were promptly sent on their way. Fifteen such incidents happened in all. Attempts on the part of the company to reach an understanding with the German authorities were in vain, and as the continued passage of the French airplanes

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

EUROPEAN AND NORTH AFRICAN AIR LINES

Areas of an altitude of 6,000 feet or over are shown by diagonal shading. The territory of Germany is dotted.

London — Paris — Zurich
London — Brussels — Cologne
London — Rotterdam — Amsterdam
Paris — Brussels — Rotterdam
Paris — Rotterdam
Amsterdam — Hamburg — Malmö
Amsterdam — Berlin
Amsterdam — Hanover — Berlin
Amsterdam — Essen — Berlin
Amsterdam — Bremen — Hamburg
Brussels — Basle
Basle — Geneva — Lyons
Toulouse — Perpignan — Barcelona — Alicante — Malaga — Tangier — Rabat — Casablanca — Dakar
Marseilles — Perpignan
Antibes — Ajaccio
Oran — Fez — Rabat
Alicante — Oran
Alicante — Algiers
Berlin — Leipzig — Nuremberg — Munich
Berlin — Breslau — Gleiwitz
Berlin — Danzig — Königsberg — Kovno
Danzig — Marienburg
Copenhagen — Berlin — Dresden
Copenhagen — Malmö
Berlin — Smolensk — Moscow — Kazan
Berlin — Warnemunde — Karlshamn — Stockholm — Helsingfors
Helsingfors — Reval — Riga — Memel — Königsberg
Breslau — Gorlitz — Dresden — Leipzig — Erfurt — Cassel — Dorsten
Nuremberg — Frankfort
Erfurt — Frankfort
Dorsten — Frankfort — Stuttgart — Zurich
Hanover — Hamburg
Hanover — Bremen
Munich — Innsbruck
Leipzig — Stuttgart
Bremen — Dortmund — Frankfort
Hanover — Leipzig — Chemnitz
Munich — Stuttgart — Baden Baden
Dortmund — Halle — Leipzig
Berlin — Halle — Weimar — Frankfort
Mannheim — Karlsruhe — Baden Baden — Villingen — Constance
Geneva — Lausanne — Zurich — Munich — Vienna — Budapest
Budapest — Belgrade — Bucharest
Prague — Vienna
Prague — Warsaw
Prague — Bratislava — Kosice
Prague — Marienbad
Eupatoria — Sevastopol — Simferopol
Kiev — Poltava — Kharkov
Kharkov — Ekaterinoslav — Odessa
Kharkov — Simferopol
(*Temporarily Suspended*)
Bucharest — Constantinople — Angora
Paris — Strasbourg — Prague

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across German soil without landing led to growing tensity of feeling, with consequent likelihood of the detention of pilots and passengers and the confiscation of mail and express, the attempt to run the service by the original route was abandoned. In the spring of 1925 a new route was laid out, skirting the German frontier by way of Basle, Zurich, and Innsbruck. Three months of trial, with one or two bad accidents, proved the virtual impossibility of regular operation across the Alps and the Tyrol, and during the latter part of the past summer the service started from Prague, — a French air line making no contact with France.

Another Franco-German incident, of a very unhappy sort, occurred during the past autumn. On September 13 Robert Thierry and Dieudonne Costes, two well-known French pilots, started from Paris with a machine loaded to the limit with fuel to attempt a non-stop flight to Bagdad. Running into fog near the Rhine, they got into a valley which rose more steeply than the heavily loaded machine could climb, and finally crashed near Freiburg. Thierry was killed and Costes slightly injured, and after his emergence from the hospital he was fined 5,000 marks for having flown across German territory in defiance of German law and for having killed fish in the stream where the airplane fell, and forbidden to return home until the sum was paid, — an action within Germany's strict rights, but hardly a graceful one under the circumstances.

The result of this cleavage of Europe into two parts by a combination of natural and artificial obstacles has been to emphasize the absolute dependence on Germany of several of the northern countries. Aeronautically, the Baltic is a German lake. From Scandinavia it is virtually impossible to go anywhere, — impossible certainly to build up any important system of air routes, — without entering German territory. The Baltic States, Sweden, and Denmark have had to come to some terms whereby their aircraft could operate over German soil, and the result is that Scandinavian lines now use, almost exclusively, equipment of German design, although in some cases locally constructed. The Baltic States, with no aircraft industries of their own, lean equally heavily on Germany, and the logic of a Russian bond with Germany in matters aeronautical, even if there were no special political friendship between the two countries, would be obvious. The drive on Moscow was actually started from two

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directions, one French and the other German. The Germans got in first three years ago with a line from Königsberg, in East Prussia, across Lithuanian soil to the Soviet capital, a line which has functioned with exceptional regularity and success and which brings Moscow to less than twenty-four hours from Berlin and thirty-two from London. The French company had a project for an extension from Warsaw across Poland and thence to Moscow, and some progress was being made in negotiations with the Soviet officials, but the elimination of the Strasbourg-Prague link has held it up for the present.

Eastern Europe necessarily being dependent on Germany for air transport under present conditions, and the Dutch and Swiss having every reason to remain on good terms with their eastern as well as their western neighbors, the countries neutral in the late war, and those formed out of the Russian Empire, have stood aloof from the International Convention, which would have required them to forbid the air to German craft. Twenty-one states, counting the British Empire and the Dominions as seven separate entities, had formally ratified the Convention by the end of August, 1925 (Bolivia had also ratified, but subsequently withdrew the action). Twelve of the twenty-one are European, but across Northern and Central Europe there extends a bloc of non-ratifying states, including Germany, Austria, Hungary, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and all the Scandinavian and Baltic countries. (Practically all of these countries, however, have passed laws regarding airworthiness, qualifications of pilots, and other matters affecting safety of flight which closely correspond to the terms of the Convention, and with the exception of Germany they even mark their airplanes with five-letter symbols corresponding in form to those used in ratifying countries.)

The situation is in a fair way to be cleared up considerably by the amendment of Art. V, in accordance with a protocol approved by the International Commission on October 25, 1922, and submitted to the member states for ratification. This amendment provides that the original provisions of Art. V, by which contracting states undertook to forbid their air to the aircraft of all non-contracting states, shall not apply in cases in which a special convention has been concluded with the state in which the aircraft is registered. Such a special convention, however, must not infringe the rights of the other contracting parties

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and must conform in its terms to the rules laid down in the Convention and its annexes. Special agreements must also be filed with the International Commission in order that they may be made a matter of general knowledge.

This opens the road for the states neutral in the late war to deposit their ratifications and still keep up their air traffic with Germany, and conversations among them have led to a tentative agreement that when the amendment is finally adopted adhesion to the Convention by Switzerland, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland will be simultaneously announced. Adoption of the amendment seems near at hand, as it has been formally accepted by every ratifying state except Jugoslavia. Germany will still hold the whip-hand over trans-European flying, however, and it is to be hoped that German ratification of the Convention, presumably accompanied by some further relaxation of the control over German civil flying, will be among the beneficent results of Locarno. When Germany is admitted to the League her accession to the Air Navigation Convention ought to be not only invited but insisted upon. Others have more to gain from it than she herself.

As for ourselves, we too are in a somewhat anomalous position. Canada has ratified the Convention already, and flight across our northern border is possible only by special arrangement and with advance notification to Ottawa in each case. As flying becomes more common, intolerable inconvenience will result unless the Senate has taken the action necessary to enrol the United States among the nations participating in the Convention or unless, as a conceivable but somewhat awkward alternative, a fresh start be made on this side of the Atlantic and a very similar document drawn up to control pan-American air traffic. There appears to be nothing to gain and much to lose by such an arrangement.

Since practically every European Government offers subsidies to commercial air lines, the development of air transport is largely under Government direction. The obvious relation between foreign and colonial policy and commercial flying has been exemplified in the great "stunt" flights of the last few years, and in the activities of the numerous aeronautical missions despatched by the European Powers to various parts of the world.

The flights which form landmarks in British aeronautical history have been flights to and from the Dominions, and es-

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pecially, in recent years, to Egypt and thence to the East or South. British pilots have flown from Newfoundland to Ireland, from England to Australia, and from England to South Africa, and a regular "all-British" airway from Cairo to the Cape was laid out in 1920. The propaganda of the Germans has specialized in demonstrations in Russia and the Baltic States. The French might have reached the same areas via Switzerland and Poland, for the passage of the Alps is easily feasible for occasional demonstration flights, especially by military machines, but they have shown relatively little interest in that direction. Their efforts have been concentrated in French Africa and in the Near and Middle East. The dream of a line to Dakar was gradually brought to practical fruition through several years of effort, and a year ago two giant machines, operated by military personnel, were despatched from Paris on a flight to Lake Tchad, some fifteen hundred miles south of the Algerian Coast. That expedition came to grief, but many remarkable flights into and across the desert have been successful before and since.

The "stunt" flight is often a trail-blazer for the air line. The most notable development in air transport under French control in the last four years has been the constant increase of activity in Northern Africa. British enthusiasm for Central African operations cooled after the preliminary experiments of 1920, but interest in flying eastward from Egypt is as keen as ever. The Royal Air Force has run an official mail service between Cairo and Bagdad for a considerable length of time, and *Imperial Airways*, now controlling British commercial operations in Europe, have been given a contract to operate a regular service between Cairo and Karachi, in Western India, on subsidy.

It is in Russia, in the Near and Middle East, and in South America that international rivalries have been and are likely to continue keenest and most direct. In Russia the Germans have scored a point, as already mentioned, for the line between Königsberg and Moscow, partly controlled by German capital, is officially backed by the Soviet Government. The *Deutsche Aero-Lloyd* holds the German end of that enterprise, while their great rivals, the *Junkers* group, have furnished machines to companies holding concessions for a number of short lines in the Ukraine and the Caucasus. There have been constant reports also of negotiations by the *Junkers* interest for a contract to run on two routes of vastly greater importance, from Moscow to

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Pekin and from Moscow to Teheran, the former following the line of the Trans-Siberian railway throughout most of its length. Experimental flights have actually been made on both routes, and the German airplanes have several times appeared in the skies of Persia and Turkestan.

In Russia, as elsewhere, the German air line combines organize local subsidiary companies, instead of taking control in their own names. Local interest and local capital are enlisted and native personnel employed, while the parent group furnishes the airplanes, advises in the operation, and in most cases holds a controlling portion of the stock. Thus *Junkers Luftverkehr A. G.*, with headquarters at Dessau, has seventeen subsidiaries, seven of them of non-German nationality, while the *Deutsche Aero-Lloyd*, in addition to its share in the *Deutsche Russische Luftverkehrs* of Moscow, has a subsidiary in Danzig and seven in various states of southern and western Germany.

In the Near and Middle East three nations are involved, and the contest is more active. The German approach, as just outlined, is from the north by way of Turkestan and the Caucasus. The *Drang nach Osten* has taken to the air, and Bagdad, once the goal of German hopes, lies within easy reach, by a single flight, of cities in which *Junkers* airplanes have already established themselves. The nature of the French approach to the East has likewise been indicated, as have the obstacles to the present maintenance of a service across Europe and Asia Minor. Both French and German interests have been active at Angora, and both French and German commercial airplanes have been flown there (even since the definite termination of the French air service to that city) by way of exploration and for moral effect. The British interest being in Egypt, Iraq, and India, rather than in Asia Minor, and British influence at Angora being at a low ebb after the Graeco-Turkish war, the selection of a southern route from Cairo to Bagdad and thence along the Persian Gulf was logical for them. An extension northward by seaplane, from Cairo across the Mediterranean and perhaps to the head of the Adriatic, may be foreseen. Angora, Bagdad, and Teheran are the bridgeheads from which the air transport lines of the three countries most interested face the nearer East.

Governmental interest in aeronautical penetration of the Near and Middle East has of course been primarily political. It has been rooted in the desire of the several European Powers

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to make an impressive display of their enterprise in developing a new art, and also in a wish on the part of each of those Powers for avenues of transportation easily and quickly conveying their mails and their officials and commercial travelers into districts judged of political or commercial importance,—avenues of transportation which can be shaped to their own convenience.

On the other hand, in the third of the disputed territories, South and Central America, the contest is more economic than political. Here the important element is the desire to develop an export market for aircraft.

In South America, as in Russia, the Germans were the first to become active after the war, and have remained more continuously on the scene than have the representatives of any other nation. The *Societa Colombo-Alemán de Transportos Aéreos*, more commonly known as the *Scadta*, was founded in 1921 under the benevolent aegis of the ubiquitous *Junkers*, and has been at work ever since carrying passengers along the Magdalena river and its tributaries. No air service could elect to compete with existing means of transport under physical conditions more ideal than those in a country where most of the travel must be by mule team or in small steamers which often have to tie up at night. One of the company's routes has reduced the time required to cover 625 miles from ten days to eight and a half hours, while another has made a reduction from four days to seventy minutes. Several hundred tons of mail and some two thousand passengers have been carried in four years. The German and Austrian capitalists controlling the line have made proposals for an extension northward to Central America and to the United States by way of the Yucatan peninsula and Havana, and one of their machines has actually been flown over that route. The company's plan, as presented to the Post Office Department, seems to contemplate the formation of an American company, the use of German airplanes continuing, although there seems to be nothing to prevent the present Colombian company from making its operations pan-American in scope if the capital needed for the expansion can be raised in Germany or elsewhere. German interests also stand behind a short line in the northern part of Argentina, and there is prospect of further expansion there.

There has also been intermittent discussion of the project of maintaining an airship service between Spain and Brazil,

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Zeppelin ships being used. As the construction of airships at the Zeppelin factory at Friedrichshafen is prohibited by one of the Allies' rules, however, and as a license to build ships under the Zeppelin patents has now been taken by an American company which has employed a number of the German engineers who might otherwise have been available for and interested in the Spanish scheme, that project seems unlikely to materialize.

British business interests in South America has shown little concern for air transport as yet. Two years ago the Argentine Government subsidized a line running across the river Plate, between Buenos Aires and Montevideo, under British management, but operation was discontinued very shortly.

French efforts in the continent to the south of us have been somewhat different from those of other countries. There has been no attempt to enter into direct rivalry with *Junkers*, whose sway in Colombia is as unchallenged as around the Baltic. France looks farther ahead to the day when Europe and South America will be directly linked by air, and when French control of air transport across the South Atlantic will be an automatic consequence of the route which must then be adopted. The distance from French West Africa to the easternmost point of Brazil is shorter than that across the narrowest part of the North Atlantic. Allowing for islands which might serve to break the journey, just as the Azores were used as a re-fueling point in the first flight across the Atlantic, the longest stretch to be covered in a single flight is that from Bissago, in West Africa, to St. Paul's Rocks, a distance of a thousand miles,—a very long airplane flight, but one not absolutely beyond the bounds of possibility for an air mail line if the need became sufficiently strong. But the project for the immediate future, formed as a result of the visit of a semi-official mission to South America, is simply to supplement the airplane service between France and Dakar by a service under French control between Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires, the normal oceanic transport being used to bridge the gap. It is claimed that the time from France to Buenos Aires can thus be cut from twenty-one days to thirteen and a half, while the operation of ships between Dakar and Pernambuco, with transfer to the airplane at that point, would further reduce the time to ten days. The intention is to start operations on the South American section in 1926 or 1927. If the plan is carried out even to the point of connecting Rio and Buenos

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Aires, it is natural to expect as an almost inevitable consequence that the same company would undertake extensions to the important inland cities, instead of leaving that for the Germans.

Both to feel out the opportunity for French air lines and to demonstrate French products and encourage export business in aircraft in a new field, Paris has sent several official or semi-official missions into the Western Hemisphere. In addition to the one just mentioned, which was promoted by the company most active in air transport in Northern Africa, an expedition of a more purely official and military nature, including among its members the greatest of French war-time aces, was sent into South America a few years ago, and within the past year Central America has been favored with a similar visit, arranged by the French Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce with governmental support. It is as yet too early for results to be apparent, but it has at least been made clear that French concentration on domestic aeronautical affairs and on those of the Little Entente is not so complete as to obscure France's vision of possible opportunities in other parts of the world.

It is perhaps unnecessary to remark that American activities below the Rio Grande have received no such official stimulation. There has been a naval mission in Brazil, including an aeronautical officer among its personnel, and a naval aviation mission has also gone from the United States to Peru, but if there has been any promotion of commercial operation as a result it has been purely incidental. Several mining companies under American control have made use of airplanes for transporting passengers and goods, but the airplanes in some cases have been old and unsuitable for the work, and there has been no regular operation of lines open to the public for any appreciable length of time. Already we find ourselves in the curious situation of having a German company knocking at the gate and offering to handle special delivery mail between the United States and the Canal Zone and points further south, and if the Latécoère Company makes as much progress in the next three years as in the last three we shall see the great cities of the east coast of South America much more quickly accessible from Paris than from New York.

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ITALIAN DIPLOMACY DURING THE WORLD WAR

By Gaetano Salvemini

I: NEUTRALITY, PROVISORY AND ABSOLUTE

THE moment news of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia arrived in Italy, the Italian Nationalists opened a campaign for Italian intervention on the side of the Central Powers and Italian forces began concentrating in the general direction of the frontiers of France.

If, before hurling that ultimatum, the governments at Berlin and Vienna had come to an understanding with Rome, if they had offered Italy the Trentino with a proportionate share in the colonial fruits of victory, it is certain that an overwhelming majority, not of the Italian people, but of Italian statesmen, would have accepted such a proposition and forced the country into the war on the side of Austria and Germany. Adopting for the moment the viewpoint of Italian Imperialists, assuming that a program of Italian expansion could actually be realized in alliance with the Central Powers, one must admit that a war based on the alignments of the Triple Alliance was the one logical, the one genuine, war that Italian imperialism could envisage. It meant that the Austro-German block would be in control of all the eastern Mediterranean basin and of the gateways to Asia. Italy would serve as a mid-European bulwark facing the western Mediterranean against England and France. In return for this, the government in Vienna would make a friendly adjustment of the Adriatic frontiers of Italy and Italians would occupy Tunis, Corsica, Nice, and Savoy, and a portion of the French and English colonies, as these became available, in Asia and Africa.

The fallacy in this policy of an Italian imperialism based on the Triple Alliance was that the policy had no foundation in fact. Nothing of the sort had ever entered a German head (and in fact the negotiation went bankrupt over a mere nothing—the question of the Trentino). The rulers of Austria-Hungary had no intention of yielding an inch of territory to Italian Nationalists. Germany was not inclined to risk her Austrian alliance by standing out against Vienna in behalf of Italian Irredentism. Both Germans and Austrians, meantime, were sure that they could win even without the army and navy of Italy. Berlin, in particu-

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lar, was convinced that Italy would fall in with the Teutonic adventure in any event, since Italians would surely foresee a German victory and be concerned as to German reprisals thereafter. Vienna actually preferred Italian neutrality to Italian intervention, since neutrality would obviate awkward discussion as to compensations. Of course, some concessions of a territorial nature would have to be made to Italy; but the character and extent of these could be determined by Berlin and Vienna at their leisure — naturally they would not affect Austro-Italian frontiers! In the organization of a victorious Central Europe, Italy was to figure as a vassal, not as an allied, state. Her position would be precisely analogous to that of Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey!

As to the reciprocal rights and duties involved in the Triple Alliance, disagreement between the Quirinal, on the one hand, and the governments of Berlin and Vienna, on the other, was no new thing in the summer of 1914. The history of that Alliance is the history of a three-cornered negotiation, prolonged over a period of thirty-two years, as to ways and means of making the alliance effective. But down to the summer of 1914 Italian statesmen had always hoped that Vienna, under pressure from Berlin, could be induced to accept the Italian point of view. Not till the last two weeks of July of that year did the rift reveal itself as utterly and finally irreparable. The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, delivered without the due warning to Italy which both the spirit and the letter of the Alliance called for, and then Austrian hedging as to compensations which had always been specifically contemplated in Article VII of the Treaty of Alliance, brushed the last cobwebs from the eyes of Italian supporters of the *Triplice*. The attitude of the Central Powers and the unexpected intervention of England on the side of France, struck Italian *Triplicist* Imperialism dead in its tracks. There was nothing left to do except declare neutrality!

When this situation developed, the Italian Nationalists abandoned overnight their agitation for a pro-German intervention. They followed a policy of watchful waiting for a month, until the Battle of the Marne convinced them that Germany had missed her chance, that victory for the Entente was imminent. Then, about mid-September, 1914, they launched a drive for intervention against their former allies.

However, the bulk of Italian "*Triplicists*" — Giolitti's "machine" and the Clericals — did not follow our Nationalists down

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this new road. Disappointed, even bewildered, by the attitude of the Teutonic governments on the question of compensations, they could not rid themselves of old habits of thought and feeling that inclined them toward the Triple Alliance. They were still certain, even after the Battle of the Marne, that Germany sooner or later would win (had it not been for the then undreamed of intervention of the United States, they would have been right!). With immediate participation in the war out of the question, the *Triplicist* majority fell back on a policy of neutrality. But it was a provisional, a temporary, neutrality. They hoped that the Central Empires would eventually see the need of being more generous toward Italy, giving the Italian Government a more conspicuous interest in the profits of the war, and thus enticing Italy into their camp the moment the military balance-sheet should be again in their favor. *Triplicist* neutrality was just a substitute for Triplicist imperialism.

During the period of our neutrality, as well as during the war, this type of Italian neutrality, essentially pro-German, was being constantly confused with Italian Socialist neutrality. There was really nothing in common between them. Neutrality, with the *Triplicists*, was a stop-gap for intervention, as yet impossible, on the side of Germany. With the Socialists neutrality was absolute. The war, as Benito Mussolini kept asserting in his Socialist *Avanti!*, was a struggle between capitalistic governments. Socialists should not be led astray by nonsense as to "national defence." They should think only of destroying the capitalist system as a whole. In point of cold fact, the masses to whom Mussolini preached from these texts wanted only one thing — to be left alone without wars and without revolutions.

But the very situation of Italy rendered a policy of neutrality extremely difficult to follow. Were the war to end without any gains for Italy, the Socialists would accuse the "bourgeoisie" of having failed to solve "the problem of national integration" and the "problem of raw materials" (colonies). Such an outcome they even hoped for as productive of intenser social unrest. In 1914 Italy was not neutral in the same sense in which Switzerland was neutral — a fact which we may approve or deplore, but which remains none the less a fact. Accustomed by long tradition — whether rightly or wrongly is not the question here — to the pretense and to the desire of playing an active part in European politics and in Mediterranean affairs, Italy could not, from one

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moment to another, draw back like a snail into her shell and remain an idle and silent spectator till the uproar should cease.

We must also bear in mind that for thirty-two years Italy had been in alliance with the Central Powers and that, consequently, in Germany and Austria, Italian neutrality was regarded as an act of treason worthy of the most exemplary punishment. On the other hand, the manoeuvres of our *Triplicists* made Italian neutrality an object of suspicion to the governments of the Entente; and they, accordingly, throughout the long war, would have hedged a neutral Italy about with a net-work of military and economic precautions — sources of daily friction and incessant danger.

The farther removed in history we grow from the facts of those days, the more earnestly we strive to evaluate them dispassionately, the more clearly one thought forces itself upon us: that Italian participation in the war was an unavoidable necessity, that Italian statesmen were free to choose the time and manner of their intervention — just when and how they would make war, just when and how they would make peace; but that, as between ultimate intervention and prolonged neutrality, they had no choice whatever.

II: SAN GIULIANO'S CONCEPTION OF INTERVENTION

When Italian *Triplicist* Imperialism came to grief toward the end of July, 1914, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Italy was the Marquis di San Giuliano, a devoted partisan of the Triple Alliance who could see no future for Italy save in opposition to England and France and who had lent his personal prestige and his government's support to the formation of the Italian Nationalist Party in 1910. Now San Giuliano did not have the courage to protest when the Government at Vienna, with the complicity of the Government at Berlin, violated the Treaty of Alliance by serving an ultimatum on Serbia without a previous understanding with Italy. He could not bring himself to repudiate the Alliance and boldly take his stand outside it. To the end of his life he wavered between one camp and the other. A weak man, physically and morally, he could never make an irrevocable decision until some immediate necessity forced him to do so.

Nevertheless, in his reluctance to go over to the Entente, he had a perfectly clear vision of what an Italian imperialistic policy would have to be, the moment it should be pursued not through

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the Triple Alliance but through the Triple Entente in conflict with Germany and Austria. While, in fact, between September 16 and October 6, 1914, the rough draft of an alliance between Italy and the Entente was being studied with the various ambassadors, San Giuliano made the acute remark that for the Powers of the Entente the principal adversary was Germany, whereas for Italy it was Austria. For the Entente the Adriatic question was of secondary importance, for Italy it was primary. Before entering the struggle, Italy must have assurances from the Entente that the full weight of Austria would not be left to fall upon Italy while the other Powers were dealing with Germany: "The Entente must not try to spare Austria" (September 17). Furthermore, if Italy would avoid charges of treason to her old allies, she would need a vital, visible, and unquestionable pretext for entering the war (having failed to break the alliance at the moment when he had good grounds for doing so, San Giuliano was now tardily compelled to find some other plausible excuse). This occasion would arise as follows: if Austria were so roughly treated as to be unable to protect territories inhabited by Italians from conquest by the Slavs, Italy would be constrained by higher necessities to move in defence of her kith and kin. Therefore the Franco-English fleet should undertake some important operation in the Adriatic which, in conjunction with movements by the land forces of Serbia and Montenegro, would put Austria in difficulties (September 19). As for the Peace, Italy should not escape from the menace of Austria only to fall under the menace of Russia (at the time, Russia was still on her feet and thrashing Austria soundly). Trieste and the Trentino would not be enough. Istria as far as the Quarnaro and the main watershed of the Alps should pass to Italy. About Dalmatia, San Giuliano had not made up his mind, though the question was first being broached in those days and, to entice Italy into the war, Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, had offered her that territory as early as August of that year. San Giuliano was eager to avoid friction with the Southern Slavs. He did not know whether to ask for some of the islands of the Dalmatian archipelago, and if so, which ones. He thought it necessary to consult the Serbian Government on these points (October 6). He considered it wise to time Italian intervention with that of Rumania. The war should be followed by a security pact among the victors, which would guarantee their several conquests over a reasonable period of years; though such a pact should not obligate

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the various signatory states to sustain aggressive policies on the part of any of them toward powers not included in the pact.

The salient and capital points in this diplomatic and military system were three: 1. a war "to the bitter end" against Austria Hungary; 2. a post-war alliance of mutual guaranty between the victors; 3. an understanding between Rome and Belgrade as to the disposal of the inheritance from the House of Austria on the eastern shores of the Adriatic.

It might further be observed that San Giuliano's diplomatic conception of the war corresponded exactly with the military conception of it held by General Cadorna in August, 1914. "Since this war is not a local war between Austria and Italy," he wrote, "but a general war involving Russia and Serbia, whose objectives on the enemy's territory are identical with ours, the three armies should work in unison, as regards both time and space, for the attainment of these common ends." And again: "The Russian, Serbian, and Italian armies should exert every energy to encompass the fall of Austria; since, with Austria out of the war, Germany will have to depend on her own resources and will necessarily yield."

The military strategy of Cadorna was the diplomatic strategy of San Giuliano.

III: THE PACT OF LONDON

San Giuliano died suddenly on October 16, 1915, and he was succeeded by Baron Sydney Sonnino.

In July, 1914, Sonnino would have preferred immediate intervention on the side of the Central Powers. In August, when neutrality had been proclaimed, he thought it necessary to keep to the policy of neutrality: "I see," he wrote on the 18th, "that many people are trying to force us into war against Austria. This is a cause of great worry to me; for, unless there be reasons I am not aware of, I cannot see any possible course for us except to adhere to the policy which we have chosen — an armed neutrality, that is, one which will find us ready for any emergency."

Sonnino was one of those whose confidence in a certain and sweeping victory for Germany was shaken by the Battle of the Marne. On October 26, in reply to a question of Deputy Antonio de Viti de Marco as to whether he desired war inside the Triple Alliance, he said: "At the beginning of the war, I did. We should have entered on the side of our traditional allies, but on terms

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clearly specified. Now, however, the situation is different." "What were those terms?" he was asked. "The Trentino?" "The Trentino," he replied, "— and one or two other things!"

Nevertheless, Sonnino presupposed — and with men of action of his type to foresee a thing is to work on the basis of it — that the war would not be of long duration. In January, 1915, in a discussion with von Bülow, he predicted that everything would be over by the autumn. The expenses of intervention he thought he could cover by a loan of forty millions (sterling) on the British Exchange. On February 23 he suspected that that sum might not be large enough, that, perhaps, a figure of fifty millions would be safer. Appearing with fresh forces on battlefields where the previous belligerents would be lying exhausted, the Italian army would tip the scales in favor of whichever side it joined, and compel the opposing side hurriedly to accept a compromise peace in order to escape ruin. Strong with the prestige of a victory due to Italian intervention, and supported by a nation still unwearied by protracted fighting, the Italian Government would be in a position to impose its will upon both parties to the conflict, garnering a fat harvest of territorial concessions on either hand. This was the manoeuvre which Premier Salandra was to define as the policy of "sacred selfishness" (*sacro egoismo*).

Sonnino began negotiations with Vienna to overcome the obstacle of Irredentism. He offered what, in the language of commerce, he styled reciprocal guarantees with collateral security (*forfait*). To the Central Empires the Italian Government would pledge its own neutrality during the war, and it would sign a quitclaim giving the Germanic powers a free hand in the Balkan Peninsula. In return the Austrian Government would cede the Trentino and — "one or two other things," to wit: the district of Gorizia, the district of Gradisca, and six islands in the central Adriatic. Trieste would become a free city.

Had this bargain been accepted, Italian neutrality would have been guaranteed to the Central Powers, *but not to the Entente.* Having come to a satisfactory understanding with Austria, Sonnino (continuing meantime to arm for war) would next turn to the colonial question. Either he could strike another bargain for Italian neutrality with the Entente, or make arrangements for a coöperation somewhat beyond neutrality with the Central Powers. Doubtless the more conspicuous concessions would come from the latter, who could well afford to be generous, since it would be at

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the expense of England and France. Thus *Triplicist* imperialism, ruined in 1914, would come to life again over a round-about route.

However, because of the stubbornness of Franz Joseph and all his Ministries on every point relating to the Austro-Italian frontier, the negotiations with Austria came to nought. By the beginning of March Sonnino had lost all hope of reaching an agreement with the former allies of Italy. It was then that he approached the governments of the Entente, in negotiations which he concluded on April 26 in the Pact of London.

San Giuliano had stopped at the Quarnaro. Sonnino demanded, as his price for intervention, that the Triple Entente guarantee him, at the expense of Austria: the Italian Trentino, the German Upper Adige, Venezia Giulia as far as Longatico, in one direction, and as far as the boundaries of Fiume in the other; Dalmatia as far as the Narenta; and virtually all the islands of the Adriatic.

Where did he get this program? It was the scheme imported into Italy by the agents of the shipping interests in Trieste around mid-September, 1914, just after the Battle of the Marne; and it had been blindly adopted by our Nationalist Party and by the General Staff of the Italian Navy. Of the Navy and not of the Army! Cadorna was opposed to any annexations by Italy on the Dalmatian mainland. Sonnino, however, never consulted Cadorna on this subject. Nor did he consult the Italian Legation at Belgrade as to the effect such stipulations might have in Serbia. The negotiations expounded in the "Green Book" would convince our neutralists that war could not possibly be avoided! Acceptance by the Entente of the Nationalist program would compensate the nation for the sacrifices it would be called on to make!

The governments of the Entente found Sonnino's demands excessive. In March and in April, 1915, he had a foretaste of what the Peace Congress itself would be like four years later. The bickering went on for a month and a half. Not a rock, not a hummock, not a rabbit hole, not an ant hill, but was bitterly and tenaciously contested. Around the insignificant peninsula of Sabbioncello raged a battle comparable to the struggle of the Trojans and the Achaeans for the corpse of Achilles. Sonnino, moreover, had not been very well informed by his friends in the Navy department. In the "Green Book" he asked for the cession of the "Curzolari," supposing this to be the name of the Islands in the central Adriatic, whereas it belongs to the group farther south which comprises

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Leanto. The Pact of London itself demands two uninhabited rocks, Palazzuolo and Gruica. It calls for a "Canidola," without distinguishing between the larger and smaller island of that name. It makes no mention whatever of Sansego, which is an island of 1500 inhabitants with an important base for navigation. Following these stipulations, Italy would have acquired the shoals of Sansego, while the island itself would have been left to Austria! Furthermore there was a demand for the Pervichio Shoal but not for the Shoal of Saint Mark, which is an important administrative boundary. Similarly Toblach Pass became "Mount Toblach." *Videbis, fili mi, quam parva sapientia regitur mundus!*

In the end, a compromise was arrived at: Zara and Sebenico to Italy—Spalato to Serbia—the Dalmatian islands, half and half!

Certain that the war would soon be over and that a peace could be dictated to Germany and Austria, Sonnino thought he had yielded even too far to the representations of the Entente. The latter, however, had given in to Sonnino, late in April, 1915, only because they felt uneasy about the military situation. They were anxious to get Italy safely into the war before some mishap on the Russian front should thwart the interventionist movement in Italy. The Pact of London was signed on April 26, 1915. One week later the débâcle of the Russian army began at Gorlice. Victory in six months, a short war costing the forty millions stipulated in the Pact of London, turned into a prospect much more serious than Sonnino had foreseen.

And not only that! The contents of the Pact of London were to remain the secret of secrets till the moment of victory, when Italian forces would be entrenched on the lines established in the Pact and the world would be confronted with a series of *faits accomplis*. Instead, the Pact of London became public property (it was the French Government that let the cat out of the bag) just three weeks after the agreement was signed. Sonnino seems always to have been pursued by just this miserable luck: not one of his guesses ever came true, not one of his hopes was ever realized. From this moment on, the Austrian Government had enough material in hand to present the war to the Slavs of the South as a war of national defence against Italian imperialism. A powerful agent of propaganda had offered his services free to the House of Austria: The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Italy!

Down to the last hour of the war the Austrian General Staff regarded Sonnino's foreign policy as a most useful weapon in its

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hands. On November 1, 1918, General Weber came to Villa Giusti to get terms for surrender, and on receiving them and finding them outrageous, wrote back to his superiors: "There is no doubt that the Entente will confine its attention to the German Empire. The acceptance of these terms ought to be left to the judgment of the General Staff; for they are calculated to re-arouse the fighting spirit of the peoples of the Monarchy, especially of the Jugoslavs, and perhaps even of the Serbs."

San Giuliano desired a direct agreement between Italy and Serbia, and for that reason he was disposed to say nothing of Dalmatia. Having set this conquest at the center of our "national aspirations," Sonnino had to leave any such agreement out of account. For that matter, once the publication of contents of the Pact of London had become known, no agreement could possibly have been reached. The moment Italy declared war the Serbs let up in their attacks on Austria. They had half a million men, fully equipped, in high morale, and thrown far forward into Bosnia after inflicting two tremendous defeats upon the Austrians. The Pact of London paralyzed and demoralized them. Instead of coordinating their operations with Italy's, they turned toward Albania, and Austria shifted to the Italian front a part of the forces hitherto required to hold the Serbs. Cadorna noted the fact, and even suspected that the Austrians and Serbs had come to a secret understanding. Cadorna was certainly wrong! It was not a question of secret accord between Serbia and Austria, but of public disaccord between Italy and Serbia. Sonnino's diplomacy was hamstringing Cadorna's plan of campaign.

When, in the summer of 1915, the Germans were hinting at an offensive against Serbia, the French proposed that an Italian contingent, under an Italian general, be sent to help meet the attack. Cadorna consented, on the theory that troops thus employed would cost the enemy more attention that they could attract on the restricted sector of the Carso. Sonnino strenuously objected: Serbia was not really an ally, but an enemy. It would be a mistake to aid her! The Serbs themselves mistrusted the Italians and declined their aid. When Serbia collapsed, Sonnino did consent to the rescue of her remnants. The "enemy" was now no longer dangerous; and the favor could be used later on as an argument to induce the Serbs to accept the Pact of London, or as an argument against them, in case they declined to bow their heads.

On September 10, 1917, Pashitch, in a conversation with Son-

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nino, proposed a "discussion as to ways and means of reaching an agreement between Italy and Serbia, since it was in the supreme interest of both nations to work together on the basis of a sound understanding." "In possession of Trieste and Pola, with half of Istria, some of the islands, and the Port of Valona, Italy could rest assured of her military supremacy in the Adriatic as well as of the enduring friendship of the new state about to rise across the sea." Anyone familiar with diplomatic language can see that this was only a "feeler," susceptible of very noteworthy improvements, as in fact the later Treaties of Rapallo and Rome show it to have been. Sonnino refused to enter into any such discussion. On March 26, 1918, Pashitch admitted that "The Italo-Slavic boundary must be not only demographic, but geographic and strategic as well, with guarantees of cultural rights to the racial islands to be left on either side of such a frontier." Sonnino declined to consider any emendations to the Pact of London.

IV: AUSTRIA AND JUGOSLAVIA

The defeat of Serbia, the Russian rout at Gorlice, stubborn Austrian resistance in the Trentino and on the Carso, dispelled all illusions that Italian intervention would bring the war to an end by the autumn of 1915. Against Russia, the House of Austria had been paralyzed by the internal struggles of the Germano-Magyars with the Slavs; but she found all her subjects united for the war against Italy. The Pact of London had proved to be a Fountain of Youth for Austria!

These unforeseen contingencies might have counselled Sonnino to change his attitute toward the Pact of London, with a view to detaching the Slavs from their Austrian allegiance. Actually they confirmed him in another idea: that it was impossible to destroy Austria. "If Austria did not exist, she would have to be invented." This aphorism Sonnino had been hearing since his apprenticeship in diplomacy at the time of the Congress of Berlin, and in following it he was only adhering to a conviction of Lord Beaconsfield, whom he greatly admired. Austria was not to be, could not be, dismembered. As for "principles of nationality," — "the *so-called* principle of nationality," the Italian Ambassador to London actually dubbed it — that was only "fiction of the democrats!"

Six months after the Battle of Vittorio Veneto, Sonnino was still spending money to foment pro-Hapsburg and anti-Serbian agitation in Croatia, trying to resuscitate as much as possible of

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the old Empire by resoldering German Austria, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia, at least, together.

At bottom, the war as fought along the lines of the Pact of London was less a war against Austria than a war against those Southern Slavs who were aspiring to the Austrian succession. Sonnino was just "getting even" with Austria — Austria should have accepted the "collateral" he first proposed! With the Slavs it was quite a different matter. The war was not only to deprive them of Dalmatia, but to prevent their consolidation into a nation capable, at some future date, of reclaiming the Dalmatia which Italy would be occupying.

San Giuliano, as a condition precedent to Italian intervention, would have insisted on a concerted attack of the Entente nations by land and by sea to make the Austrian succession available for Italians and Slavs in the Adriatic. Sonnino thought of no such provision. At once, therefore, bickerings began as to the extent to which England and France should assist in the naval campaign against Austria. Sonnino complained that Italy was being left too much to herself. On the other hand he did not want too much help! Cadorna's proposal (it was seconded by Lloyd George) for a gigantic concentration of the Allied forces on the Italian front to put Austria *hors de combat*, he characterized as "sheer madness:" "Such uses of Allied troops would compromise our foreign policy."

With a total defeat of Austria out of the question, a compromise peace would have to be made in any event, and this would necessarily imply some sacrifice of Italian claims under the Pact of London. A revision would be possible only along lines of concession to Austria. A revision in favor of Serbia might be limited to surrender of claims on Dalmatia; but Austrian demands would cut much deeper. Italy would be forced back to the *parecchio* — the "something appreciable" — of Giolitti. But to accept either of these two alternatives would turn the Italian war into a fizzle. Sonnino, therefore, came to a standstill, his "piece of paper" in his pocket, doing nothing, saying nothing, but sullenly defending that piece of paper against everything and everybody. Without concessions to Serbia, he could not win the war. Without concessions to Austria he could not make peace.

V: "OUR WAR"

Just as Sonnino did not look forward to the disintegration of Austria, so he did not look forward to a total defeat of Germany.

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His mind had been formed in admiration of Bismarck's Germany and of Beaconsfield's England, and in hatred of France, whose seizure of Tunis had embittered the youthful days of all the men of his generation. These various sentiments blended in his mind into an expectation of a "drawn war" in which Austria would suffer perceptible losses while Germany kept her feet, her resources unimpaired and strong enough to drive her enemies into a compromise peace. This conviction led him to another idea in direct opposition to the policies of San Giuliano. San Giuliano wanted a post-war agreement between the victors mutually to guarantee their respective acquisitions. Sonnino would have nothing of such a contraption. In the "drawn battle" he would be so fixed as to dictate to both parties. Sitting on the fence, able to throw his strength to the one side or to the other, he could extract the greatest possible concessions in territory from both. This state of mind is written all over the Pact of London, in which the new Austrian frontier is drawn with the greatest conceivable minuteness, while the Italian rake-off in African and Turkish territory is left quite undefined. Sonnino preferred to avoid all chance of future friction as to the former. Then with Austria intact and in good humor, and with Germany not wholly crushed, he could reconstruct the Triple Alliance on sounder bases than it had ever had, and be in a position to exact a favorable settlement of the colonial question from England and France. A premise, also, of this policy was Italian freedom from any such post-war alliances as San Giuliano contemplated. The Italian war must be regarded as a localized operation for the interpretation of article VII of the old Treaty of the *Triplice* — conducted to be sure in conjunction with the "world war;" but remaining "our war" as our Nationalists said, and as Sonnino instructed his propaganda to say. Italy was a "provisory ally" of the anti-Germanic Entente — an "*allié pour le moment*," one of our diplomats actually averred in Paris. On abandoning the Triple Alliance, Sonnino had moved toward the Triple Entente, but had stopped half way. He could retrace his steps any time — tomorrow, friends with the enemy!

That is why Italy declared war only on Austria, remaining at peace with Germany till the summer of 1916, till a time, that is, when the failure of immediate victory and the development of an Austrian offensive from Trent compelled closer relationship with the Allies. That is why, on May 21, 1915, just before the declaration of war on Austria, an agreement with Germany was made

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"for the protection of respective subjects and properties." That is why, two days later, when von Hindenburg (not the general, but the legal advisor to the Embasssy at Rome) observed that "since German and Austrian troops were everywhere combined, an attack on the Austrian Army would be tantamount to an attack on the German Army," Secretary de Martino replied that "that is very distressing information, since a clash between Italian and German troops would arouse in Italy a hatred of Germany which today *does not exist* and would open such a gulf between the two powers as to *make a later rapprochement* the work of years." Says Von Hindenburg, further: "De Martino was deeply moved. He repeated several times that *Germany and Italy had no incompatible interests of a political nature;* and expressed the hope that the war would be fought *without too much bitterness* to avoid danger of an irremediable break between the two countries."

When victory came, Sonnino found on his hands a dismembered Austria and an impotent Germany, and his scheme for playing both ends against the middle at the Peace Conference vanished into thin air. He was now confronted with French and British diplomats who had understood his game all along and who had put up with him only because Italian "cannon fodder" had been essential in goodly measure to their success in the war. Completely triumphant, they had nothing to fear from Sonnino's devious policies.

It was now the turn of the Entente diplomats to remind the Italians that they had been *alliés pour le moment.* The war over, the "provisory alliance" had come to an end. Just what did Italy, their ex-ally, expect? A certain amount of Austrian territory was due Italy under the Pact of London. A subsequent Pact of San Giovanni di Moriana has reserved to the Italian government a certain zone in Asia Minor (a dangerous and unsubdued zone, to be sure). These obligations, they, Italy's ex-allies, would be happy to satisfy to the letter — except that Sonnino himself would have to see about getting Mr. Wilson's consent! As for all the rest, complete freedom of action! Sonnino had been an ideal ally: he had bled his country to help win the victory, and he had freed his allies from any duties as regards the settlement of peace!

If we would understand Sonnino's failures at the Peace Congress, we must go back to this, the first cause of all his mishaps: to the mistaken belief that an "our war" could be fought inside the "world war," to his attitude as a "provisory ally" and as a possi-

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ble post-war enemy, an attitude which he studiously adhered to in all his dealings with the Allied Governments.

To avoid being crushed by the English and French, who had acquired full freedom of action with the collapse of Germany and would use that freedom without scruple or restraint (as the rules of diplomacy dictated, and as Sonnino would have done himself, had he been able), Sonnino still had one recourse. He might manoeuvre among the dissensions that obtained between the victors, supporting one against the other, and selling his support case by case. Clemenceau wanted not only Alsace-Lorraine, but also the Saar and the left bank of the Rhine. Lloyd George had his eye on the German colonies. Wilson wanted to dominate the Peace Conference as supreme arbiter, and as originator of the League of Nations.

Late in December, 1918, Clemenceau seems to have offered on his own initiative a scheme for an Italo-French entente, which, however, providing for a dismembered Germany and a united Jugoslavia, was at the antipodes of Sonnino's way of thinking. As for Lloyd George, Sonnino might have asked for some colonial concessions in exchange for helping to checkmate Clemenceau's Rhine plans. Did he make any such advances? We do not know.

But there was still another way out: he might have allied himself with President Wilson, who was eager for an agreement with Italy: he might have seconded the President in upholstering the League of Nations, even without believing in it (Lloyd George and Clemenceau followed just that line!). He might have supported Wilson in compelling Clemenceau to rest content with Alsace-Lorraine, and in persuading Lloyd George to go easy with the German colonies and with Turkey. In exchange for all that, he could have asked from Wilson the cancellation of the inter-allied debts and a fair distribution of the colonial mandates. These tactics would surely have succeeded, because they could have relied on receiving support from English liberal-radicals and Laborites and from very considerable democratic elements in France. But Sonnino never could take "democratic ideologies" seriously. He went to the Peace Conference as a neutral *vis à vis* of Clemenceau and Lloyd George, and as an avowed antagonist of Wilson.

And what did he do there? Just as, during the war, he had based his diplomacy on the mistaken guess that the war would soon be over, so at Paris he manoeuvred as though his other guess — that Austria and Germany would have a loud voice in the negotiations

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—had come true. He could not see that, since this expectation had been disappointed, his hostile isolation in the Big Four frightened absolutely nobody and invited reprisals from all. Even the Almighty Himself, having created Adam and mankind, came one day to realize that he had made a mistake—and then he sent the Flood. Sonnino, having made the Pact of London, regarded it as a masterpiece of diplomatic ingenuity, perfect, final, *ne varietur*, to the bitter end. The thicker difficulties gathered along his path, the straighter and straighter ahead he went, along the line of greatest resistance. His diplomatic economy can only be defined as a policy of the smallest results from the greatest expenditures of energy.

VI: THE RESULTS OF THE WAR

And yet, when all is said and done, Italy obtained from the World War all she could reasonably hope to obtain.

What our Nationalists regarded as our most disastrous check at the Peace Conference—the loss of Asia Minor—turned out to be the greatest piece of luck that ever happened to Italy in the course of her long history. The governments of England and France had shrewdly taken for themselves Asiatic territories inhabited by non-Turkish peoples, to whom they could present themselves as liberators from the famous "Ottoman yoke." To Italy they had given Asia Minor, that the Italians might act as jailers to the Turk and keep him from molesting their own dominions. Sonnino swallowed this proposition whole. (What ever possessed Venizelos, one day, after Italy had withdrawn from Paris, to snatch this attractive morsel for Greece?)

As for our slender gains in African colonies, it should be observed that the real colonial problem of the Italian people is the problem of emigration, and it cannot be solved by acquiring territories in Africa. One of the greatest shortcomings of Sonnino is never to have considered this vital question of emigration in any of his negotiations for war or peace.

And the Adriatic question, after many pains, has been settled in the way most truly desirable for Italy. To occupy Dalmatia would have been to assume during peace times a permanent "state of war," involving incredible burdens of armament, and to face during possible future wars the necessity of using on a secondary line of defence forces needed for the protection of Venezia Giulia.

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And have we gained or lost from the dismemberment of Austria? No longer, on our eastern borders, are we faced with a hostile power of fifty millions of people. Our nearest neighbor on the Adriatic is a kingdon of twelve millions, with more need of our friendship against the German-Magyar-Bulgar danger beyond, than inclined to turn us toward their foes by policies of deliberate antagonism. It may even be said that we have freed ourselves from the menace of Austria much more satisfactorily than France has from the menace of Germany. In proportion as Germany and Russia regain their feet, Italian friendship will be much more valuable to France and the Danube peoples. This happy position, which we have won from the World War, will be precious to our heirs of a half century hence, in fighting new wars, if they are dogs, — if they are men, in working for the peace of the world. Our generation has given them just this blessing: that they may choose whether they shall be dogs or men, a blessing which we ourselves did not inherit from the Europe of a half century ago, for the nearness of a hostile empire has always obliged us to be more or less dogs in spite of ourselves.

The real harm done by the policies of Sonnino and our Nationalists has been more than anything else a moral one. They brought the Italian people away from the Peace Conference despised by others and dissatisfied with itself. They led the Italian people to believe it had been robbed of the fruits of victory. For the intellectual disorder that has been rampant in Italy since the war, and has all but destroyed our country, the tactics of our Nationalists have been in large part responsible. Take a people peacefully inclined, force it into a gruelling war three years long, and then send it home with the conviction that all its effort has been in vain, that all its sacrifices have been wasted, that its objectives have not been attained, that it has been cheated by everybody — and can one be surprised if it kicks over the traces and begins to rear around? In very truth Italians have shown themselves possessed of the kindest of hearts in that they have not massacred every one of us who dragged them into the war, and who then — as the author of our war, our Minister of Foreign Affairs, assured them — failed to press from the victory the peace for which they had fought.

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SUGAR

By F. Schneider, Jr.

SINCE its first appearance sugar has exercised an important effect on the development of world commerce. It has influenced the course of discovery; it has created great political issues. Conversely, the commodity itself has reacted often to the pressure of political events; its industrial history has been altered by the policies of sovereigns, ministries and parliaments. It has influenced politics and been a prey to politics. One writer[1] goes so far as to declare that "Probably no other industry has maintained so persistently a reputation for unjust discrimination and maladministration."

Sugar appears to be one of the many things that came to western civilization from beyond the Arabian plains in Asia. Sugar cane is known to have been cultivated in India before the start of the Christian era. The soldiers of Alexander the Great brought back from the banks of the Indus the "honey-bearing reed." The real introduction of sugar into Europe came, however, at a considerably later date. From India the use of sugar spread east and west. Sugar cane was known in China before Christ; the art of refining seems to have spread there from India by the early part of the seventh century A.D. By the same time the production of sugar was solidly established in Persia. There the Arabs found it at the time of their conquest. Turning westward with their wars to extend the teachings of Mohammed the Arabs carried sugar cane with them. They introduced its cultivation into Egypt, and, by way of north Africa, into Spain. The industry became well established around the Levant; and there the Crusaders became familiar with the commodity. Returning home, they introduced its use to Europe generally. A flourishing sugar trade developed between Europe and the Levant and Asia Minor, the great northern Italian cities, principally Venice, acting as distributing centers. Sugar became one of the more important commodities dealt in over these great medieval trade routes.

By the close of the fifteenth century, however, the evolution of the industry had taken a new turn. In 1453 the Turks took

[1] G. T. Surface: "The Story of Sugar;" D. Appleton and Co., 1917. For discussion of the history of the sugar industry see also G. M. Rolph: "Something About Sugar;" J. J. Newbegin, San Francisco, 1917.

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Constantinople; by 1517 they had taken Cairo; and their control of the Levant and overland traffic to the East was complete. Europe, tired of the exactions and dangers of the trade with and through Asia Minor, was seeking new routes to the East; the age of discovery was on. The Portuguese and Spaniards, who had found a new continent instead of a new way to India and Cathay, were about to take sugar cane to the West Indies. Venice was to lose and London to gain title to the world's sugar market. By this time sugar no longer was a commodity of the apothecary, but it was still a luxury. In 1482 it sold for as much as $2.75 a pound in the London market.

The beginnings of the independence from eastern supplies were laid, however, even before the Turkish conquests. The Portuguese started the cultivation of sugar cane in Madeira in 1420. In 1432 they carried it to the Azores, later on to the Cape Verde Islands and St. Thomas. By 1494 they had started what was to be a rapidly growing industry in San Domingo. During the early part of the sixteenth century the Portuguese and Spaniards carried the cultivation of sugar throughout the West Indies and into South America; they came to dominate the sugar trade. Antwerp first and then London became great refining centers from which sugar was distributed to the consuming countries of northern Europe. The discovery of cocoa in the West Indies and its rapid adoption as a beverage greatly stimulated the demand for sugar, just as the introduction of coffee, which came later in 1650, and the wide popularity it shared with tea, gave the industry another great stimulus. Later on the French, Dutch and British, extending their colonial activities and displacing the Spaniards and Portuguese, became the chief factors in the American sugar trade. More was heard of governmental interference with trade, through duties and navigation acts. Sugar became a large factor in the slave trade. The sugar plantations needed a large supply of cheap labor that could stand tropical conditions; the West Indian colonies supplied the sugar and other materials that furnished the basis for a triangular trade between Africa, America and Europe. The growing use of sugar during this period is indicated by the fact that consumption in Great Britain increased from 10,000 tons in 1700 to 150,000 tons in 1800.

As the nineteenth century approached there began to take place another great change in the development of the world's sugar industry, comparable to that which started with the age

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of discovery. The quarrels between the maritime nations of Europe had made the West Indian sugar trade increasingly dangerous. With British sea power established at Trafalgar, Napoleon instituted his Continental System. He prohibited all trade with England; in retaliation, Britain blockaded the ports of Europe. Napoleon had hoped to replace the West Indian sugar by eastern sugar brought over the old overland trade routes. He also had in mind the development of substitutes. Margraff had shown in 1747 that sugar could be extracted from beets. A few experimental beet sugar factories had been built in France and Prussia. Chemists had been exploring the possibilities. Napoleon offered the first government bounty on beet sugar in 1806; in 1811 he issued a decree to put 79,000 acres of French land into beet cultivation and started the industry off on large-scale operation. Napoleon's fall and the break in the blockade brought a collapse in sugar prices and put the beet industry to a severe test. German and French beet production fell off seriously; but the industry received aid from another quarter — the abolition of slavery in the European colonies, a development that came between the years 1825 and 1850. The change in the labor basis for the production of West Indian sugar was sufficiently disturbing materially to reduce the competitive effort from that region and greatly to strengthen the position of the young beet sugar industry. In any event, the production of beet sugar increased so that its proportion of the world's sugar crop grew from 14 percent in 1852–53 to 65 percent at the start of the twentieth century. In the earlier year the beet grower produced only 202,000 tons of sugar as against 1,260,000 of cane sugar; in 1899–1900 he produced 5,410,000 tons as against 2,880,000 tons of cane. At the start of the World War the figures were 8,908,000 and 9,879,000. The twentieth century, in short, witnessed the opening up on a huge scale of an entirely new supply of sugar.

To say that this development of the last century brought to its full fruition man's ability to interfere with the normal economic evolution of the sugar industry would not, perhaps, be an exaggeration. One might even go further and say that the history of the sugar industry during the twentieth century illustrates man at his best, or worst, in attempting to substitute his own conceits for free operation of the natural process of trade. Certainly the story abounds with instances of countries attempting to secure advantages by offensive and defensive legislation and

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of countries attempting programs of industrial development without any very clear idea of where they were leading.

The European beet industry from the start was fed on bounties. Napoleon started the ball rolling in 1806. By the time the system was in full swing all the chief European producing countries were subjecting the industry to a strong stimulus. In each case high import duties were installed to keep out foreign sugar, and in addition a bounty was offered for domestic production. The bounty might be direct, or it might be indirect, as was the case when the internal excise tax was kept below the import duty. The system greatly stimulated export business and fostered pooling within individual countries and dumping without. England benefited by these supplies of bounty-fed sugars which commonly were offered below the cost of production. The result was the paradoxical picture of England, the great free trade country, finding great virtues in the protective policies of its neighbors. The cost was borne, of course, by the consumers in the producing countries, where sugar prices were high on account of the high import duties and excise taxes. Meanwhile the artificial margin of profit that the system offered to producers led to quite natural and characteristic abuses.

While England itself profited by the situation, however, things were quite otherwise with its sugar-growing colonies, which suffered severely from bounty-sustained competition. The bounty-paying governments also began to feel the weight of the burdens they had assumed. The upshot of the matter was that the British Government in 1887 sent out invitations to an international conference. A meeting was held at London and an agreement was drawn up calling for the abandonment of bounties on production or exports and providing for the barring of bountied sugars by importing countries. This convention of 1888 failed of ratification, partly because France was unwilling to adhere and partly because of opposition in Great Britain itself.

Things came to a head a few years later. Germany doubled export bounties in 1895 and competing countries followed suit. Joseph Chamberlain, British Colonial Secretary, asked for and obtained a royal commission investigation of the effects upon the West Indian colonies. The United States set up countervailing duties on bountied sugars. A new international conference was held at Brussels in 1898 at the invitation of the Belgian Government. After much discussion a new agreement hung fire.

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France was unwilling to drop all bounties and Russia had reservations of her own. In the spring of 1899, however, the Indian Government set up countervailing duties and another dumping ground for cheap sugars was closed. Late in 1901 another session of the conference was held at Brussels and a convention was signed in 1902 which was ratified in 1903. This Brussels Convention, which suppressed the bounties and stopped the "hothousing" of the beet industry in Europe, remained in force with minor modifications up to the outbreak of the World War. Since the war, and with the many new countries created by the peace seeking to strengthen their home industries, a new system of duties has sprung up. The resulting situation embodies one of the tariff problems that Europe is coming to realize will call for some kind of conference and compromise if the economic recovery of the continent is not to be impeded.

Our own experience with sugar duties is of long standing. After the Civil War, and up to 1890, the tariff amounted to about two cents a pound. The McKinley bill, which became effective 1891, substituted for the tariff a bounty of two cents a pound. The Wilson bill of 1894 did away with the bounty and substituted a tariff of 40 percent ad valorem which, at the prices prevailing, amounted to about one cent a pound. The Dingley bill of 1897 restored the duty to close to the old rate. No change was made in the Payne-Aldrich Act of 1909. The Underwood Act of 1913 cut the rate to 1¼ cents and gave a reduction of 20 percent to Cuban sugar. It also contemplated the ultimate abolition of the duty, but this intention never was carried out. When the Republicans came into power after the close of the war they passed the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921 which raised the duty to 1.60 cents. In the Revenue Act of 1922 the duty was further raised to 1.7648 cents, where it still stands, the President having refused to lower it in accordance with the authority granted him by the "flexible provision" of the last tariff act.

The effects of our own tariffs have been not greatly dissimilar from those experienced abroad. The price of sugar to the consumer has been raised, the government has obtained important revenue, and an artificial stimulus has been put on the growing of sugar within the United States and its insular possessions. As to the revenue side of the matter, it has been estimated that out of a total tax on sugar consumers in 1922 of $216,000,000 the Treasury obtained $124,000,000, while the remaining $92,000,000

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were distributed in the form of an indirect bounty to domestic producers.[2] Of the latter sum the beet industry is estimated to have obtained some $38,000,000, leaving $19,000,000 for Hawaiian producers, $13,000,000 for those in Porto Rico, $11,000,000 for domestic cane growers and $9,000,000 for the Philippine industry. Prof. Taussig has shown very clearly how production in Hawaii was pushed to unnatural proportions, with the attendant creation of serious economic and social problems.[3] He has emphasized the difference between the acquisition by the United States of insular possessions with lop-sided economic developments and wholly undesirable social and political conditions and such acquisitions as Louisiana and Texas, which made possible "a great extension of the geographical division of labor." "It is difficult to find in the whole Hawaiian episode," he declares, "anything but one long course of error. The American consumer paid for thirty years (barring the brief respite while the McKinley tariff was in force) a tidy sum annually to the Hawaiian planters. In the later years of the period this tribute amounted to twelve or fifteen millions of dollars a year. For this there has been nothing of any real value to show,—unless it be a stepping-stone to the Philippines, another dependency hardly less unprofitable."

With regard to the beet sugar industry, which is carried on chiefly in California, Colorado, Utah and Michigan, our Government has adhered pretty consistently to a paternalistic policy. The duties and bounties have been a direct stimulus, while the Department of Agriculture has carried on a persistent propaganda for the cultivation of beets and has spared no effort to assist the growers. An industry that produces about one million tons yearly and that represents a capital investment of about $300,000,000 has been built up. Defenders of this policy emphasize the desirability of being independent of foreign sources of sugar and cite the employment and wealth created by the industry. Economically, our "hot-housing" of beet sugar has little to defend it. Americans will not perform the labor needed in the beet fields, which is exacting, and labor conditions among the foreigners used for this work have been a constant source of criticism. Taking broader ground, it seems that the economic resources employed in the industry could be more profitably employed in other lines. As for being independent of foreign

[2] P. G. Wright: "Sugar in Relation to the Tariff;" McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1924, p. 98.
[3] F. W. Taussig: "Some Aspects of the Tariff Question;" Harvard, 1918, p. 58.

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sugar, it may be noted that American capital already controls the Cuban industry, our chief source of supply. Pretty clearly it seems unwise to tax our consumers heavily in order to produce a commodity with difficulty in this country that can be produced more easily and cheaply in Cuba. A more rapid increase in our wealth and prosperity may be obtained by concentrating on our export trade with Cuba and other sugar-growing countries.

Having encouraged the development of the domestic beet industry our Government has, of course, a certain responsibility toward the interests vested therein. Complete withdrawal of the duty probably would put a considerable proportion of the producers out of business. A policy that has stood for several decades need not be reversed hastily. However, regard for vested interests should not obscure the need for setting up a policy that will stop the diversion of our national resources into relatively unprofitable channels. Some part of the beet industry would survive with a materially lower duty, while a reduction would stop the growth of the industry and its attendant problems.

The question may now be considered of how it is that Cuban raw sugar is selling at far less than the cost of production, at a time when prosperity is widespread and the consumption of sugar is establishing new high records? Sales recently have been made, cost and freight paid at New York, but without the duty paid, at $1^{15}/_{16}$ cents a pound. This is only $^{1}/_{8}$ of a cent above the low level touched early in 1921, when the industry was deep in the depression that followed the great post-armistice collapse in sugar. It is less than half a cent above the lowest price for all time, that touched in 1902 when Cuban raws sold, cost and freight at New York, for $1^{9}/_{16}$ cents. In 1923, with prosperity restored, Cuban raws commanded more than $6^{5}/_{8}$ cents. Why do they again sell at less than 2 cents?

Not much analysis is required to discover that for the moment the world has too much sugar, nor is it difficult to identify the sources of the excess production. Cuba has supplied a record-breaking crop at a time when the European beet sugar industry has recovered from war-imposed curtailment and when yields in other growing districts are generous. As a result, the world's sugar production for the crop year 1924–1925 has jumped, according to the statistics prepared by Willett and Gray,[4] to

[4] Willett and Gray: *Weekly Statistical Sugar Trade Journal*, Oct. 29, 1925, p. 56. For estimate of European beet crop 1925–26 see *ibid.* Oct. 22, 1925.

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23,557,280 tons. This output represents an increase of 3,436,011 tons over the previous year, and of 5,235,000 tons over that of two years previous. Carried back to 1919–1920, the low year of the war-affected period, the gain is 8,335,000 tons, or 55 percent. A moderate growth over pre-war production, which was about 18,000,000 tons, certainly would be justified. Perhaps a supply of 20,121,000 tons, such as was produced in the crop year 1923–1924, would not be too much. But a production of over 23,500,000 tons clearly is more than the world can absorb at this stage of its development without a disastrous effect on prices. And the latest Willett and Gray estimates (November 12) are for 24,242,250 tons in 1925–1926.

How large a part Cuba has played in upsetting the industry's equilibrium may be seen when the facts regarding the island's output are reviewed. Last year's crop of 4,066,000 tons was considered a bumper; it exceeded any other on record. Yet this year's crop has yielded no less than 5,125,000 tons. High war-time prices greatly stimulated the cultivation of cane in Cuba. This year's crop was just about twice that produced in the year the war started. Part of the exceptional size of the latest crop was due to unusually favorable weather; similar weather would be required to duplicate it. On the other hand, given reasonably good weather, the new crop is likely to be large. Willett and Gray estimate it at 5,150,000 tons. Cuba has indeed become our sugar bowl — and a very capacious one.

Meanwhile the recovery in the European beet sugar industry has carried production, which amounted to 8,180,000 tons in 1913–1914 and which dropped to a low of 2,603,000 tons in 1919–1920, back to 7,077,000 tons for the present crop year. For the crop year 1925–1926 it is estimated by F. O. Licht, the German authority, at 7,605,000 tons. French production, which dropped to as little as 110,000 tons in 1918–1919 — the French beet fields and sugar factories having been in the zone of active military operations — is now back at normal with an output this year of 827,000 tons. The German crop of 1,575,000 tons, still much below the 2,720,000 tons obtained in 1913–1914, is, however, a great improvement over the 739,000 tons obtained in 1919–1920. Some 200,000 tons of the German deficiency is explained by the loss of territory to Poland; the other one million tons appears a real loss, and one of the few losses in Europe that still exist. Austria's great pre-war production has now been split

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up among Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland; the aggregate, however, is well up to the pre-war — Czechoslovakia alone produced 1,409,000 tons this year, Poland 494,000 tons, Hungary 202,000 tons. Production in other European countries, such as Belgium and Holland, has been increasing, and that in Russia is coming back materially. Licht estimates Russia's crop for 1925–26, in fact, at 950,000 tons as compared with 458,000 in 1924–25. Altogether it is entirely probable that Europe soon again will be the great sugar producer that she was before the war.

Such being the situation, the outlook for the sugar-growing companies does not appear particularly promising. Unfavorable weather could materially alter the position to the benefit of prices. Lacking that, another large crop is in prospect. The makings of another big Cuban crop certainly are present; and there is no particular reason to anticipate radical curtailments in other regions. In time low prices will bring the natural remedy in the form of reduced production and increased consumption; but they hardly have been in force long enough to restore the equilibrium. After all, the sugar industry enjoyed two years of generous prosperity in 1923 and 1924. If these were to be followed by two years of lean profits, the working of the law of compensation would be illustrated. The inertia of so huge an industry must be given due weight; the curb of low prices probably must be felt for more than a few months before the world production apparatus is readjusted. The situation is summed up in a recent statement by Edwin F. Atkins, by many regarded as the dean of the American trade. "I have not been disappointed," he declared, "at the fact that prices have not improved since last January, as I felt that there was an overproduction of sugar in the entire world and it will require another year before this can be adjusted to consumption and the surplus stocks absorbed. If none of the many possible adverse conditions develop, the coming Cuban crop will be large enough to keep prices low. While such conditions cannot be permanent, they will be likely to last long enough to put out of business the high cost producers, which will in turn have the effect of reducing production. I look for better conditions in 1927. . . . The whole trouble, particularly in Cuba, is due to the high prices of several years ago, which led to over-expansion of the sugar business, planting of too much cane and the erection of new factories. Our domestic industry is in a similar position. The sugar industry is sick and needs a strong

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medicine in the shape of low prices to cure the sickness. After this, prices should slowly recover with a normal condition restored by 1927, and while the high cost producers may have to go out of business, low cost producers with strong financial resources will be in a better position than ever."

The sufferings imposed by the present situation by no means are restricted to the sugar producers. The refiners have been having fully as difficult a time. They have been unable to make profits at times when the producers have been earning well. All this argues for the existence of excess refining capacity. In addition, however, the refiners have been forced to cope with the fact that their refining margin is small in relation to the fluctuations that have occurred in the price of the raw material. When the price of sugar is stationary the refiner's problem is comparatively simple; he has merely to add his charge to the price of raws. When prices fluctuate the refiner must either speculate in the raw material or attempt to hedge in the futures market on the Sugar Exchange. Those refiners who have neglected, or have been unable to avail themselves of, the protection of the futures market have on numerous occasions during the past several years found their refining profit wiped out by their losses in the raw material. Our largest refining company was unable to pay dividends on its common stock during the past four years. Periods of rapidly fluctuating prices are difficult for refiners; those of slowly falling prices also appear to be unsatisfactory.

The sugar industry furnishes interesting evidence, then, of the limitations of the protective system as applied to internationally produced raw materials. Our high sugar tariff has been no safeguard for the domestic producing and refining industries against the cycles of depression that run over the world. In fact, there is reason to suspect that the industry's present troubles have been augmented by the tariff, which has stimulated domestic production at a time when the rest of the world has been working up to a surplus. Sugar, after all, is a highly competitive commodity. Its production is spread widely over the world, its consumption is sensitive to prices, and substitutes for its use exist and are being developed. Fluctuations between prosperity and depression are severe. The labor problem involved in its production is a difficult one. It would seem the part of wisdom to let the tropics carry this burden, and obtain our reward in supplying the tropics with the things that nature has best fitted us to produce.

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"COSAS DE ESPAÑA"

By Ernest Boyd

LAS RESPONSABILIDADES DEL ANTIGUO REGIMEN. By Conde de Romanones. Madrid: Renacimiento, 1924.

ALFONSO XIII UNMASKED. By Vincente Blasco Ibáñez. New York: Dutton, 1925.

POR ESPAÑA Y CONTRA EL REY. By Vincente Blasco Ibáñez. Paris: Editorial Excelsior, 1925.

RENDEZ-VOUS ESPAGNOLS. By Jérôme and Jean Tharaud. Paris: Plon, 1925.

EL NOVELISTA QUE VENDIO A SU PATRIA. By El Caballero Audaz. Madrid: Renacimiento, 1924.

ESPAÑA ENTRE DOS LIBELLOS. By El Caballero Audaz. New York: Publicidad Hispanica, 1925.

On September 13, 1923, parliamentary government in Spain made way for the military Directorate of General Primo de Rivera. Since then, so far as the outside world is concerned, our sources of information have been as unsatisfactory to us as that substitute for the constitution has been to Conde de Romanones. The press is heavily censored and the daily papers appear adorned by those smudgy blanks which are a souvenir of the Continental censorship during the Great War. The British press censor was more decorous and did not allow the newspapers to expose themselves in that unbecoming disarray, but Spain follows the Continental tradition in such matters. Very naturally, there has been a burst of pamphleteering, which offers us the only alternative supply of information.

The publications listed above are a typical selection. The only one which aims at a solid and reasoned presentation of facts is Conde de Romanones' weighty volume, "The Responsibilities of the Old Régime," and it, characteristically enough, has a title obviously aimed to catch the curiosity of the moment, which its contents do not. In order to illustrate this piece of ingenuity, I have translated the title literally. Actually, however, the book is not an indictment, as the word "responsibilities" would suggest, but an apologia, in which that word occurs in the sense of a rendering of accounts. "The Stewardship of the Old Régime," or "What the Old Régime Accomplished" would more truthfully

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describe the author's material and his object, which is to clear the rulers of Spain of the charges of corruption and gross incompetence which have been freely brought against them, and to which confirmation is added by the drastic abandonment of constitutional government. As a law-abiding, liberal, and patriotic Spanish statesman, Conde de Romanones feels that both the arguments used to justify the dictatorship and the accusations of its opponents are a serious and unwarranted reflection upon the governments which were entrusted with the welfare of their country for the fifty years from the Restoration in 1875 to the *coup d'état* of 1923.

The author's method of combating the belief that constitutionalism is bankrupt in Spain is to make a survey of what has been accomplished since the Bourbons, in the person of Alfonso XII, were restored to the throne of Spain in 1875. This survey is statistical in the extreme, and apologetic where figures fail. Ten chapters are devoted to the following topics: The Foreign Policy of Spain, The Army, The Naval Power of Spain, The Judiciary, The Social Problem in Spain, Education, Central and Local Government, The Development of Economic Life, Public Finance. Needless to say, the statistics under all of these heads indicate increases in every department of Spanish life. If the increase in the number of ships entered and cleared, the number of schoolhouses built, the minerals mined, the kilometers of railway constructed, the street cars running, the passengers travelling — if these tables could bring the blush of shame to the unconstitutional cheeks of the Directorate, and awe Catalan separatists into loyal acquiescence, then the future would be bright.

Unfortunately, all is not gold that increases, or rather it is gold that no longer glitters. The Spanish-American War cost Spain 1,969 million pesetas, and ten years in Morocco has cost 2,204 million. The total for military expenditure between 1875 and 1923 reaches nine thousand one hundred and eighty-five million, eight hundred and ninety-one thousand pesetas (9,185,891,000), a sum which drives Conde de Romanones to the use of capitals. And even then he tells us to add supplementary credits for the years 1909–1923 amounting to two hundred and eighty-eight million, one hundred and twenty-three thousand (288,123,000) pesetas. The return upon this investment, he points out, is the loss of Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines, the disaster of Melilla in

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1921, and a generally disadvantageous position in Morocco. As the only figures, among a great many, which are set in large type and are further emphasized by large capitals are those relating to the army, one may conclude that Conde de Romanones wishes to insinuate that military gentlemen are not supremely gifted for the tasks of wise and frugal administration.

Apart from his statistics, the author is not so definite. Usually he ends his chapters with less conclusiveness. He asks the reader, very reasonably, to admit that some progress has been made, and then concedes that things might have been better, but, after all, it is human to err. For example, this is his summing up in the chapter on improvements in the administration of the law: "After all that has been set forth, can it be said that, so far as the matters related in this chapter are concerned, the Spanish people has remained stationary since the Restoration and untouched by any notion of progress? I have no hesitation in saying that such a statement would be notoriously unfair. But it is none the less certain that, in spite of the efforts to improve the administration of justice, the latter is not what it ought to be, for reasons which are not due exclusively to politics, but are rooted in the conditions of the social environment from which those charged with the administration come and where they must exercise their functions." In another place Conde de Romanones traces the history of the Spanish navy and concludes: "It must be admitted that fate has been against our navy, and it is impossible to struggle against fate." In his chapter on the finances of Spain he shows "a progressive and uninterrupted increase in the expenditure and an almost permanent deficit, but at the same time a continuous increase of revenue." From this contrast he concludes that "the economic evolution of the country is satisfactory," but there is "defective management," which "is not at all surprising in view of the political vicissitudes through which Spain has passed in this interval." In other words, one turns to this book for some clue to the vicissitudes of Spanish politics and one finds that everything is progressing beautifully except for the vicissitudes aforesaid.

"It is impossible to struggle against fate," and the fatality which dogs Spain, according to Conde de Romanones, as well as lesser commentators, is nothing more or less than the Spanish people! The governments and the political parties must not be blamed. Their good faith and patriotism were beyond question,

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whatever the advocates of dictatorship may say, but what could they do in the face of the much vaunted docility of the Spanish people? "This collective docility is not a matter of temperament, but a state of mind; it is the political reflection of spiritual inertia and paralysis of the will; above all, it is the domination of egotistical impulses." He complains that there is no national ideal, and no public opinion. "Nations without a public opinion have inefficient governments. And this is one of the most obvious and far-reaching errors of the authorities, their obstinacy in crushing public opinion, in preventing its free expression."

To the vacillating indifference of the general public Conde de Romanones attributes the failure of Spain to side with the Allies during the late war, and he recounts his efforts, both in office and out, to keep Spain by the side of the Powers with which her interests in Morocco were involved. Spanish foreign policy was, he felt, dictated by the agreements with England and France in regard to Morocco, so much so that, as he reports, the German Ambassador at Madrid offered to guarantee Spain additional territory in Morocco, in return for her coöperation with the Central Powers. But the Spaniards were not interested in the Moroccan adventure, a policy of no entanglements was adopted, with the result that, when the Germans were on the point of surrendering, fifteen days before the Armistice, the Spanish authorities were still unwilling to challenge what they deemed a powerful opponent. Spain was isolated when peace came, and "for the first time since the Peace of Westphalia . . . a general peace was about to be concluded and a repartition made of the map of Europe without the coöperation and the more or less effective intervention of Spain."

Conde de Romanones went to Paris in the hope of doing something to counteract the effects of Spanish neutrality, which had been "to diminish the international personality of Spain, making it possible for Europe and the United States to settle problems which, nevertheless, concerned her." The state of the national mind, he asserts, was duly reflected in the attitude of the various governments, irrespective of party, and "to charge Parliament and the politicians with what was due to lack of nation idealism is to confuse cause and effect." The reasons for that state of mind are complex, but "it is very easy and possibly effective to trace them to a few men in politics, as has been done ever since September 13." Conde de Romanones does not see in this evasion of the

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difficulties any solution to Spain's problem. "Militarist régimes and dictatorships conflict with the spirit of the times, which is increasingly inclined towards self-government, within constitutional and parliamentary limits. Even Turkey, which closes the Eastern end of the Mediterranean as Spain opens its Western end, has chosen this road. To take another is to make a serious mistake, which contravenes our constitution and prevents Spain from taking her part in the work that is hers, in the concert of world Powers."

What prospects of restoring constitutional government are offered by other commentators? Blasco Ibáñez needs no introduction as a powerful publicist, but the indifference with which his pamphlet "Alfonso XIII Unmasked" has been received is the measure of the futility of the opposition to the Directorate. In "Por España y contra el Rey" that brochure and two others, as yet untranslated into English, have been collected. As a sentimental republican of long standing he is assuredly entitled to seize this opportunity of outlining the Spanish republic of his earliest dreams without being accused of mere opportunism. Blasco Ibáñez had such visions long before he beheld the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse. But his activities on behalf of his ideal are so largely submerged in laborious efforts to prove that Alfonso XIII was pro-German and that Primo de Rivera is fond of wine, women and song, that it is permitted to wonder what he is really after. Since neither of these charges will damage the gentlemen in question with their subjects, willing or unwilling, it was inevitable that he should be accused of "selling his country," to quote El Caballero Audaz. The latter is a journalist second only to Blasco Ibáñez in newspaper fame, and like him the author of novels more vigorous than artistic, and his pamphlets merely turn the tables by proving irrelevantly that the Blasco Ibáñez pot is calling the Primo de Rivera kettle black.

The one illuminating piece of journalism which throws a presumably impartial light upon Spanish conditions is "Rendez-vous Espagnols," by Jérôme and Jean Tharaud, the distinguished French novelists who have made literature of their descriptive journalism in the Near East and in Eastern Europe. As the authors of "Le Chemin de Damas," "Rabat, ou les Heures Marocaines," and "Marrakech, ou les Seigneurs de l'Atlas," the brothers Tharaud were naturally interested in what was happening to France's neighbor in Morocco, so in the spring of 1925,

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having spent the winter in Fez, they proceeded to investigate the situation in Spain. Their brief and vivid little book is a record of what they saw and heard. Minus the statistics, it really tells in eighty pages what is essential in the three hundred and sixty of Conde de Romanones.

Having outlined the tragic disaster of Melilla as the prelude to the *coup d'état*, and explained how the Directorate was welcomed as the only alternative to anarchy, so long as it lasted only the three months provided in such emergencies by the Spanish constitution, they put their first question: how did the King come to acquiesce in the violation of a constitution which he had sworn to uphold? "How did this descendant of Charles V and Louis XIV, who found it difficult, by all accounts, to submit to the restraints that a parliament puts upon the royal initiative, learn to tolerate the tutelage of a Primo de Rivera, which ought apparently to be very much more irritating than that of an elected assembly?" And they report the answer of His Majesty in terms which have something of the inconsequential gravity of Conde de Romanones uttering his apologetic epilogues: "You are surprised, I suppose, that we have been living for twenty-two months in defiance of all the rules of constitutional government. Frankly, however, did you notice, when travelling in Spain, that we were living in a state of siege, under a military tyranny? In foreign papers I read that our Directorate is shooting and imprisoning people, that police terrorism prevails everywhere. Is that your impression? Life here is going on as usual, and I do not mind saying that I know few countries where the police are less troublesome than here. You can stop calmly in the middle of the street to chat with your friends, without being ordered immediately to move on by a polite but firm policeman. After midnight you can have as many drinks as you like in the cafés — which is more than you can do in New York or London, those strongholds of liberty. In Madrid you can shout, yell and sing until five in the morning, if you want to."

The authors declare that, after this demonstration of liberty, the King displayed none of that bitterness visible in the eyes, at least, of the politicians when they contemplate life without a constitution. His Majesty further declared that bandits and strikers were extinct, and that as soon as the political parties showed signs of regeneration the destinies of the people would once more be entrusted to them. "But up to the present the party leaders show no disposition to renounce their old prejudices, per-

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sonal quarrels, and parish-pump politics, and to rally to the ideal for which the Directorate stands." To this ingenuous demand the Tharauds replied that they could not see "how Spain will ever free itself of a dictator." Whereupon the King, in the approved manner, retorted that the Spaniards are not like other people. "In this country we do not yet possess that sense of public life so familiar to the French and English. Strictly speaking, we have no public opinion." Primo de Rivera, he added, was engaged in creating one. The absence of a public opinion, which Conde de Romanones described as the difficulty in the way of enlightened government, is claimed by the Directorate as a positive proof of its wisdom. "Is not this peaceful acquiescence, this perfect calm which you have observed everywhere, a plebiscite which tacitly gives its daily vote to the Directorate?"

The King finally points out that the problem goes far beyond Spain. "The great question to-day is whether parliamentarianism is capable of defending the existing order against sovietism. Italy was the first to see that it was not. In her turn Spain has found the same thing. Who knows if to-morrow other nations will not also be compelled to set themselves above the law for a time?" Whereat one can picture Conde de Romanones quoting his figures on industrial movements and showing statistically that the menace of Bolshevism in Spain is illusory. The Tharauds merely conclude that a king who does not like to be controlled by parliament will not object to being controlled by a soldier in an army of which he is commander-in-chief, if he believes that it is for the good of his people. In polite language this is the gist of whatever is serious in the fulminations of Blasco Ibáñez.

When the authors come to that soldier, so violently denounced by the novelist, they forgive him his weaknesses of the flesh with Gallic tolerance, and view him as a gambler with destiny no less than with cards and horses. So far as he is concerned, things are working out splendidly. He has solved the Morocco question by retreating and refusing to hold the Spanish Zone in the Riff, and the fact that this attitude coincides with the general public indifference to the Moroccan adventure and redounds to his popularity is of more importance to the General than the complications which have ensued for France. To the Tharauds, naturally, the situation seems different, and they regret that neither Alfonso XIII nor his dictator seems to be aware that Spain has compelled France "to hold a line of 400 kilometers in order to protect our-

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selves against tribes which Spain, according to the treaties, should police." They do not argue, however, with Primo de Rivera, but listen politely to his account of how Catalonia has been calmed, how communism has been stamped out, and the nation showered with the blessings of good government. They are a trifle sceptical, in spite of the apparently submissive attitude of the people, but they do not doubt the General's faith in himself. "His optimism is not assumed. It is the optimism of the gambler who has good nerves and believes in his luck."

In Conde de Romanones they find a supporter for their view of the Morocco situation, and the Count's prognostications concerning Abd-el-Krim have proved sounder than those of the military expert, who was certain that the Riff would be quiet. This is their picture of the Liberal leader: "A small, lame man, with a dislocated hip, . . . a huge, crooked nose, on which are several warts, and a toothless mouth, he looks like a picture by Goya. Add to all that an amazingly brilliant mind, full of kindness and malice, and you have Conde de Romanones, former Prime Minister, and leader of the Liberal Party in Spain. Further, he is an important business man and the largest taxpayer in Madrid." He is devoted to the monarchy, but thinks the King is too intelligent, and that he tries to exercise that intelligence instead of "peacefully remaining a constitutional monarch." Granted the deceptive docility of the Spanish people, the dictatorship follows, but "if we have no public opinion, irresistible currents sweep our people along," and it is as unsafe to assume that liberty to stay on the streets until five in the morning will satisfy Spain indefinitely, as to deduce long life for the Soviets from the analogous docility of the Russian *moujik*.

"We could not help thinking," the Tharauds conclude, "of the immense gap between this very modern mind and the mass of the Spanish people, which he himself described as crude and backward, with the instinctive qualities of those races which are still untouched by modern civilization. What does that world of Spanish rustics, who have the mentality of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, care about the loss of those liberties at which this Liberal grieves?" These people adore the King with medieval fervor, and "the monarchy alone has created and still maintains the unity of the country." Conde de Romanones and his friends imagine in all good faith that "there is no salvation for their country outside parliamentarianism. But this may be an illu-

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sion." And as they accompany him to an exhibition of Spanish national costumes, marvelling at the color and diversity of local taste, they realize what a constitutional Liberal means to Spain. "He simply added another costume to the collection: the top hat and frock-coat of the British Member of Parliament."

Although not elsewhere expressed with that humor, the same idea runs through all of this literature, except the ideal republic of Blasco Ibáñez, which consists merely of that type of political argument where whatever is not shall be, because voting will make it so. Internationally, as Conde de Romanones admits, Spain was losing ground and prestige through causes which the present régime accentuates. In domestic affairs the conditions upon which the Directorate relies for its continued existence are, again on the admission of its opponents, the conditions which made the *coup d'état* possible. Alfonso XIII, Primo de Rivera, and Conde de Romanones reiterate — and outside witnesses like the Tharauds agree — that there is no coördinated and articulate public opinion, therefore a dictatorship provokes little resistance, and that little, by the very terms of a dictatorship, can carry even less weight than in normal times.

The English-speaking world looks with an almost religious respect at the institution of representative government, and we are inclined to shake our heads over those who are unworthy to bear that honorable burden. The fact, however, remains that, on their own showing, Italy and Spain, the two chief Mediterranean Powers, have had to dispense with the blessings of constitutionalism for reasons which, however distorted in controversy, are fundamentally the same in all versions of the situation. So we must fall back on our own dictum: a nation gets the government it deserves.

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The three economic divisions already constituted in European Russia — the Ural, the North Caucasus, and the Lower Volga — are shown above with light solid boundary lines. Proposed divisions are shown with light broken lines. The small insert map shows the Siberian Territory (5), which has been actually constituted, and the seven proposed Regions of Asiatic Russia.

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RUSSIA'S NEW ECONOMIC DIVISIONS

AS told in previous numbers of FOREIGN AFFAIRS,[1] the Soviet régime has completely changed the political organization of Russia's vast territory. The program has been carried through with ethnic considerations primarily in mind. Simultaneously, there has also been under consideration an elaborate scheme providing for the redivision of Soviet territory into new administrative units based entirely on economic considerations.

The idea of dividing up the Russian Empire on scientific principles made its appearance in the early part of the last century, and in the intervening years not a few books were written discussing this question and proposing various territorial arrangements based on natural characteristics, such as soil or climate, or on economic factors such as density of population, degree of industrial development, and so forth.

With the consolidation of the Soviet power in 1920–1921, the Communist leaders turned their attention to this problem, and the VII All-Russian Congress of Soviets instructed the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to work out a plan of an administrative-economic division of Soviet territory. After considerable discussion and investigation certain general principles were agreed upon, and from these a concrete plan was elaborated by the State Plan Commission in 1922.

The primary objective being to facilitate the development of the productive forces of the country, the State Plan Commission set out to divide the Russian territory into economic Regions which would be at the same time new administrative units, but which first and foremost would be economic production units best adapted to fulfill certain clearly defined functions in the general economic life of the whole country. In determining the composition of the various Regions, attention was given primarily to economic factors, such as natural resources, density of population, transportation facilities, economic centers, and industrial and technical equipment. Each Region was to be guaranteed the possibility of independent economic development, and to a certain extent was to specialize in a definite branch of economic activity.

The Region (*Oblast*), therefore, was made the fundamental unit of the new administrative division. It was agreed that it should enjoy certain economic administrative rights, especially in financial matters, and in the management of large industries situated within its bounds. It was to have a budget of its own and was to be empowered to impose local duties and taxes with the approval of the central authorities. According to the plan, the Region was to be divided into *Okrugs*, designed primarily as administrative units, these in turn to be divided into *Raions*. It was hoped to effect through this reorganization a considerable economy in the cost of the administrative apparatus. Thus under the project the Soviet state was to be divided into 21 Regions in place of the old 93 Provinces.

Of the 21 proposed Regions, 12 were planned for European Russia and 9 for Asiatic Russia. The European Regions were to be as follows:

[1] Vol. III, No. 1, p. 91 and Vol. III, No. 3, p. 511.

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Region	*Administrative Center*	*Economic Function*
Northwest	Leningrad	Industry
Northeast	Archangel	Timber, fishing, hunting
Western	Smolensk	Timber
Central Industrial	Moscow	Industry
Viatka-Vetluga	Viatka	Agriculture, etc.
Ural	Sverdlovsk	Industry
Middle Volga	Samara	Agriculture
Central Black Earth	Voronezh	Agriculture
Southwestern	Kiev	Agriculture
South Mining	Kharkov	Industry
Southeast	Saratov	Agriculture
Caucasus	Rostov	Diversified

Asiatic Russia was to be divided into 9 Regions, namely: West Russia, Kuznets-Altaisk, Enisseisk, Lena-Angara, Yakut, Far East, West Kirghiz, East Kirghiz and Turkestan.

Although the project was approved in principle by the IX All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December, 1922, it has encountered many difficulties in being carried into effect. One of the chief obstacles has proved to be the opposition of autonomous national units which did not consider that their individual interests had been sufficiently safeguarded. The administrative center of the Middle Volga Region, for instance, was located, on the basis of economic considerations, at Samara; the Tatar Republic, however, has insisted for political reasons that the capital should be at Kazan. The center of the Western Region is fixed at Smolensk, but this can hardly be pleasing to the White Russian Soviet Republic, which is comprised within that area.

The whole question was considered at length at the XII Congress of the Russian Communist Party in April, 1923. A resolution of that Congress, while recognizing that the existing administrative-economic division of the state does not correspond to the new economic and political needs of the country, finds that the introduction of the new system requires careful consideration and a longer period of time for its definite realization. The Central Committee of the Party is directed to carry the plan into effect as an experiment in two Regions — one industrial and one agricultural. The realization of the plan in the other Regions is to await the result of this preliminary test.

In accordance with the directions of the Party, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee selected the Ural and the Lower Volga Regions as the first areas to be organized under the new plan, the former as a type of an industrial and the latter as that of an agricultural Region.

The Ural Region is one of the richest areas of Russia in mineral wealth. There are vast deposits of iron ore, copper and platinum; and such minerals as graphite, asbestos, gypsum, slate, salt, gold and manganese are found in considerable quantities. Furthermore, it is both a grain and timber exporting region, and is therefore capable of supporting a large industrial population. The organic act of the Ural Region was confirmed at the III session of the Central Executive Committee on November 3, 1923. The new Region's administrative center is at Sverdlovsk (Ekaterinburg).

The second area to be formed was the North Caucasus Territory, which was organized in the early part of 1924. The economic significance of this Region,

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of which the capitol is at Rostov, is agricultural; there also are important natural resources, notably the oil deposits at Grozny and Maikop. Although certain autonomous Regions are absorbed in the new unit, their autonomy does not appear to be impaired thereby. In such matters as education, health, internal administration, justice, local economy, etc., they are independent of the general administrative organs of the Territory. It is to be noted that whereas the project of the State Plan Commission contemplates the Caucasus as a single economic Region, the North Caucasus Territory does not include, due to political considerations, the Trans-Caucasus Federation or the autonomous Daghestan Republic.

By a decree of May 25, 1925, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee announced the formation of a Siberian Territory out of the Provinces of Omsk, Novo-Nikolaevsk, Altaisk, Tomsk and Enisseisk and the autonomous Region of Oirat, with administrative center at Novo-Nikolaevsk. This Siberian Territory comprises no less than three of the Regions appearing in the original project of the State Plan Commission for the reorganization of Asiatic Russia.

The fourth Region to be definitely delimited is the Lower Volga Region, which is being constituted out of the Provinces of Saratov, Tsaritsyn and Astrakhan, the autonomous Kalmuck Region and the Republic of the Volga Germans, with capital at Saratov. The economic importance of the Lower Volga Region is based on agriculture, it being one of the great granaries of the country, supplying both domestic and foreign markets.

On the accompanying map of European Russia are indicated the three economic Regions which have already been constituted, and (in broken lines) the nine other Regions projected by the State Plan Commission. With regard to the Ukraine, it is to be noted that the division of that area into two Regions — South West and South Mining — as worked out by the State Plan Commission, has been rejected by the Ukrainian authorities, so that the Ukraine will constitute one economic Region when the reorganization is complete.

The small insert map of Asiatic Russia shows the recently delimited Siberian Territory and (in broken lines) the six projected Regions of the State Plan Commission. In view of the recent territorial rearrangement of Central Asia on ethnic lines, and the creation of the Uzbeg and Turkoman Republics, it is probable that the plan will undergo revision before being carried into effect.

It will be observed that whereas the original plan contemplated an administrative redivision of all the territory under Soviet control, — purely on economic considerations without regard to existing territorial arrangements based on ethnic considerations, — the realization of this plan has not failed to take into account national interests and has been largely restricted to the territory of one of the constituent republics — the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. If the plan was originally intended to counteract the development of nationalist and separatist tendencies, which might have been expected to follow the application of the principle of national self-determination to the territorial organization of the Soviet power, especially in the case of the larger national groupings, it would appear that this purpose has been largely abandoned. The economic Regions will not run counter to the boundaries of at least the larger national entities.

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THE SEARCH FOR RUBBER: NEW PROSPECTS IN SOUTH AMERICA

THE world's supply of crude rubber formerly came from the wild rubber industry of South and Central America. Today, over nine-tenths of all the rubber produced comes from plantations in southeastern Asia and the East Indies,—from areas controlled by Great Britain, Holland and France. Over two-thirds of these areas are in British possessions; and the Stevenson Restriction Act passed by the British Parliament in 1922, regulating their production and exportation, tends to maintain rubber prices at an artificial level. Further, researches by the Rubber Association of America have indicated the probability of a world shortage in 1928 and of a rate of consumption exceeding production by 1930. The United States imports three-fourths of the world's rubber output. The need of American industry to develop fresh sources of supply of its own has led to special studies by public and private agencies, in the Philippines, Hawaii, Florida, Latin America and Africa. A plan to establish plantations in Liberia totalling a million acres has recently been reported in the press.

As one part of a survey of essential raw materials for which funds were appropriated in 1923, Congress instructed the Department of Commerce to investigate and report on the possibilities of developing the rubber plantation industry in the Philippine Islands and Latin America.

A lack of adequate supplies of labor has usually been believed to preclude the establishment of large-scale plantations in South America. H. N. Whitford, Chief of the Crude Rubber Section of the Department of Commerce, wrote in FOREIGN AFFAIRS for June, 1924, in an article entitled "The Crude Rubber Supply, an International Problem:" "In the Latin American republics investigated there is a shortage of labor. No production of rubber on a large scale is possible in them without resorting to imported labor, which can be obtained cheaply only in China."

Later investigations, described in a report on "Rubber Production in the Amazon Valley" which the Department of Commerce published in November, have thrown new light on the situation. Out of a total population of about 1,500,000 in the Amazon Basin, this report contends, a force of 30,000 laborers well qualified for plantation work could be brought together without great difficulty. This number is estimated to be sufficient to plant and care for an area of 150,000 acres.

The accompanying map shows the distribution of wild rubber trees in the Amazon Valley. Level, well-drained land, suitable for plantations, is located close to navigable rivers, such as the Tapajoz. The best combination of conditions for the artificial cultivation of rubber is found in a zone extending from the Madeira River east across the Tapajoz River to the Tocantins River, with the region of the lower Tapajoz offering the greatest advantages.

South American production has been based mainly on the tapping of wild native trees, although there never has been any doubt that natural factors would favor artificial cultivation. It was from Brazilian seeds that trees were

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grown by Sir Henry Wickham in Kew Gardens, London, for the first British plantings in 1876 in India, Ceylon and the Malay States. When the British experiments had demonstrated that rubber trees could be cultivated successfully in the Middle East, plantations were established and extended, mainly in British and Dutch colonies and a few in French colonies. Their mounting production began to displace that of the wild rubber industry of South America. "The Eastern plantations," says the report, "have furnished a cleaner and more uniform product . . . at a price below which wild rubber cannot be produced profitably except in certain favorable localities." The output of Asiatic plantations passed that of the Amazon area in 1913 and in the next two years left it far behind.

The effect on the South American industry is made most clear by comparing production for the peak year of 1912 with that for 1923. The total output of the



The distribution of wild rubber trees in the Amazon Basin is shown by the dotted areas.

Amazon region for 1912 is given as 45,067 metric tons, to which should be added 4,114 metric tons for Brazil outside the Amazon region. In 1923, competition of Asiatic plantations and the business depression of 1920–1921 had cut down the total output, including all Brazil, to 21,537 metric tons. Improved business conditions and high prices for rubber have stimulated production somewhat since then. But steady future production depends on the possibility of developing well-managed plantations, able to compete with those of the Middle East with their abundant cheap labor.

The report analyzes this problem comprehensively from the point of view of topography, soil, climate, health, costs of establishing plantations, land tenure and taxes, export duties, and transportation, especially navigability of rivers. But particular interest attaches to the sections which deal with the recruiting of labor. Careful surveys were made in the areas of the lower and upper Amazon and its tributaries, and in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia.

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The investigators found that labor was most easily procurable in the State of Para, in Brazil, and progressively difficult to secure in the upper river areas. Regarding the sources and quality of labor, the report says: "The decline in the wild rubber industry has lessened the demand for laborers, and so has created a potential source from which a very considerable number of men might be drawn for new plantation projects. . . . Others could be attracted from the Brazil nut industry, which is only a seasonal occupation and where conditions of employment often leave much to be desired. Still others could be engaged in the small river towns or drawn away from the desultory pursuit of agriculture and fishing, in which many are engaged for lack of more satisfactory occupation. If additional laborers were required for any undertaking in the Brazilian part of the Amazon Basin, the northeastern coast states, the traditional recruiting ground of that region, could be resorted to." These states are Maranhao, Piauhy, Ceara, Parahyba and Rio Grande do Norte, with a total population of 4,300,000.

The labor available in the Amazon Valley and nearby states of Brazil is reported as being probably as good as any body of tropical workers in the world, and man for man possibly superior to those employed on the rubber estates of the Orient. The native workers are usually of mixed Portuguese, Indian and Negro blood. Contrasting the types in the Amazon area and in the East, the investigators rate the South American laborer as superior to the Javanese and Indian, and more like the Chinese, the most intelligent laborer on Asiatic plantations. They think the South American, more independent in spirit and more difficult to control, could not be worked in gangs on day wages as well as the Eastern laborer, but would do excellent work under a task or piece-work system. Peruvian and Bolivian laborers are found to be better disciplined and more tractable in disposition than Brazilian. "The best class of laborers in the Amazon Basin are the immigrants from the State of Ceara. These people are hardy, ambitious and inured to hard work. American employers stated they found them excellent workers, some even going so far as to say they secured as much and as good work as from the average laborer of the United States."

Comparing wages in South America and the East, the report gives the basic daily labor wage scale in the East as 20 cents U. S. for Indians and Javanese and 35 cents for Chinese. Other expenses for housing, sanitation and recruiting bring the cost of Indian and Javanese labor up to that of the Chinese. In South America, wages depend on locality. Basic wages in Brazil are given as varying from 25.75 to 41.2 cents, with wages lowest in the State of Para where the average is about 30 cents a day.

In spite of the need to develop sources of future supply, the tendency of men in the rubber trade is to doubt that much capital will be invested at present in South American enterprises, both because of the long-term risk involved (since rubber trees take from four to six years to come into bearing), and because of other projects, already under way, for developments in Africa. But the evidence in the report of the Department of Commerce, that considerable labor forces could be secured for plantation work in the Amazon Valley, provides a new basis for estimating the possibility of large scale production there when the demand becomes sufficiently pressing.

M. W. D.

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SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By William L. Langer

General International Relations

THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE. By Alexander P. Fachiri. New York: Oxford University Press, 1925, 342 pp. $5.00.

A substantial account of the organization and working of the court.

LA COUR PERMANENT DE JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE. By Antonio Sánchez de Bustamente y Sirvén. Paris: Sirey, 1925, 367 pp.

A valuable survey of the history and constitution of the court by one of the justices.

SOVEREIGN STATES AND SUITS BEFORE ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS AND COURTS OF JUSTICE. By James Brown Scott. New York: University of New York, 1925, 370 pp. $6.00.

Lectures by a well-known American authority.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. By James Wilford Garner. Calcutta: The University, 1925, 840 pp. 30/.

An excellent handbook of international law as now practiced.

THEORIE UND PRAXIS DES VOELKERRECHTS. By Karl Strupp. Berlin: Liebmann, 1925, 206 pp. M.7.50.

A splendid manual by one of the foremost German scholars, stressing particularly the recent developments.

THE BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 1925. Oxford University Press, 1925, 273 pp. 16/.

Contains valuable essays by some of the leading British authorities.

THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS. By D. Mitrany. New York: Oxford University Press, 1925, 88 pp. $0.85.

An examination of military and economic sanctions as means of enforcing peace.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By Raymond Leslie Buell. New York: Holt, 1925, 783 pp. $5.00.

A very satisfactory text-book.

A GRAMMAR OF POLITICS. By Harold Joseph Laski. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925, 672 pp. $6.00.

A scholarly examination of the place of the state in modern society.

INTERNATIONALE SOZIALPOLITIK. By Friedrich Ritzmann. Mannheim: Bensheimer, 1925, 220 pp. M.7.50.

An excellent historical study of international social legislation, with important documents in the appendix.

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE AND ECONOMIC THEORY. By R. G. Geale. London: King, 1925, 171 pp. 6/.

An able presentation of the discrepancies between theory and practice in international commerce.

LA REVISION DES TRAITÉS SOUS LE RÉGIME DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS. By Aladar Goellner. Paris: Rousseau, 1925, 108 pp. Fr.10

A celebrated Hungarian jurist argues against the application of force in attempting to revise the treaties.

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L'INDEMNITÉ DE DOMMAGES DE GUERRE. By Jacques Romanet du Caillaud. Paris: Sagot, 1925, 550 pp. Fr. 40.

An authoritative technical discussion of the problem of war damage in all its aspects.

LA LIBERTÉ DU COMMERCE ET LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS. By Yoshiro Ando. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1925, 184 pp. Fr.14.

A good presentation of some of the economic possibilities of the League's work.

LE RETOUR À L'OR DANS LES RÉGIMES MONÉTAIRES APRÈS LA GUERRE. By Jean Sancery. Paris: Dalloz, 1925, 198 pp. Fr.20.

A competent study of the return to the gold standard.

International Relations of the United States

THE SENATE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By Henry Cabot Lodge. New York: Scribner, 1925, 424 pp. $4.00.

A work of the highest importance, setting forth the Republican view of President Wilson's League policy in Paris and in Washington.

AMERICA AND WORLD PEACE. By John H. Clarke. New York: Holt, 1925, 152 pp. $1.50.

A former justice of the Supreme Court of the United States pleads for America's entry into the League of Nations.

THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR. By Hector C. Bywater. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1925, 326 pp. $2.50.

An account of an imaginary war between the United States and Japan in 1931.

AMERIKA UND SEIN PROBLEM. By Moritz J. Bonn. Munich: Meyer und Jessen, 1925, 176 pp. M. 3.

Penetrating, if sometimes over-clever, observations on American problems by one of the Williamstown lecturers.

RACE OR NATIONALITY. By Gino Speranza. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1925, 278 pp. $3.00.

An able discussion of the problem of unassimilated foreigners in America.

THE PRESENT ECONOMIC REVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES. By Thomas Nixon Carver. Boston: Little, Brown, 1925, 278 pp. $2.50.

An admirable exposition of recent economic tendencies.

Europe

THE GOVERNMENTS OF EUROPE. By William Bennett Munro. New York: Macmillan, 1925, 792 pp. $4.25.

A thoroughly reliable text.

SOCIAL CLASSES IN POST-WAR EUROPE. By Lothrop Stoddard. New York: Scribner, 1925, 178 pp. $2.00.

Essays by a frequent writer on many and various sociological subjects.

MATERIALIEN ÜBER DEN STAND DER BAUERNBEWEGUNG IN DEN WICHTIGSTEN LÄNDERN. By Eugen Varga. Hamburg: Hoym, 1925, 176 pp.

Useful data on the agrarian movement.

ICH SUCHE DIE WAHRHEIT. By Ex-Crown-Prince William. Stuttgart: Cotta, 1925, 396 pp. M. 5.

A creditable essay on the causes of the war.

DIE POLITIK KAISER KARLS UND DER WENDEPUNKT DES WELTKRIEGES. By Richard Fester. Munich: Lehmann, 1925, 310 pp. M. 10.

A careful historical study of Austria's separate peace negotiations in 1917.

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DIE SICHERHEITSFRAGE. Edited by Karl Linnebach. Berlin: Hobbing, 1925, 265 pp. M. 6.40.

An excellent collection of documents on the security question from 1917 to June 1925.

DER LATEINISCHE MÜNZBUND SEIT DEM WELTKRIEG. By Erich Egner. Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft, 1925, 108 pp. M. 5.60.

Really a history of the Latin monetary union, with emphasis on the problems arising from the collapse of the franc.

L'ANTHOLOGIE DES DÉFAITISTES. By Jean Maxe. Paris: Bossard, 1925, 2 volumes, 1154 pp. Fr. 18.

A highly interesting collection of extracts to illustrate the defeatist propaganda, especially the red.

LES DOCTRINES ÉCONOMIQUES EN FRANCE DEPUIS 1870. By Gaëtan Pirou. Paris: Armand Colin, 1925.

An excellent survey of modern economic thought.

THE FRENCH DEBT PROBLEM. By Harold G. Moulton and Cleona Lewis. New York: Macmillan, 1925, 459 pp. $2.00.

The best treatment in English of the French financial situation. It lends able support to the contention that France cannot make debt payments on the scale demanded by the American debt commission.

NOTRE DIPLOMATIE ÉCONOMIQUE. Paris: Alcan, 1925, 256 pp. Fr. 9.

Valuable lectures by French experts, delivered at the École des Sciences Politiques.

LE PROBLÈME BUDGÉTAIRE, COMMENT LE RÉSOUDRE. By Jean Lescure. Paris: Sirey, 1925.

A sound discussion of the financial situation.

LA DÉPRÉCIATION MONÉTAIRE, SES EFFETS EN DROIT PRIVÉ. By Eugène Schkaff. Paris: Dalloz, 1925, 339 pp. Fr. 30.

An admirable legal study.

L'ÉTAT, LES FINANCES ET LA MONNAIE. By Georges Valois. Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1925, 630 pp. Fr. 25.

An exhaustive account of the financial crisis since 1919. The best general treatment of the subject.

L'AGONIE DU RÉGIME. By Léon Daudet. Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1925, 376 pp. Fr. 10.

Parliamentary reminiscences by the Royalist leader, covering the post-war period.

DIE VIELSPRACHIGE SCHWEIZ. By Hermann Weilenmann. Basel: Rhein-Verlag, 1925, 301 pp. M. 8.

A careful study of the Swiss solution of the nationality question.

LA GUERRA ITALO-AUSTRIACA. By Aldo Valori. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1925, 602 pp. Lire 50.

The second revised edition of a favorite history.

LA VITTORIA DELLO SPIRITO. By Tomaso Sillani. Florence: Bemporad, 1925, 244 pp. Lire 16.

A passionate epic of the Fascist victory.

ÀIRREALT NAZIONALISTA. By Luigi Salvatorelli. Milan: Corbaccio, 1925, 190 pp. Lire 9.

An attack on the extreme nationalism prevalent in Italy.

PENSIERO ANTIFASCISTA. By Luigi Sturzo. Turin: Gobetti, 1925, 280 pp. Lire 12.

An indictment of the existing régime, by the leader of the Catholic group.

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IL CRESPUSCOLO DEL SOCIALISMO. By Arturo Salucci. Milan: Corbaccio, 1925, 325 pp. Lire 14.
A pessimistic picture of the tendencies and aims of modern socialism.

LA DEMOCRAZIA E L'UNIONE NAZIONALE. By Ruini Meuccio. Milan: Corbaccio, 1925, 299 pp. Lire 14.
The position of the democratic parties under the Fascist régime.

L'ITALIA NUOVA. By Eduardo Capuano. Naples: Giannini, 1925, 177 pp. Lire 10.
A glorification of Fascism and all that is Fascist.

THE COÖPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN ITALY. By E. A. Lloyd. London: Allen and Unwin, 1925, 131 pp.
A readable account by an ardent sympathizer.

DISARMO E DIFESA. By R. L. Gatto. Milan: Corbaccio, 1925, 535 pp. Lire 25.
An excellent discussion of the problem of disarmament as it affects Italy.

DER VERSAILLER VERTRAG UND DIE SANKTIONEN. By Conrad A. Willie. Berlin: Stilke, 1925, 243 pp. M. 6.
A thorough examination of sanctions as a problem in international law.

DER DEUTSCHE UNTERSEEBOOTKRIEG. By H. Pohl. Stuttgart: Enke, 1925, 54 pp. M. 4.
A lecture on submarine warfare from the point of view of international law.

DIE URSACHEN DES DEUTSCHEN ZUSAMMENBRUCHES. Edited by Albrecht Philipp. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1925, 3 volumes, 515, 466, 385 pp. M. 50.
The full report of the evidence on Germany's collapse as presented to the parliamentary commission.

MEIN KAMPF. By Adolf Hitler. Munich: Eher, 1925, volume I, 423 pp. M. 12.
Unimpressive memoirs of the Bavarian leader.

THE LABOUR REVOLUTION. By Karl Kautsky. New York: Dial, 1925, 287 pp. $2.50.
The progress of socialization in Germany, by the well-known socialist leader.

MISÈRE ET SPLENDEUR DES FINANCES ALLEMANDES. By Valéry de Moriès. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1925. Fr. 7.50.
A cynical account of Germany's sudden recovery.

ZAHLEN ZUR GELDENTWERTUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND 1914–1923. Berlin: Hobbing, 1925, 54 pp.
Figures published by the Statistical Office to illustrate the course of the mark, the wholesale and retail prices, salaries, etc.

DIE DAWESGESETZE. DEUTSCHLANDS WIRTSCHAFTLICHE VERSKLAVUNG. By W. D. Preyer. Berlin: Stilke, 1925, 62 pp. M. 1.60.
An extremely hostile attack on the Dawes Plan.

FINANZ UND WIRTSCHAFTENTWICKLUNG DEUTSCHLANDS 1921–1925. By Hermann Bücher. Berlin: Heymann, 1925, 203 pp.
Speeches on reparations, the Dawes plan, the Rentenbank, etc., by the influential ex-president of the "Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie."

HANDEL DEUTSCHLANDS IN DEN JAHREN 1923 UND 1924. Berlin: Hobbing, 1925, Hefte I, IV and VI, 119, 54, 168 pp. M. 6.75, 3, 9.
The foreign trade of Germany in 1923 and 1924 as compared with 1913 and 1922.

DAS NEUE DEUTSCHLAND IN DER WELTPOLITIK UND WELTWIRTSCHAFT. By August Schmidt. Berlin: Hobbing, 429 pp. M. 15.
An interesting discussion of the leading economic problems of the day.

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DEUTSCHLANDS WELTPOLITISCHE ZUKUNFT. By Paul Göhre. Berlin: Vowinckel, 1925, 176 pp. M. 4.50.

A plea for Germany's entrance into the League, as the most effective way for Germany to regain her position. The author is a former Prussian minister.

DIE DEUTSCHEN GRENZLANDE. By Max H. Boehm. Berlin: Hobbing, 1925, 294 pp. M. 14.

A study of the German borderlands, by the author of "Europa Irredenta."

RHEINKAMPF. By Paul Wenzcke. Berlin: Vowinckel, 1925, 2 volumes, 337, 267 pp. M. 20.

Volume two is a substantial account of the problem of the Rhine since 1919.

DIE VERTRÄGE ÜBER BESETZUNG UND RÄUMUNG DES RHEINLANDES. By Werner Vogels. Berlin: Heymann, 1925, 398 pp. M. 14.

A valuable collection of documents and ordinances of the Rhineland Commission.

PFALZFRAGE UND WELTPOLITIK. By Wilhelm Marx, Maximilian Pfeiffer und Hermann Oncken. Heidelberg: Thoma, 1925, 64 pp.

A series of essays by competent writers on various aspects of the Franco-German rivalry in the Rhineland.

NATIONALITÄT UND VOLKSWILLE IM PREUSSISCHEN OSTEN. By Manfred Laubert. Breslau: Hirt, 1925, 72 pp. M. 2.50.

An investigation of ethnographic, political and other conditions on the eastern frontier.

DEUTSCHLAND BRAUCHT KOLONIEN! Edited by R. von Zastrow and Eduard Dannert. Berlin: Verlag Deutsche Volksgemeinschaft, 1925, 48 pp. M. 2.

A coöperative appeal for colonies, by men like Schnee, Seitz and Solf.

OESTERREICHSICHE REGIERUNG UND VERWALTUNG IM WELTKRIEGE By Joseph Redlich. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925, 302 pp.

A splendid volume in the Carnegie series. Really the best existing treatment of the Austrian system since 1867.

DIE OESTERREICHISCH-UNGARISCHE KRIEGSMARINE VOR UND IM WELTKRIEGE. By Peter Handel-Mazzetti. Klagenfurt: Roschnar, 1925, 127 pp. Schilling 28.

A very satisfactory brief sketch of the Austrian navy.

ERLEBNISSE UND ERFAHRUNGEN NACH DEM KRIEGE. By Graf Josef Mailáth. Budapest: Benko, 1925, 328 pp. M. 10.

Volume three of the Hungarian statesman's memoirs, dealing with the Karolyi and Kun régimes, and the Rumanian occupation.

UNGARISCHES WIRTSCHAFTS-JAHRBUCH. Edited by Gustav Gratz. Volume I, Berlin: Hobbing, 1925, 274 pp. M. 12.

Contains valuable articles on all aspects of Hungary's economic condition.

DIE WIRTSCHAFTSKRISE IN MITTELEUROPA. By Arpád Török. Novivrbas: Pleesz, 1925, 99 pp. Schilling 2.50.

The economic situation in the Danubian countries described from the Magyar viewpoint.

DIE HANDELSPOLITIK IN MITTELEUROPA. By Elemér Hantos. Jena: Fischer, 1925, 111 pp. M. 7.50.

An indictment of the existing methods of exclusion.

DER TERROR GEGEN DIE SOZIALISTISCHEN PARTEIEN IN RUSSLAND UND GEORGIEN. By R. Abramowitsch. Berlin: Dietz, 1925, 134 pp. M. 2.50.

Contains interesting contributions by some of the socialist leaders.

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DIE INTERNATIONALE UND SOWJET RUSSLAND. By Karl Kautsky. Berlin: Dietz, 1925, 62 pp. M. 75.

The German socialist calls for a new crusade against absolutism in the shape of Bolshevism, but deprecates the use of force.

GRUNDLAGEN DER RUSSISCHEN SCHWERINDUSTRIE. By Sergius von Bubnoff. Berlin: Sack, 1925, 69 pp. M. 2.30.

A careful outline of Russia's resources and of the present condition of industry.

THE NEW BALTIC STATES AND THEIR FUTURE. By Owen Rutter. London: Methuen, 1925. 15/.

A survey written primarily from the geographical standpoint.

THE FINANCES OF POLAND, 1924–1925. By George Zdziechowski. London: Published by the Polish Government, 1925, 172 pp.

Practically an official statement, written by the chairman of the budget committee of the Polish Sejm.

POLAND'S ACCESS TO THE SEA. By Stanislaw Slawski. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1925.

Essentially an official restatement of the Polish position, by a member of the Danzig Harbor Board.

MNIEJSZOSCI W NAJNOWSZEM PRAWIE MIEDZYNARODOWEM. By Stanislao Kutrzeba. Leopoli, 1925, 132 pp.

A treatment of the minority question, especially in Poland, by a professor at the University of Cracow.

LA POLITIQUE DE DÉFLATION EN TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE. By G. Georges-Picot. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1925, 90 pp. Fr. 6.

A scholarly presentation of the history and effects of the policy.

EN ESPAGNE SOUS LA DICTATURE. By Pierre Daye. Paris: Éditions Gauloises, 1925.

A reprint of articles in the Brussels *Soir*.

RÉPLICA AL CONDE DE ROMANONES SOBRE LAS RESPONSABILIDADES DEL ANTIGUO RÉGIMEN. By Un Español Neutral. Madrid: Volundad, 1925, 503 pp. Pesetas 6.

A detailed, able reply to the attacks of the liberal leader.

RENDEZVOUS ESPAGNOLS. By Jérôme and Jean Tharaud. Paris: Plon, 1925.

The well-known politico-novelists reach Spain.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS. By Viscount Grey of Falloden. New York: Stokes, 1925, 2 volumes, 331, 353 pp. $10.00.

An honest but unimpressive account of his policy, by the former British Foreign Minister.

ENGLAND, DEUTSCHE FLOTTE UND WELTKRIEG. By Karl Galster. Kiel: Scheibel, 1925, 200 pp. M. 5.

A sane reconsideration of the German naval policy as it affected German relations with England.

FROM ADAM SMITH TO PHILIP SNOWDEN. By F. W. Hurst. London: Unwin, 1925, 96 pp. 2/6d.

A sympathetic outline of the history of free trade in Great Britain.

SHELTERED MARKETS. By F. L. McDougall. London: Murray, 1925, 148 pp. 5/.

An able discussion of the value of Empire trade and preference.

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THE PROBLEM OF DEFENCE. By Sir George Aston. London: Allen, 1925, 180 pp. 3/6d.

An interesting discussion by a competent critic, particularly valuable on the problem of Singapore.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE. By Albert Demangeon. New York: Harcourt, 1925, 298 pp. $2.50.

A translation of an important book by a professor at the Sorbonne.

ANGLO-SAXON UNITY. By C. A. Brooke-Cunningham. London: Selwyn and Blount, 1925, 306 pp. 10/6d.

Four essays of little value, by a race purist.

AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT. By Edward Sweetman. London: Macmillan, 1925. 25/.

An excellent scholarly treatment.

BEYOND KHYBER PASS. By Lowell Jackson Thomas. New York: Century, 1925, 272 pp. $4.00.

Journalistic observations on conditions in Afghanistan.

A NATION IN THE MAKING. By Sir Surendranath Banerjea. New York: Oxford University Press, 1925, 435 pp. $6.50.

A sane history of Indian development in the last half century, by a man long active in public life.

The Near East

DER KAMPF DER SÜDSLAWEN UM FREIHEIT UND EINHEIT. By Hermann Wendel. Frankfurt: Frankfurter Societätsdruckerei, 1925, 798 pp. M. 13.50.

The most pretentious and detailed account of the Southern Slav movement yet published.

MONTENEGRO. LE CRIME DE LA CONFERENCE DE LA PAIX. By Whitney Warren. Paris: Édition Atar, 1925.

A severe indictment of the treatment accorded the Montenegrin Jugoslavs at the Peace Conference, by d'Annunzio's former New York representative.

L'INTERVENTO DELLA GRECIA NELLA GUERRA MONDIALE E L'OPERA DELLA DIPLOMAZIA ALLEATA. By Mario Caracciolo. Rome: Maglione, 1925, 254 pp.

A valuable and thoroughly documented contribution to the history of Allied diplomacy during the war.

LA LIQUIDATION FINANCIÈRE DE LA GUERRE EN BULGARIE. By Henri Prost. Paris: Marcel Giard, 1925.

An authoritative treatise, by the sub-director of the *Banque Balkanique* at Sofia.

ROUMANIA AND BESSARABIA. By C. Rakovsky. London: Coates, 1925, 64 pp. 1/.

A restatement of the Russian claims, by the Soviet Ambassador in London.

Africa

LE PEUPLE MAROCAIN. LE BLOC BERBÈRE. By Victor Piquet. Paris: Larose, 1925, 320 pp. Fr. 12.

An important ethnographical contribution.

POR CEUTA, TETUÁN Y TÁNGER. By Julio del Carpio. Madrid: Nieto, 1925, 101 pp. Pesetas 3.

Experiences with the Spanish troops in North Africa.

DER KAMPF UM MAROKKO. By Albrecht Wirth. Munich: Einhorn, 1925, 204 pp. M. 5.50.

A useful recapitulation of the Moroccan question.

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DIE TANGER FRAGE. By Kurt Fritz von Graevenitz. Berlin: Dümmler, 1925, 85 pp. M. 3.50.

An able examination of the Tangier problem as an international question.

IL GOVERNO FASCISTA NELLE COLONIE. Milan: Ghidoni, 1925, 43 pp.

A severe criticism of the Fascist government in Somaliland, Eritrea and Libya.

The Far East

THE REMAKING OF THE NATIONS. By J. H. Nicholson. New York: Dutton, 1925, 276 pp. $5.00.

Original and suggestive lectures on the interaction of Western and Eastern culture.

WEST OF THE PACIFIC. By Ellsworth Huntington. New York: Scribner, 1925, 453 pp. $4.50.

Valuable observations in the Far East by a well-known geographer and anthropologist.

FROM MELBOURNE TO MOSCOW. By G. C. Dixon. Boston: Little, Brown, 1925, 319 pp. $4.00.

Interesting experiences of an Australian journalist.

CHINA'S CASE. London: Union of Chinese Associations, 1925.

Contains stimulating articles by a group of professors at the University of Peking.

CHINA UND SEIN WELTPROGRAMM. By Shen Yi and Heinrich Stadelmann. Dresden: Gutewort, 1925, 163 pp. M. 7.

The program of the liberal group.

Latin America

POR LA ESPAÑA GRANDE. By Máximo Vergara. Madrid: Reus, 1925, 250 pp. Pesetas 6.

A good exposition of the Pan-Hispanic argument.

JURISPRUDENCIA Y CRÍTICA DE LA DOCTRINA DE LA CASACIÓN VENEZOLANA. By G. M. Pacanius. Caracas: Litografía del Comercio, 1925, 596 pp.

An exhaustive treatment of Venezuelan financial policy from 1876 to 1923.

EL DERECHO DE SOBERANÍA SOBRE LA ISLA DE PINOS. By Carlos A. Vasseur. Panama: Star and Herald, 1925, 43 pp.

A good outline of the Isle of Pines question, now at last settled, by the Cuban envoy in Panama.

Miscellaneous

JUDEN UND JUDENTUM VON HEUTE. By Jonas Kreppel. Zürich: Amalthea, 1925, 891 pp. M. 25.

A ponderous statistical and demographic work dealing with the situation of the Jews before, during and since the war, with special reference to Eastern Europe and Palestine. The author is a Zionist.

MODERN IMMIGRATION. By Annie M. MacLean. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1925, 405 pp. $3.00.

A first-rate examination of the immigration question in the United States, Latin America and the British Empire.

DIE ORGANISATIONSFORMEN DES WELTFUNKVERKEHRS. By Fritz Beckmann. Bonn: Marcus and Weber, 1925, 166 pp. M. 8.50.

An original discussion of radio as an international problem.

POLITISCHE GEOGRAPHIE. By Otto Maull. Berlin: Borntraeger, 1925, 743 pp. M. 36.

A standard work of modern anthropogeography.

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ARBITRATION, SECURITY, DISARMAMENT

ARBITRATION, Security and Reduction of Armaments. Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. [Replies of Governments.] (League of Nations, A. 25. 1925. IX.) $.20.

PROTOCOL for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. Correspondence relating to the position of the Dominions. London, 1925. 27 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 2458.) 6d.

ARMS AND AMMUNITION, TRADE

CONFERENCE for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of war. Convention [etc.] signed at Geneva, June 17, 1925. 68 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 16. 1925. IX.)

PROCEEDINGS of the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War. (Geneva, May 4th to June 17th, 1925.) 799 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 13. 1925. IX.)

AUSTRIA

THE ECONOMIC Situation of Austria. Report presented to the Council of the League of Nations by W. T. Layton, C. H., and Charles Rist. 213 p. 25 cm. (C.440 (1). M (1). 162. 1925. II.). $1.50.

CANADA — UNITED STATES

TREATY between the United States and Great Britain in respect of Canada. Boundary between the United States and Canada. Signed at Washington, February 24, 1925. Washington, 1925. 6 p. 23½ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 720.)

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